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ABSTRACT 
The thesis explores the possibilities of extending the Constitutional guarantee of 
equality into the sphere of personal laws in Bangladesh. It examines the validity of 
the arguments generally put forward against the applicability of equality guarantee in 
the sphere of personal laws with a view to exploring grounds for challenging such 
arguments. 
In Bangladesh the Constitution affords the right to equality to every citizen but the 
actual experience and status of women, as determined by personal laws is that of 
inequality, subordination and disadvantage. The study maintains that the existing 
division of the legal system into "public" and "private" in the form of "general" and 
"personal" serves as a device to exclude women from the protection of the 
Constitution and leaves the personal sphere to be regulated by the discriminatory 
religious laws. This has profound implications for women's right as the religious 
laws as understood and applied in Bangladesh deny women equal rights within the 
family and contribute to their subordination and disadvantage in the society. The 
thesis therefore, addresses this dichotomy and its present feminist critique with a 
view to considering its relevance and application in the legal context of Bangladesh, 
that is, in the form of the general-personal law, weighing the arguments in the light 
of feminist critique with a view to extending an "equality-approach" into the 
personal sphere. 
The thesis aims to illustrate conventional legal wisdom regarding the scope of the 
equality principle and support its application in the sphere of personal laws through 
progressive interpretation. To this end, the thesis explores and compares the concepts 
of equality as they have taken specific and varied juridic form in different countries 
with a view to assessing what form gender equality could effectively take in the 
context of Bangladesh. In doing so, the research reviews feminist literature covering 
theories and debates related to issues such as essentialism, formal versus substantive 
equality, equality and Islam etc. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PERSONAL LAWS OF BANGLADESH: A GENDER STUDY IN LIGHT OF 
THE EQUALITY-APPROACH OF THE CONSTITUTION 
1. Introduction 
The object of this research is to explore the dichotomy between "general" and 
"personal" laws in the legal system of Bangladesh and to examine the arguments 
marshalled against the applicability of the equality principles of the Constitution in 
the sphere of personal laws. The research aims to explore grounds for challenging 
such arguments. 
The legal system of Bangladesh consists of the general law and the family laws 
(hereinafter referred to as "personal laws") of the religious communities. While the 
general law including the penal law and some areas of the civil law (laws governing 
personal obligations such as laws of contracts and torts) is secular and common for 
all citizens, Personal laws are different for different religious communities. Personal 
laws in Bangladesh as modified by statutes and case law govern various areas of 
I 
family law including marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance, guardianship, and 
custody of children. A close scrutiny of personal laws shows that these laws not only 
discriminate against women but also significantly contribute to their social and 
economic disadvantage, obstruct their participation in the public life and perpetuate 
their subordination within the family and the society. 
On the other hand, the Constitution of Bangladesh which is the supreme law of the 
land, guarantees equal status and rights to all citizens, irrespective of their religion, 
race, caste or sex. In addition, Bangladesh has also undertaken to ensure women's 
equal rights and to end all forms of gender discrimination by participating in a 
number of international human rights treaties'. Nevertheless, these equality 
guarantees have traditionally been perceived by the state as inapplicable to the 
sphere of religious personal laws hence, arguably in violation of the constitutional 
guarantee of equality and international obligation, discriminatory personal laws 
continue to regulate the legal relationships in the personal sphere. 
2. Arguments for and against the applicability of the equality guarantee in the 
sphere of personal laws 
As has been discussed above, despite the constitutional guarantee of equality, the 
legal system of Bangladesh has continued to leave scope for the application of 
discriminatory personal laws. The reason behind this is the general belief that the 
scope of the Constitutional guarantee of equality does not extend to the sphere of 
personal laws. In this regard, arguments commonly placed are as follows: 
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Since subsection 2 of Article 28 of the Constitution which contains the equality 
guarantee gives women equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and public 
life, hence it is argued that its application is limited to the "public sphere" only and 
does not apply in the private sphere where discriminatory religious personal laws 
operate. It is also argued that the Constitutional provision of equality is balanced by 
the countervailing constitutional provision (Article 41 (1)) on "freedom of religion" 
which affords every religious community the right to establish, manage and maintain 
their respective religious institutions. The argument is that to interfere with the 
personal laws may be interpreted as undermining the right to practice and maintain 
religion. Equality is supposedly a western value and when equality and freedom of 
religion seem to be in conflict, there is no consensus that equality should have 
preference. Moreover, pursuant to amendments2 to the Constitution, it is now argued 
that the Directive Principles of the Constitution should be understood to give 
preference to the religion observed by the majority of population, which is Islam. 3 
This shift away from secularism to "Islamisation" has also contributed to a climate in 
which the discriminatory personal laws are legitimised and practiced in Bangladesh. 
1 Bangladesh has acceded to UN Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
- The Constitution has been amended several times having the effect of altering its secular 
characteristics. An amendment in 1977 removed the principle of secularism (which was one of 
the "four pillars" of the Constitution) that had been enshrined in Article 8 under Part II of the 
Constitution, replacing it with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah. " In 1988, the Eighth 
Amendment affirmed that "[t]he state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religions may 
be practised in peace and harmony in the republic". 
s Some women's groups challenged the Eighth Amendment on the ground that it is inconsistent 
with the spirit of the Constitution and United Nations Conventions. They argued that this 
amendment will strengthen the authority of the religious fundamentalist groups which will in 
turn operate against the interest of women by exposing them even more to discriminatory laws 
and practices. For details see S Alam `State-Religion in Bangladesh: A Critique of the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution' (1991) 4 South Asia Journal 3, pp. 313-334. 
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It is argued that an equality-based and secular personal law regime applicable to all 
citizens is contrary to the values and ideals of an Islamic state. 
The thesis maintains that the existing division of the legal system into "public" and 
"private" in the form of "general" and "personal" serves as a device to exclude 
women from the equality guarantee of the Constitution through discriminatory 
personal laws. It argues that the equality guarantee of the Constitution should clearly 
apply to all spheres including the sphere of personal laws. To this end, the research 
examines the validity of the arguments generally put forward against the 
applicability of equality guarantee in the sphere of personal laws with a view to 
exploring grounds for challenging such arguments. The research also explores 
concepts of equality as they have taken specific and varied juridic form in different 
countries with a view to assessing what form gender equality could effectively take 
in the context of Bangladesh. 
3. Methodology 
This thesis endeavours to combine a formal legal approach to the interpretation and 
application of the equality provisions of the Bangladesh Constitution with a feminist 
perspective on the scope and limits of the equality principle in order to analyse the 
extent to which those principles can and do operate within the existing legal 
framework of Bangladesh. The research employs theories of constitutional 
interpretation as developed by classical jurists as well as Bangladeshi case law to 
explore the meaning and scope of the equality provisions as they currently operate. 
The thesis goes on to invoke a woman-centred approach to comprehensively critique 
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various provisions of Bangladeshi personal laws, focusing on their impact on 
women. The object is to highlight both the explicit discrimination and consequent 
patterns of gender-based disadvantage with a view to developing an argument for 
their reform. To this end the research draws on materials focusing on the socio-legal 
impact of personal laws on women and evidencing the disadvantage they cause 
women in Bangladesh. These materials include published doctoral researches 
undertaken by socio-legal scholars on women's socio-legal status and the impact of 
discriminatory personal laws, reports published by various government, non- 
government and international organisations, official data etc. 
Feminist critiques of the "public/private" dichotomy are deployed to topple some of 
the arguments generally marshalled against the applicability of the equality 
guarantee to the personal sphere. Particular research objectives here include: 
i) identifying the role and ideological effect of the public/personal (parallel to 
the public/private) dichotomy in positioning women within the legal system; 
ii) exploring the shifting strands of this dichotomy and using feminist critiques 
to question the coherence and sustainability of the public/personal 
dichotomy; and 
iii) analysing and deconstructing the apparent conflict between freedom of 
religion and gender equality with a view to challenging their alleged 
incompatibility in the context of Bangladesh. 
The thesis also draws on feminist deconstruction methods to explore the range of 
meanings, scope and possibilities of the concept of equality with a view to finding a 
more viable strategic position for women in parallel with the values and cultural 
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norms of the Bangladeshi society. In doing so, the research considers feminist 
literature and debates surrounding issues such as gender essentialism, critical race 
feminism, formal versus substantive equality, equality and Islam. 
Another dimension to this research is comparative. Specifically, the thesis employs 
comparative legal methodology to make a cross-national comparison of how the 
concept of equality is translated into norms in jurisdictions that provide a 
constitutional guarantee of gender equality. To this end the research looks at four 
different jurisdictions, comprising two non-Islamic countries namely Canada, South 
Africa and two Islamic countries-- Tunisia and Morocco. The research looks at 
Canada and South Africa to trace the development of substantive equality analysis in 
these two jurisdictions. The research then looks at Tunisia and Morocco, to trace the 
different reform approaches to personal status laws in these two Muslim countries 
and examine what kind of equality is emerging. The object is to explore the 
possibilities these jurisdictions offer in initiating gender equality-based reforms in 
Bangladesh. 
In the course of the present research, the benefits of such a cross-national 
comparative approach are as follows: 
By bringing together different backgrounds and by comparing and evaluating a 
variety of conceptual approaches, valuable experience and knowledge of different 
intellectual traditions and contributions can be obtained. 4 In the course of the present 
research, this approach is particularly useful because it helps the exploration of 
°L Hantrais and S Mangen (eds) Cross- National Research Methods in the Social Sciences 
(London: Pinter, 1996). 
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various conceptual developments in equality analysis in countries such as Canada 
and South Africa in the form of substantive equality which focuses on disadvantage 
and thus breaks away from the narrow confines of formal equality focusing on 
similarity and difference. This highlights new possibilities for equality both as a 
norm and as a strategic goal. 
According to Hentrais, comparisons can lead to fresh insights and a deeper 
understanding of issues that are of central concern in different countries. They can 
lead to the identification of gaps in knowledge and may point to possible directions 
that could be followed and they may also help to sharpen the focus of analysis of the 
subject under study by suggesting new perspectives. 5 In particular, a comparative 
approach is useful in informing strategies to initiate reforms of religious-based 
personal laws in Bangladesh where current personal laws arguably undermine the 
right to gender equality guaranteed by the state's constitution. To initiate reforms of 
personal laws in a Muslim society such as Bangladesh, it is politically imperative 
that these reforms are in accord with the socio-cultural values of that society. Seen 
from this perspective, it becomes important to compare approaches and policies that 
have proved effective in other similar contexts such as Tunisia and Morocco so that 
strategies can be developed to initiate necessary reforms to religious personal laws in 
Bangladesh. In the context of the present research, the comparative approach 
becomes particularly valuable in understanding the familial ideologies prevalent in 
various Islamic and non-Islamic societies and in identifying similarities and 
differences between them. This exercise in turn helps us to reconsider the values and 
5 See generally, Ibid. p. 10. 
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practices embedded in the socio cultural norms of our society and find a solution in 
accord with these values. 
Although the benefits of successful cross-national comparisons may be considerable, 
so are the limitations. Since the research involves comparison, it therefore invariably 
encounters all the dilemmas associated with comparison. One such dilemma is the 
ethnocentrism inherent in a comparative approach. The problem of ethnocentrism is 
a familiar one in feminist legal scholarship. As Cossman points out, in the context of 
feminist legal research, the dilemma of ethnocentrism is associated with the problem 
of unstated norms against which difference is viewed and judged. This is because the 
unstated norms of feminist theories and practices have long been the subject of 
criticism from both inside the West - by women whose lives do not accord with these 
norms (because they are arguably based on a white, middle-class, heterosexual 
female identity) and from outside - by those who view it as representing Western 
values and therefore utterly devoid of cultural legitimacy in non-Western contexts. 8 
For example, the strategic value of equality in non-white/non-western contexts has 
been questioned when equality is invoked as sameness and operates normatively to 
affirm and promote western values and lifestyles. The concern is that equality cannot 
accommodate the needs and aspirations of women from different social, cultural, and 
geographical backgrounds. 
6B Cossman ̀ Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and 
the Postcolonial Project' in AK Wing (ed) Global Critical Race Feminism: An International 
Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2000). 
7 Joanne Conaghan identifies some common and recurring features of feminist academic 
engagement with law: "Firstly, feminist legal scholars seek to highlight and explore the gendered 
content of law and to probe charaterisations posing themselves as neutral and, more specifically, 
ungendered. Secondly, they are part of a cross-disciplinary feminist effort to challenge traditional 
understandings of the social, legal, cultural and epistemological order by placing women, their 
individual and shared experiences, at the centre of their scholarship. Thirdly, feminist legal 
scholars seek to track and expose law's implication in women's disadvantage with a view to 
bringing about transformative social and political change. " For details, see J Conaghan 
`Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law' (2000) 27 JLaw and Society 351, pp. 357- 
374. 
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Cossman observes in this regard that in the specific context of comparative law's 
encounter with feminism there may be different ways of negotiating the ethnocentric 
gaze of comparative law without falling into the trap of cultural relativism which 
may result in discarding the very project of comparison or "looking beyond". One 
such way is strategic intervention or "turning the gaze back on itself'9. As she 
explains, strategic intervention in the form of "turning the gaze back on itself' can 
help to displace the Anglo-American centre of feminist legal studies and help to 
defend the feminist emancipatory project against those who would deny its cultural 
legitimacy and authenticity. 10 This is because strategic intervention can help multiply 
the norms, perspectives, and frames of reference in and through which feminist legal 
studies is constructed. 11 For example, in the context of family laws, the analysis of 
feminist engagement with law in Bangladesh can become a stated norm against 
which the familial ideologies and assumptions of Western feminist legal studies can 
be viewed, judged and potentially, rethought. Through the process of turning the 
gaze back on itself, feminist legal studies can thus be rendered "more complex, more 
global, more local, more transnational". 12 It is a process in which the unstated norms 
and frames of reference of Anglo-American feminist legal studies are "stated and 
8 B. Cossman, n6 above. 
9 According to Cossman, one of the dilemmas of comparative law is its ethnocentric gaze or 
looking when the gaze is not returned. If this gaze is considered inescapable or inherent in 
comparative law, then some might be tempted to abandon the project of looking beyond or 
comparing. Cossman argues that if the danger lies in a gaze that is not returned, then we should 





revealed on the one hand and challenged as contingent, temporal, and partial on the 
other". 
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4. Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1: Personal laws of Bangladesh-the Legal Framework 
This Chapter introduces the problem of the "general/public", "personal/private" 
division of the legal system and its implications for women in the context of 
Bangladesh. The Chapter begins by outlining the existing legal framework of 
Bangladesh and locating the personal laws therein. After briefly discussing the 
history, promises, spirit, and aspirations of the Bangladesh Constitution towards 
equality, social justice and secularism, the Chapter considers the scope and 
applicability of its equality provisions. In doing so the Chapter examines the existing 
rules/principles of judicial interpretation of the constitutional provisions as 
developed by case law in Bangladesh. The aim of the discussion is to illustrate 
conventional legal wisdom regarding the scope of the equality principle and support 
its application in the sphere of personal laws through progressive interpretation. 
Chapter II: Personal laws and Their Impact on Women 
The focus of this Chapter is on the discriminatory aspects of the personal laws. As 
the areas covered by various religious personal laws operated in Bangladesh are too 
vast to have exhaustive citation and discussion, the discussion in this Chapter makes 
a comprehensive exposition of provisions of the religious law that governs the lives 
of the majority of women in Bangladesh (i. e. Islamic law as incorporated in the 
13 According to Cossman, in breaking the here/there, us/them cultural binaries and revealing the 
hybridity of culture, we can begin to disrupt the very assumptions on which claims of feminism's 
cultural inauthenticity are based. And in its place, we can defend not feminism's authenticity but 
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religious texts and legislation) specially focusing on explicit points of discrimination. 
Special attention is given to their practical application in the courts. In addition, the 
Chapter also assesses how far these discriminatory laws contribute to women's 
disadvantage. While doing so the Chapter reviews collection of statistics and reports 
published by different national, international and private bodies documenting the 
socio-legal and economic status of women in Bangladesh. Particular focus is given 
to issues such as discrimination in family and public life, women in development, 
and the obligations of the state under international law. 
Chapter III: Public/Private Dichotomy and the Personal laws 
This Chapter addresses the public-private dichotomy and its present feminist critique 
with a view to considering its relevance and application in the legal context of 
Bangladesh, that is, in the form of the general-personal law dichotomy, weighing the 
arguments in the light of feminist critique with a view to extending an equality 
approach into the personal sphere. In this Chapter, the conventional line of 
demarcation between general and personal is challenged by putting forward 
arguments highlighting their contradictory and shifting strands. In this regard, the 
Chapter looks at various feminist debates and critiques regarding the public/private 
dichotomy and examines their relevance in the legal system of Bangladesh. In the 
light of existing feminist arguments, the study proposes that in order to ensure equal 
rights of women in the public sphere as envisaged in the Constitution, the state has 
effectively to ensure equal rights in the private sphere as well. 
Chapter IV: The Prospects of Equality and the Religious Personal Laws 
simply its political legitimacy and relevance in the analysis of contemporary gender relations. 
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This Chapter explores the range of meanings and possibilities of equality. In doing 
so, the research reviews feminist literature covering theories and debates related to 
issues such as essentialism, formal versus substantive equality, equality and Islam. 
The main object of the Chapter is to highlight the contingency of particular 
arguments asserting the incompatibility of gender equality and Islam, drawing on 
feminist (re)interpretations of key Islamic texts and precepts. The discussion reveals 
that different versions of Islamic doctrine abound alongside varied approaches to the 
articulation and realisation of equality. This lays the ground for further probing of 
equality jurisprudence in the latter section of the thesis. 
Chapter V: Equality: The Canadian Experience 
In attempting to think strategically and critically about our engagement with 
equality, Chapters V, VI and VII of the thesis look at feminist engagement with 
equality in different jurisdictions providing constitutional guarantees of gender 
equality. In so doing, the research undertakes case studies of four different 
jurisdictions, namely, Canada, South Africa, Tunisia and Morocco, to see how 
equality has been applied as a strategic and normative goal and what form of equality 
is emerging in these jurisdictions. To this end Chapter V looks at the equality 
jurisprudence developed in Canada especially focusing on the development of 
grounds-based analysis and the debates associated with it. The reasons behind 
choosing Canada in this regard are twofold. Firstly, the pluralist and multicultural 
society in Canada, because of its complexities and socio-cultural undercurrents, 
provides fertile ground for the development of a more dynamic understanding of 
equality. Secondly, feminist scholarship in relation to equality jurisprudence in 
See ibid. 
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Canada, although not without its limitations and setbacks, has developed 
considerably (through some progressive court decisions) during the last few decades 
due to the strong presence of women's groups, pioneering a substantive equality 
approach. 
Chapter VI: Equality: the South African Experience 
Chapter VI traces the equality jurisprudence developed in South Africa. The Chapter 
looks at the interpretation of the equality principle developed by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa especially focusing on the transformative approach of the 
interpretation and its impact on equality analysis. The Chapter looks particularly at 
concepts such as human dignity as a strategy and normative goal and its relationship 
with substantive equality, as well as living customary law and the debates related to 
them. The object is to highlight ways in which South Africa has approached 
difficulties in the application of the equality principle which have parallels in a 
Bangladeshi context. 
Chapter VII: Personal Status Laws in Tunisia and Morocco 
The object of this Chapter is to challenge the commonly held view in some part of 
the Islamic world that religious-based personal laws are sacred and therefore not 
amenable to reforms and changes. The Chapter begins by tracing the reforms in the 
sphere of personal laws in Tunisia and Morocco with a view to exploring their 
prospects in contributing towards an equality-based reform approach in Bangladesh. 
It is argued that the recent landmark reforms to family law in Morocco demonstrate 
that it is possible to achieve "women-friendly" reforms within an Islamic legal 
framework. On the other hand, the Tunisian Personal Status Code with its successive 
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reforms shows that a secular and gender equality-based model of personal law can 
also be successfully integrated into the way of life of a Muslim society. This 
highlights among other things the range of responses of Muslim societies to equality- 
based reform and the particular differences in approach in initiating them. This 
Chapter attempts to map these different and sometimes competitive approaches and 
locate them within contemporary feminist debates related to gender equality 
discourse in the East and the West. 
Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
Drawing on the findings of Chapters II, III, IV, V, VI and VII this Chapter explores 
the possibilities of equality based reforms to religious personal laws in Bangladesh. 
It concludes that there is scope to interpret the Constitutional guarantee of equality 
(enshrined in Article 28 of the Constitution) through progressive interpretation 
established and indicated in various cases in Bangladesh to extend it in the sphere of 
religious personal laws. Drawing from the experiences in other jurisdictions (i. e. 
South Africa and Canada) and from the debates, arguments and critiques put forward 
in feminist legal literature on equality (discussed in Chapter IV, V and VI), the thesis 
further concludes that there is scope to interpret the equality guarantee to embrace a 
"substantive approach" to equality. In this regard, the thesis draws attention a recent 
case14 (discussed in Chapter IV) where "substantive equality" argument was put 
forward by the petitioners to interpret the equality guarantee of the Constitution. 
Unfortunately the Court in this case is in the process of writing the judgment at the 
time of submission of this thesis. As such it is not yet known how far the Court has 
endorsed the argument of substantive equality. It is needless to mention that the 
14 Shamima Sultana Seema and Ors v Bangladesh and ors WP No. 3304/2003 (unreported). 
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judgment if endorses this argument, will strengthen the argument put forward in the 
thesis in relation to the scope of the Constitution of Bangladesh to embrace a 
substantive approach to equality. Drawing from feminist critiques focusing in the 
area of public/private dichotomy (discussed in Chapter III) the thesis further 
concludes that to fulfil its Constitutional obligation to ensure gender equality in the 
public sphere, it is imperative that the state should ensure gender equality in the 
private sphere (i. e. the sphere of religious personal laws) as well. While the thesis 
concludes that the Constitutional guarantee of equality, if progressively interpreted 
calls for a unified personal law regime in line with the equality guarantee of the 
Constitution, it however, accepts that the current socio-political situation in 
Bangladesh may render it difficult to achieve it presently. The thesis in this regard 
concludes that while the ultimate goal is to achieve a uniform personal law regime 
informed by the concept of "substantive equality", there are different strategies that 
can be pursued at present to further the same goal. One such strategy can be to 
reform the personal laws through progressive interpretations of the religious sources, 
side by side facilitating feminist reinterpretation of religious texts. In this regard, the 
thesis concludes that reforms introduced in Tunisia and especially in Morocco 
(which explicitly took a reform approach consistent with the values and spirit of 
Islam) in various areas of family laws such as divorce, polygamy and custody of 
children (discussed in Chapter VII) can serve as examples to be followed to reform 
the relevant provisions of Islamic law in Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER I 
PERSONAL LAWS IN BANGLADESH-THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
I. Introduction 
One of the distinctive features of the legal system of Bangladesh is that, there is a 
clear division between the general law of the land and the family laws (hereinafter 
referred to as "personal laws") on the basis of affiliation with religion and how they 
apply. On the one hand, there is general law of the land which is secular and 
commonly applied to all citizens. This includes the Constitution, penal law and some 
areas of civil law such as, law of personal obligations (contract law, tort law), labour 
law etc. On the other hand, there are personal laws based on religions which are 
different for different religious communities. The religious personal laws determine 
rights relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance, guardianship and 
custody. The major three religious-based personal laws in the country are Muslim 
law, Hindu law and the Christian law. In Bangladesh, women's rights under personal 
laws have given rise to a considerable amount of contention and debate. The crux of 
the debate, as explained in the introduction, is associated with the argument that 
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personal laws do not subscribe to the principle of gender equality, which is granted 
by the Constitution of the country as well as by the international treaties to which the 
country is a party. 
In Bangladesh, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and operates as a 
benchmark or yardstick for determining the validity of all other laws in the land'. 
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equal status and rights to all citizens, 
irrespective of his or her religion, race, caste or sex'. But despite this guarantee, the 
right to gender equality have traditionally been considered inapplicable to the sphere 
of personal laws and hence, arguably in violation of the constitutional guarantee of 
equality, discriminatory personal laws continue to regulate the legal relations in the 
families. 
The Chapter begins with an overview of the legal system of Bangladesh. It specially 
focuses on the relevant constitutional provisions regarding gender equality, their 
scope and limits and the rules regarding their interpretation. While doing so, the 
Chapter highlights and discusses some of the commonly held arguments for 
protecting religious personal laws from the scrutiny of the Constitution. The Chapter 
then outlines the obligations of the state under international law with regard to 
gender equality and examines various policies undertaken by the Government to 
improve the socio-economic and legal status of women. It then proceeds to discuss 
briefly the statutory regime relevant to the personal laws. While doing so, the 
Chapter locates the division between the general law and the personal laws in the 
context of the legal history of the Indian Subcontinent. 
1 Article 26 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
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2. Personal laws and the Constitution 
a) Rights of women under the Constitution 
To understand the status of the religious personal laws in the legal system of 
Bangladesh, it is necessary to discuss some of the salient features of the Constitution 
embodying the intention and obligation of the state regarding gender equality. 
The Constitution of Bangladesh came into existence in 1972 after a series of 
movements and struggle leading to a nine months' war of independence in 1971. The 
key slogans of the independence movement were secularism, social justice and 
freedom from discrimination in all forms. The Constitution of Bangladesh was 
adopted on 4 November 1972 and it came into force on 16 December 1972, one year 
after independence from Pakistan. The Constitution came into existence at the cost 
of lives of millions of men and women. Side by side with the men, the women of 
Bangladesh also made a significant contribution in the war of independence. Not 
only did they actively take part in the liberation movement but they also suffered 
terrible torture and persecution in the hands of the invading Pakistani forces and their 
local allies. 3 After independence, acknowledging their contribution in the liberation 
movement, the first Constitution of 1972 affirmed the equal rights of women and 
incorporated "secularism" and "social justice" as two of its fundamental pillars. 
Unfortunately, in later years, the Constitution underwent some major surgeries and 4 
2 Article 28 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
3 According to official documents, there were nearly 30,000 reported cases of rape of 
Bangladeshi women committed by the Pakistani soldiers in their so-called mission to populate 
this wing of the nation with pure Muslims. Unofficial sources claim that the number is more than 
2.7 million. For details see: N Kabeer `The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the 
State in Bangladesh' (Brighton: IDS, 1989) pp. 1-33. See also, N Ibrahim Ami Birangana Bolchee 
The Voices of War Heroines) (Dhaka: Jagreeti Prakashani, 1998). 
Between 1975 and 1990 when the country was under military dictatorship. 
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the principles of secularism and social justice (which were two of the "four pillars" 
of the Constitution and were vital for developing a uniform family law regime based 
on secularism and equality) were replaced with diametrically opposite principles. 5 
An amendment to the Constitution in 1977 removed the principle of secularism that 
had been enshrined under Article 8 in Part II of the Constitution and replaced it with 
"absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah. " 6 In addition, the words "fraternal 
relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarit y17 were included in the 
fundamental principles guiding the state's international relations. Finally, in 1988, 
the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act (1988)8 inserted Article 2A in the 
Constitution, affirming, "[t]he state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other 
religions may be practised in peace and harmony in the republic. "9 All these 
amendments to the Constitution are alleged to have contributed to the legitimisation 
of discriminatory personal laws. In spite of these amendments, there still remain 
some constitutional provisions in force that are advantageous for women and 
guarantee them equal rights. We shall look at each of them in turn. 
i) Preamble and Fundamental Principles of State Policy 
The preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh sets out clearly the philosophy, aims 
and objectives of the Constitution and describes the qualitative aspects of the polity 
5 For a detailed discussion on these developments, see S Hossain `Equality in the Home: 
Women's Rights and Personal Laws in South Asia', in RJ Cook (ed. ) Human Rights of Women 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
(, Articles 8(1) and (1 A) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
7 Article 25(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
8 Act XXX of 1988, Section 2. 
9 At that time, some women's groups challenged this amendment on the ground that it is 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and with various United Nations Conventions. 
They also argued that this amendment will strengthen the authority of the religious 
fundamentalist forces of the country who want to obstruct women's participation in the public 
life and will expose women to more to discriminatory laws. 
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the Constitution is designed to achieve. 10 Referring to the historic war of 
independence the preamble declares that the fundamental aim of the State is to 
establish a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, 
equality and justice would be ensured. " 
Further, Part II of the Constitution narrates the fundamental principles of the State 
policy that translates into word the society envisioned by the framers in the preamble 
and sets the economic, social and political goals towards which the government is 
required to strive for. 12 Article 10 therein clearly states "steps shall be taken to 
ensure participation of women in all spheres of national life". 
According to Article 8 of the Constitution, the Fundamental Principles of State 
Policy are not only fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh but they are also to 
be applied by the state in the making of laws. However, it needs to be mentioned that 
these principles are not judicially enforceable as fundamental rights. 13 
ii) Fundamental Rights 
Taking the Preamble and the fundamental policy of state as our starting point we 
shall now turn to Part III of the Constitution to consider how far it recognises and 
incorporates the equal rights of women in public and private spheres. Article 27 of 
the Constitution provides "all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal 
protection of law. " Article 28 of the Constitution which is also known as the 
"equality principle" states: 
11 M Islam Constitutional Laws of Bangladesh (Dhaka: BILIA, 1995) p. 45. 
1 Preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
12 Islam, n. 10 above, p. 47. 
13 Article 8 (2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
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(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race caste, sex or place of birth. 
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State 
and of public life. 
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place 
of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition 
with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or 
admission to any educational institution. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special 
provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any 
backward section of citizens. 
In addition, Article 29 of the Constitution states: 
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect of 
employment or office in the service of the Republic. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place 
of birth, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any 
employment or office in the service of the Republic. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from - 
(a) Making special provision in favour of any backward section of 
citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the 
service of the Republic; 
(b) Giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving 
appointments relating to any religious or denominational institution to 
persons of that religion or denomination; 
(c) Reserving for members of one sex any class of employment or office 
on the ground that it is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members 
of the opposite sex. 
As has been discussed above, in Bangladesh, despite the constitutional guarantee of 
equality, the state has always left scope for the application of discriminatory personal 
laws. One of the main reasons behind this is the fact that there remains certain 
amount of controversy and confusion as to whether the scope of the Constitutional 
guarantee of equality extends to the sphere of existing personal laws. One of the 
main sources of the confusion lies in the wording of the equality provision itself. 
As 
seen above, the Constitution in its Article 28 subsection 2 states that women shall 
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have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and public life. As this 
Subsection specifically mentions of the State and public life and remains silent about 
equality in private life where the religious-based personal laws operate, one may 
argue that the constitutional guarantee of gender equality only applies to the public 
sphere and protects the personal laws from the scrutiny of the Constitution under 
section 26 which declares laws inconsistent with fundamental rights to be void. 14 On 
the other hand, if Subsection 2 is read together with Subsection 1 which 
unequivocally states that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race caste, sex or place of birth, it becomes clear that the 
intention of the legislature was not to exclude the personal sphere altogether from the 
scrutiny of the Constitution but only to affirm its position explicitly on ensuring 
gender equality in the state and public life. The study argues that in this regard, the 
silence does not amount to "exclusion" and there is scope to interpret this provision 
to extend the scope of equality guarantee to the personal sphere by employing 
various well-established rules and principles of interpretation such as purposive 
interpretation of the Constitution, ascertainment of the intention of the makers of the 
Constitution, ascertainment of express and implied meaning, harmonious 
construction etc., all of which call for taking into account the overall spirit of the 
Constitution while interpreting the scope of a particular Constitutional provision. 
Various modes of interpretation have been discussed later in this Chapter. This 
argument is further elaborated and strengthened by discussions in Chapter III on 
14 Article 26 of the Constitution states: "Laws inconsistent with fundamental rights to be void. (1) 
All existing law inconsistent with the provisions of this Part shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, become void on the commencement of this Constitution. (2) The State shall not 
make any law inconsistent with any provisions of this Part, and any law so made shall, to the 
extent of such inconsistency, be void. " 
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Public Private Dichotomy and the Religious Personal Laws and Chapter IV on 
Prospects of Equality and the Religious Personal Laws. 
Freedom of Religion 
While discussing the constitutional guarantee of equality, it is also important to take 
note of another provision of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of religion 
and is often portrayed as curtailing the scope of the gender equality guarantee. The 
argument is that the constitutional guarantee of equality is balanced by the 
countervailing constitutional provision Article 41 (1)) on "freedom of religion" for 
the protection of minority rights which affords every religious community the right 
to establish, manage and maintain their respective religious institutions subject to 
law public order and morality. 15 
The guarantee of freedom of religion is a common feature of any democratic 
constitution. But in the legal context of Bangladesh where religions and religious- 
based laws arguably do not allow gender equality, the right to freedom of religion 
can be seen as in conflict with the guarantee of gender equality. The concern is that 
to interfere with the personal laws may be interpreted as undermining the right to 
freely practice and maintain one's religion. 
'6 As such, it is sometimes argued that 
15 Article 41 of the Constitution states: "(1) Subject to law, public order and morality- (a) every 
citizen has the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion; (b) every religious community 
or denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. 
(2) No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious 
instruction, or to take part in or to attend any religious ceremony or worship, if that instruction, 
ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own. " 
16 This view was endorsed by the Government in various international fora and also in reports 
submitted to various treaty governing bodies. Although, Bangladesh has acceded to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women-CEDAW (1981), 
it still holds reservations on Article 2 and 161 (c) as they, in its opinion, conflict with Shari'a 
Law. A similar view was also expressed by the representatives of Bangladesh before the 
Women's Anti-Discrimination Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
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equality is supposedly a western value and when equality and freedom of religion 
seem to be in conflict, equality should not have preference. The matter becomes even 
more complicated and problematic for our purpose when we look at the wording of 
the constitutional guarantee of equality which, as discussed above, is silent about 
extending the guarantee into the private life of its citizens where religious personal 
laws operate. This then leaves open the question of whether discriminatory personal 
laws are protected from the scrutiny of the Constitution. 
In this regard, it is important to note that while the Constitution guarantees freedom 
of religion, this right has also been made conditional. As seen above, Article 41 
makes the right to practice religion subject to law, public order and morality. 
Moreover, there are also a number of judgments by the highest court of the land 
which reaffirms the position that freedom of religion is not an unconditional right. 
For instance, in Nelly Zaman v. Giasuddin Khan (1982)'7 it was observed that "by 
lapse of time and social development the very concept of the husband's unilateral 
plea for forcible restitution of conjugal right against a wife unwilling to live with her 
husband has become outmoded and does not fit in with the accepted state and public 
principle and policy of equality of all men and women being citizens equal before 
law entitled to equal protection of law and to be treated only in accordance with law 
(comprising of 23 expert members to monitor compliance with the CEDAW who were 
considering the Fifth Periodic Report of the States Parties submitted by Bangladesh (Doc. No. 
CEDAW/CBGD/5) covering the period from 1997 to 2002. The representatives of Bangladesh 
explained that although the Government is currently trying to address the issue of religious 
freedom and a uniform family law, there are certain constitutional barriers to the adoption of a 
family code based on gender equality which will be commonly applicable to all citizens. Another 
member of the delegation said that one such barrier is the constitutional right to practice 
religion. For a summary of the meeting, see: 
http: //www. un. org/News/Press/docs/2004/woinl454. doc. htm (Last accessed on 02.12.04). For 
the full text of CEDAW, see Genral Assembly Res. 34/180,34 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 
193, U. N. Doc. A/34/46. Online version available at: 
http: //www. un. org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention. htm (Last accessed 10.05.04). 
17 34 DLR 221. 
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as guaranteed in Article 27 and 31 of the Constitution of Bangladesh". Also in a writ 
petition on fatwa it was reaffirmed that the right to practice religion is subject to law, 
public order and morality. 's However, it is important to note that there is no clear 
guideline as to how these conditions (i. e., law, public order and morality) are to be 
defined and applied. It is perhaps for this reason that the High Court Division 
recommended "an enactment to control the freedom of religion subject to law, public 
order and morality within the scope of article 41 (1) of the Constitution. The State 
must define and enforce public morality. It must educate society. " 
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Considering the fact that freedom of religion is not an absolute right and is subject to 
certain conditions, this study argues that there is scope to interpret these conditions 
to scrutinise and reform or strike down religious rules and practises that cause 
significant disadvantage to women. The reasons and the theoretical basis for this 
argument will be further elaborated in Chapter IV on the Prospects of Equality and 
Religious Personal Laws. 
Enforcement of the Fundamental Rights 
It is to be noted that according to Article 26 (1) of the Constitution, all existing law 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights shall, to the extent of inconsistency, become 
void on the commencement of the Constitution, while Article 26 (2) provides that the 
18 See n. 19 below. 
19 In January 2001 in a landmark judgment Editor The daily Banglabazar Patrika and two others 
v District Magistrate and Commissioner, Naogaon (Writ Petition No. 5897 of 2000), a Division 
Bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh ruled all fatwas, or expert 
opinions on Islamic law issued from an unauthorised source illegal and also ruled that giving a 
fatwa by unauthorised persons(s) must be made a punishable offence by Parliament. Following 
the court's decision, a number of NGOs and women's rights activists expressed support for the 
ruling, seeing it as a positive step towards bringing an end to the sufferings and abuses of women 
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State shall not make any law inconsistent with the fundamental rights and any law so 
made shall, to the extent of inconsistency, be void. 
Under Article 102(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, the High Court Division of 
the Supreme Court has the power to pass necessary orders to enforce fundamental 
rights and under Article 44 (1) the right to move to the High Court Division for 
enforcing a fundamental right is itself a fundamental right. The power of the High 
Court Division "in respect of enforcing fundamental rights and granting relief is not 
a discretionary one; once it finds that a fundamental right has been violated, it is 
under constitutional obligation to grant the necessary relief. "20 
Judicial Review 
In the legal system of Bangladesh, the Supreme Court is considered the guardian'`' of 
the Constitution and is vested with the power of judicial review. Save in some 
specified situations, the Supreme Court, in exercise of that power can strike down 
any law for inconsistency with any provision of the Constitution including the 
provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights. 22 As it was observed in Anwar Hossain 
Chowdhury v. Bangladesh (1989)''3: 
Ours is a controlled constitution with entrenched provisions which has 
circumscribed the power of Parliament in making laws and has reposed on 
the Supreme Court the constitutional responsibility to adjudicate upon the 
validity of laws. 
in the name of. fatwa. However, some fundamentalist Islamic groups condemned and rejected the 
ruling seeing it as an express attack on their religious freedom. 
20 Islam, n. 10 above, p. 377. 
21 Islam, n. 10 above. 
22 Ibid. 
23 BLD (Spl) 1. 
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According to Islam, although Article 102 does not specifically grant any power of 
judicial review of legislation on the ground of contravention of the provisions of the 
Constitution other than the provisions enumerated in Part III, it can be said to be 
implicit in the Constitution. 24 As it has been observed in Kudrat-E-Elahi v. 
Bang ladesh (1992)75, when Article 102 is read with Article 7 it becomes clear that 
the Supreme Court has the power to declare void any provision of law on the ground 
of inconsistency with the Constitution and the Supreme Court has been exercising 
that power while deciding applications filed under Article 102. 
3. Interpretation of the Constitutional Provisions 
The Constitution of Bangladesh, under Article 8(2) provides that the fundamental 
principles of State policy shall be a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and 
the laws of Bangladesh. Following this, the court is, therefore, required to take note 
of the scheme and objectives of the Constitution as envisaged by the principles of 
State policy and "cannot interpret any provision contrary to such principles unless 
the language of the provision is so clear as to convince the court that in that 
particular instance the framers wanted to make a departure". 26 
Apart from this, there are some other general rules of interpretation which have been 
pointed out by the constitution experts and developed through case law. Islam27 
summarises some of the relevant principles and rules which can be enumerated as 
follows: 
24 Islam, n. 10 above, p. 376. 
25 44 DLR (AD) 314. 
26 Islam, n. 10 above, p. 29. 
27 Ibid,, pp. 28-9. 
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a. Purposive Interpretation of the Constitution 
As Islam observes, every constitution is founded on some social and political values 
and the legal rules are incorporated to build a structure of political institutions aimed 
to realise and effectuate those values. Therefore, the legal rules incorporated in the 
body of a Constitution cannot be interpreted divorced from those social and political 
values and the purpose which emerge from the scheme of the constitution. 28 This 
principle was established in the celebrated case of Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. 
Bangladesh (1989)29 where the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh interpreted the Constitution on the basis of its spirit instead of confining 
itself in the written words of the Constitution. 
b. Ascertainment of Intention 
The function of the court in interpreting any provision of a constitution is to ascertain 
the intention of the makers of the constitution. 30 As the language primarily expresses 
the intention, effort should be made at the first instance to gather it from the words 
used 31 and upon consideration of the whole of the enactment. A clause cannot be 
interpreted in isolation and must be construed as part of a unified whole. 32 
2 Ibid., p. 28. 
29 See n. 23 above. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Muiibur Rahman v. Ban ladesh (1992)44 DLR (AD) 111. 
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c. Harmonious Interpretation: 
A constitution must be read as a whole. If there is an apparent repugnancy between 
different provisions of a constitution, it should be removed by interpretation. But if 
the repugnancy is real, the court should harmonise them if possible. 
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4. The Obligation of Ensuring Gender Equality under the International 
Conventions 
Bangladesh acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women34 (CEDAW) in 1984 with a reservation on Article 2 
which prescribes the elimination of discrimination against women through various 
measures including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women35 and Article 
32 Islam, n. 10 above, p. 31. 
33 Ibid., p. 42. 
34See n. 16 above. The Convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution of 18 December 1979 and was entered into force on 3 
September 1981. As mentioned above, at the time of ratification of the Convention, the 
Government of Bangladesh has also registered reservations in relation to a number of articles of 
the Convention. Later, Bangladesh has withdrawn some of the reservations, such as, from article 
13(a) (i. e., on the right to family benefits), and article 16.1(f) (i. e., on marriage and family 
relations), specifically the right to guardianship, trusteeship and adoption of children. It still has 
reservations on article 2, by which States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all 
its forms and agree to pursue by all appropriate means a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women, and article 16.1 (c) (i. e., on rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution). For Reservations, see-- 
http: //www. un. org/womenwatcli/daw/cedaw/reservations. htm (Last accessed on 05.08.04); see 
also-- 
http: //simlaw uu nl/SIM/Library/RATIF. nsf/0/5f2e]3c766de882cci2568b900379af0? OpenDocu 
ment (Last Accessed 05.08.04). 
article 2 of the Convention states: "States Parties condemn discrimination against women in 
all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: (a) To embody the principle of the 
equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not 
yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical 
realisation of this principle; (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including 
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal 
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent 
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16(l)(c) regarding equality of rights and responsibilities during marriage and upon 
its dissolution. 36 Bangladesh put a reservation on these provisions by observing that 
they "conflict with the Shari'a law based on (the) Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. "37 From 
these reservations it becomes clear that policy of the Government of Bangladesh is 
of protecting personal laws from state intervention to ensure gender equality in all 
spheres including the family. It also reflects their view that the rules and principles 
of Shari 'a law are irreconcilable with the concept of gender equality and in case of a 
conflict (between rules of Shari 'a and gender equality), the religious law should be 
protected. 
Considering the reservations as a major obstacle to improving the status of women in 
Bangladesh, over the years various women's groups and NGOs3' have continually 
voiced their views against the reservations and initiated lobbying efforts and 
national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act 
of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by 
any person, organization or enterprise; (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, 
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women; (g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women. " 
36 Article 16 of the Convention states: "(1) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations 
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same right to 
enter into marriage; (b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at 
its dissolution; (d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount; (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of 
their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights; (f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist 
in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (g) The same 
personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession 
and an occupation; (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or 
for a valuable consideration. (2) The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal 
effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for 
marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. " 
37 See n. 34 above for detail on the reservations of Bangladesh Government. 
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advocacy programmes to raise public awareness in favour of withdrawing these 
reservations. Their continuous effort seemed to have yielded some results over the 
past few years as we can see a slow but gradual shift from a rigid governmental stand 
which was overprotective of the religious laws to a slightly more flexible and 
accommodating stand. This shift in the attitude is reflected in the Government's 
decision to withdraw some of the original reservations to the Convention and its 
decision to consider the withdrawal of some of the reservations. In this regard, in 
Government's Fifth Periodic Report39 to CEDAW covering the period between 1997 
and 2002, it was stated that "about withdrawing reservation on Article 2, the present 
government is taking active interest to come to a decision. In this regard, to avoid 
future legal complication, the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs (MWCA) 
has requested the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Ministry) 
to examine the ways and means to withdraw the reservation on Article 2. " It was 
further reported that "the Government of Bangladesh is assessing whether its 
reservation on Article 2 is in direct contradiction to the Religious Personal Law" and 
"to mitigate the problem of heterogeneity", in 1996, the Government set up a high 
powered inter-ministerial committee under the Ministry of Women and Children 
affairs to review the overall situation and recommend changes. Considering 
recommendations of this committee the government has already withdrawn its 
reservation from one of the articles and sub-articles of the CEDAW. Currently 
38 For example, Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, Bangladesh Women 
Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) etc. 
39 See-- Government of Bangladesh Fifth periodic report of States Parties to the Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women U. N. Doc. No. 
CEDAW/C/BGD/5. Full text of the report submitted by Bangladesh is available at http//daccess- 
ods. un. org/TMP/4305302. html (Last accessed on 02.12.04). 
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withdrawing reservation from or approving the Article 16.1(c) and Article 2 is under 
"40 active review of the Government. 
Bangladesh signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)4' (CRC) in 
1990 and ratified the same year, with reservations to Articles 14(1) (i. e., on 
children's freedom of religion) and 21 (i. e., on adoption). The reservation to Article 
21 states that the provision will apply subject to the existing laws and practices in 
Bangladesh. 42 
Bangladesh acceded to the International Convention on Socio Economic and 
Cultural Rights (1966)43 (ICESCR) in 1998 with a number of declarations. The 
interpretative declaration relating to Articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant states that "the 
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh will implement articles 2 and 3 
in so far as they relate to equality between man and woman, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of its Constitution and in particular, in respect to certain aspects 
of economic rights viz. law of inheritance. 
A4 
40 Ibid. 
41 General Assembly Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U. N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989). The Convention entered into force on September 2 1990. Full text of the 
Convention is available online: http: //wwwl. umn. edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc. htm (Last accessed 
10.07.04). 
42 Full text of the declaration available at: 
httn: //www. ohchr. org/english/countries/ratification/3. htm. (Last accessed on 02.12.04). 
U General Assembly Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U. N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U. N. T. S. 3, entered into force January 3,1976. Full text available online at: 
litg2: //wwwl. umn. edu/huinanrts/instree/b2ese. litiii (Last accessed 10.07.04). 
44 Full text of the declaration available at 
Mtn: //www. ohclir. or-z/english/countries/ratification/3. htm. Las accessed on 2 Dec 2004. 
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5. Government policy. Plans for Action and other initiatives related to gender 
equality 
In addition to the above, from time to time, the Government of Bangladesh has also 
taken some specific initiatives directed at improving the socio-political, economic 
and legal status of women. Included in these initiatives is the adoption of a National 
Women's Development Policy45 and undertaking periodic development plans and 
specific Plans of Actions. 
a) National Policy for Women's Advancement in Bangladesh 
To guide, initiate and promote overall development activities for women in March 
1997 the Bangladesh Government for the first time declared the National Women's 
Development Policy46 Some of the major goals of the policy are to establish equality 
between men and women in all spheres, to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against women and to establish women's human rights. 7 
45 Government of Bangladesh National Women's Development Policy (Dhaka: Government 
Publication, 1999). 
40 For details about the background of the National Women's Development Policy, See the Fifth 
Periodic Report, n. 39 above. 
47 The major goals of the National Women's Development Policy-have been summarised as 
follows: "(1) Establish equality between men and women in all spheres; (2) Eliminate all forms 
of discrimination against women and girls; (3) Establish women's human rights; (4) Develop 
women as human resource; (5) Recognize women's contribution in social and economic spheres; 
(6) Eliminate poverty among women; (7) Establish equality between men and women in 
administration, politics, education, games, sports and all other socio-economic spheres; (8) 
Eliminate all forms of oppression against women and girls; (9) Ensure empowerment of women 
in the fields of politics, administration and the economy; (10) Develop appropriate technology 
for women; (11) Ensure adequate health and nutrition for women; (12) Provide housing and 
shelter to women; (13) Create positive images of women in the media; (14) Take special 
measures for women in especially disadvantaged situations. " For details, see - n. 45 above. See 
also, n. 39. 
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With regard to the monitoring of the implementation of the various policies, 
programmes and laws, the National Council for Women's Development and the 
Inter-ministerial Coordination and Evaluation Committee provide institutional 
mechanisms through which individuals and various women's organizations can 
participate 49 
b) Five-Year Development Plan 
The Bangladesh Government undertook a Five Year Development Plan for 
improving the status of women. Promoting gender equality, and "realising the 
constitutional goal of equality between all citizens - women and men", was a major 
aim of the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1997-2002)49. For example, some of 
the goals and objectives of the plan were to: 
a. initiate necessary steps to implement the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); 
b. ensure women's legal rights in property, inheritance and related laws; 
c. increase women's participation in decision making at both the national 
and local level; 
d. ensure the visibility and recognition of women's work and to reduce the 
gender gap in access to information, skill and knowledge about economic 
opportunities; and, 
e. raise the rate of female participation in the active labour force (employed) 
to bring it at par with men. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Government of Bangladesh Fifth Five-Year Development Plan 1997-2002 (Dhaka: 
Government Publication, 1997). 
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c) National Plan for Action (as follow-up to 4th World Conference on Women, 
1995) 
The government of Bangladesh also endorsed the Beijing Platform for Action 
(Platform) with no reservations. The main tool for implementing the Platform is the 
National Action Plan (NAP), which sets the following broad goals: 
1. to make women's development an integral part of the national 
development programme; 
2. to establish women as equal partners in development with equal roles in 
policy and decision-making in the family, community and nation at large; 
3. to remove legal, economic, political or cultural barriers that prevent the 
exercise of equal rights by undertaking policy reforms and strong 
affirmative actions; 
4. to raise/create public awareness about women's differential needs, 
interests and priorities and increase commitment to bring about 
50 improvements in women's position and condition. 
From the above it becomes clear that although the Government of Bangladesh in its 
national policy expresses a clear commitment to ensuring gender equality in all 
spheres and to uphold women's human rights these have not been translated into the 
legal structure of the land which falls short of incorporating the principle of gender 
equality. Since its declaration in 1999, it has also failed to take any specific steps to 
50 In relation to women's employment, the National Action Plan stresses the need to improve 
women's working conditions. This includes increasing the scope of maternity leave, more 
creches and day care centres, adequate numbers of separate toilet facilities, better transport 
facilities especially for night work and accommodation facilities for out of station work 
placements. The Plan also proposes the development of professionally elaborated gender- 
sensitive codes of conduct/ethics/self-regulatory mechanisms for the medical and media 
professionals, with the goal of promoting greater respect for women and their rights, monitoring 
action and taking internal disciplinary actions against violations of the agreed codes of conduct. 
For details, see-- Government of Bangladesh National Action Plan Towards Implementing 
Beijing Platform for Action. The English version of the major goals ands objectives of the Plan is 
available at-- 
http: //www. ilo. org/public/enelisli/employinent/, izems/eeo/izuide/ban , lay de/n. ty fydp htm (Last 
accessed on 02.12.04). 
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reform the religious laws to ensure equality in the personal sphere. Similarly, the five 
year development plan, although in promising to ensure women's legal rights in the 
area of property, inheritance and related laws, makes no specific commitment or plan 
of action to reform the provisions of the existing Hindu law and Muslim law which 
as Chapter II will elaborate, fail to provide equal rights for women in the area of 
inheritance and other property related rights. In the same way, although the National 
Action Plan for implementing the Beijing Platform for Action speaks of ensuring 
"equal roles in decision making in the family, community and nation at large" and 
also speaks of removing "legal, economic, political or cultural barriers that prevent 
the exercise of equal rights by undertaking policy reforms and strong affirmative 
actions", the personal laws which are the main obstacles to achieving equal roles in 
the family have been left unreformed or with no substantive change. In this regard, 
from the perspective of gender equality, one of the main points of concern is that 
various stated and unstated norms of personal law which obstructs women's 
participation in public life (for example, the duty of obedience and the traditional 
gender roles of women/dependant, man/provider-underpinning all religious laws) 
have been left unreformed and unchallenged. 
From the above, it is evident that although the Government policy and plans of 
action indicate a willingness or positive attitude on the part of the Government 
towards improving the status and condition of women in the economic sphere, 
education etc, they lack a clear commitment, guidelines and strategies as to how to 
improve the legal status of women particularly in the personal sphere by bringing 
any substantive change or reform to the religious personal laws. 
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6. Historical development of personal laws in brief 
The division of the legal system into personal laws and general laws in the Indian 
Subcontinent was first created during British colonial rule51. In the early days of the 
British rule in India the British rulers adopted a non-interference policy towards the 
personal laws of the natives. 5` As Agnes points out, the Charter of George I in 1726, 
which authorised the establishment of Mayor's Courts (Courts of the King of 
England) in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, was silent regarding jurisdiction over 
native inhabitants. 53 The Warren Hastings Plan of 1772 provided for the 
establishment of civil and criminal courts in each district and granted the Company 
jurisdiction over the natives. 54 The plan explicitly protected the right of the Hindus 
and Muslims to apply their own personal laws in civil matters concerning 
inheritance, marriage, caste etc. The practice of non-interference in the personal laws 
of the natives continued through all the subsequent regulations in the early days of 
the British rule. Warren Hastings by Regulation II in 1772 declared that Muslims and 
Hindus would be allowed to be governed by their own laws in all suits regarding 
inheritance, succession, marriage, caste and other religious usages or institutions. In 
the Act of Settlement (1781), the same policy of non-interference of the 1772 
Regulation was reaffirmed. 55 
51 T Monsoor From Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Fantilty Laic and its Impact on Women in 
Bangladesh. (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 1999). 
52 Monsoor points out that before the British assumed political power, the Muslim rulers 
enforced the public laws of Islam as the law of the land and in matters of personal status the 
other religious communities were governed by their own religion based laws and usages. Ibid. 
53 The Charter of Charles 11 in 1661 was the first in a series of charters which authorised the East 
India Company judicial powers in India. For details, see F Agnes Law and Gender Inequality: 
the Politics of Women's Rights in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
54 For details, see Ibid. 
55 See Monsoor, n. 51 above. 
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As Monsoor observes, as a result of Warren Hasting's scheme, for the first time the 
legal system of the Subcontinent was divided into general laws and personal laws. 
But this apparent non-interference policy was only with regard to the two major 
religious communities, i. e., Muslims and the Hindus. 56 
According to Agnes, the consequence of this public-personal division was that the 
communities in the Subcontinent were categorised on the basis of their religion, and 
the customs and laws, which the English administrators had decided to save, were in 
turn deemed to be religious. This according to her created a legal fiction that the laws 
of Hindus and Muslims are rooted in their respective scriptures and further that 
Hindus and Muslims are homogeneous communities following uniform laws. As 
Agnes points out, there was also a presumption that the dividing line between the 
communities is their religion, over-riding other factors such as caste, sect, 
occupation, language or regionality. This legal fiction provided no space for 
validating the role of customary law which has no scriptural basis and is evolved at 
the local level transgressing boundaries of religious identities. This, as she points 
out, curtailed women's customary rights which did not have a textual base. Also, as 
pluralistic communities became characterised as "Hindu", women's right to property 
ownership became curtailed. For example, the notion of a constrained and limited 
stridhana followed by the Bengal school57 became the accepted principle of Hindu 
56 See generally MP Jain Outline of Indian Legal History (5th ed., reprinted) (Nagpur: Wadhwa 
and Co., 2003) and the reference made to him in Monsoor, n. 51 above. Monsoor summarises, the 
personal laws of the Christians and Parsis were codified by the Parsi Marriage and divorce Act 
(1936) [(II1 of 1936) 9 PC 351], the Divorce Act (1869) [(IV of 1869) 1 BC 246,1 PC 303], the 
Christian Marriage Act (1872) [(XV of 1872) 2 BC 140,2 PC 142], the Succession Act (1925) 
[(XXXIX of 1925) 8 PC 195,10 BC 355] and the Special Marriage Act (1872) [(III of 1872) 2 
BC 66,2 PC 62]. 
57 The Bengal school followed the Dayabhaga principle of strict construction of stridhana or 
women's property. The two dominant schools of Hindu law are Mitakshara of Vijnaneshwar and 
Dayabhaga of Jimmutavahana. The law that governs Hindus in Bangladesh is the Dayabhaga 
School. The other school i. e., the Mitakshara is an important authority for non-Bengali Hindus in 
all over India. 
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law for the whole of British India (with a few concessions granted to the Bombay 
Presidency). 58 
Despite the initial policy of non-interference in "personal" matters, over time a 
gradual process of interference with the established local customs and personal laws 
became evident. While these interferences succeeded in improving the position of 
women to some extent by getting rid of the notorious practice like sail or widow 
immolation and granting Hindu widows right to remarry 59, in some instances these 
interferences also resulted in curtailing the existing rights granted under the local 
customs. Some of these instances can be identified as follows: 
1. Agnes observes, until the advent of the colonial rule, various local and non-state 
legal fora applied the norms of customary law and adaptations of the Smriti or 
Qur'anic injunctions to suit local conditions. But when the company officers 
attempted to arbitrate in civil and criminal disputes, due to their limited 
understanding of local traditions and customs, they relied upon Hindu pundits and 
Muslim qazis to ascertain their respective laws. This set in motion the process of 
Brahminisation and Islamisation of laws which adversely affected women's rights in 
the Subcontinent. 60 Gradually the British administrators started to take it upon 
themselves to translate the ancient texts which later became the basis of Anglo- 
Hindu and Anglo-Mohammadan law in India. As Agnes observes, it is at this stage 
that "the process of evolving laws at the local level through commentaries, which 
38 For details, see Agnes, n. 53 above. 
59 As Monsoor points out, during this period the much acclaimed Sati Regulation Act (1829) was 
followed by other legislations such as the Widow Remarriage Act (1856), the Age of Consent 
Act (1860) and the Prohibition of Female Infanticide Act (1872), the Muslim Personal Law 
(Sharjat) Application Act (1937) [(XXVI of 1937) 9 PC 404,11 BC 387], Dissolution of the 
Muslim Marriages Act (1939) [(VIII of 1939) 9 PC 716] and the Child Marriage Restraint Act 
(1929) [(XXXVIII of 1984) 36 DLR (Sta) 134]. For details, see Monsoor, n. 51 above. 
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incorporated within them the local customs was arrested". The British interpretations 
of the ancient texts became binding and made the law certain, rigid and uniform, 
61 contributing significantly to the disadvantage of women. 
2. Simultaneously with the above, a series of judicial decisions also curtailed the 
scope of women's rights. For example, Agnes points out that during that period the 
Mitakshara had expanded the scope of stridhana 62 or women's property to include 
property acquired by a woman through every source, including inheritance and 
partition. But judicial decisions changed this concept and gradually introduced a new 
legal principle which laid down that inherited property (through a woman's male 
relatives or female relatives) is not stridhana and that it would devolve on the heirs 
of her husband or father. In this way, women lost the right to will or gift away their 
stridhana and it acquired the character of limited estate. In support of this Agnes 
cites a number of judgments such as Srinath Gangopadhya v Sarbamangala Debi 
(1868)63, Gonda Kooer v Kooer Gody Singh (1874)64 where the lower courts, 
following the local customs, upheld the women's rights. The lower courts' decisions 
were reversed by the higher judiciary and then became binding principles of law. 65 
6" n. 53 above. `'1 
Ibid. 
62 The property which a woman obtains by her own labour is called her stridhana. The word 
stridhana derives from stri, woman, and dhana, property, and means literally woman's property. 
While declaring the perpetual tutelage of women, and their general incapacity to hold property, 
Hindu law allows then to hold property of certain descriptions with absolute power of disposal. 
Only with regard to her stridhana, is a woman in the same position as any other person. She may 
sell it or give it away and at her death she may leave it by will to any one she may choose, and if 
she dies intestate it will go to her heirs. But with regard to property which is not stridhana, her 
ownership is a restricted one. She can enjoy the full and exclusive enjoyment and the 
management of the property only as long as she lives. She cannot give it away, nor can she sell it, 
except under very special circumstances and in case of urgent necessity. She also cannot dispose 
of it by will and at her death it does not go to her heirs. 
63 10 WR 488. 
" 14 BLR 159. 
65 For details of the above argument see Agnes, n. 53 above. 
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After getting independence from colonial rule, some attempts were made in the 
newly independent, post-1947 Pakistan to improve the position of women through 
legal reform. But in Pakistan (as it was a country created for the Muslims) the reform 
approach mainly focused on improving the position of women within the framework 
of Islam instead of bringing any substantive change by introducing a secular 
framework for the personal laws. However, in independent Pakistan, various women 
groups began their campaign against discriminatory personal laws and demanded 
reforms. In this regard, the campaign and lobbying efforts organised by the All 
Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) should be mentioned who vociferously 
demanded reforms of Islamic personal law. As a result, the Government established 
a Commission on Marriage and Family Laws on 4`h August 1955 to review the 
existing family laws. The Commission, which was constituted of seven members and 
headed by a former Chief Justice, submitted a report that approached a modernist 
trend of reform and gave rise to considerable amount of controversy and debate 
between the traditionalist ulemas and the modernist Muslim scholars of that time. 66 
The Commission made proposals and recommendation in the areas of marriage, 
maintenance, divorce and property. On the basis of these recommendations the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961)67 was promulgated in March 1961. 
After nine months of war Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan and became 
independent on 16 December 1971. Bangladesh too opted to retain the religion based 
framework of personal laws instead of adopting a secular and uniform personal law 
regime. Thus the British-era legislation that had continued to be applied in Pakistan, 
as well as the post-1947 legislation enacted in the Pakistani era, remained the basis 
66 For details of the debates for and against the Commissions proposal at that time, see A 
Serajuddin Shari 'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Subcontinent (Dhaka: 
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of Bangladeshi personal status laws. As has been mentioned before, no judicial 
attempt has yet been made to examine whether the existence of the discriminatory 
personal laws offends against the provisions of the Constitution. 
In independent Bangladesh, Family Courts were established by the Family Courts 
Ordinance (1985)6, which is considered as a significant step in legal reforms for 
women. There have also been some amendments of the existing legislations. 
Prominent among them are, the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance 
(1984)69, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages (Amendment) Ordinance (1986)70, 
the Ordinances (of 196171,198572 and 198673) amending the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinances (1961)74, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) (Amend) 
Ordinance (1982)75 and the Family Courts (Amendment) Act (1989)76. This list 
makes it evident that while in the field of personal law for the Muslim community 
there have been some reforms in Bangladesh; in the field of personal laws of other 
minority communities (i. e., the Hindus and the Christians) there has been virtually 
no reform or change. 
Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991) pp. 34-66. 
67 1961) 14 PC 67. 
GK (XVIII of 1985) 37 DLR (Sta) 159. 
69 (XXXVIII of 1984) 36 DLR (Sta) 134. 
70 (XXV of 1986) 38 DLR (Sta) 105. 
71 Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance (1961) [(XXI of 1961) 14 PC NP]; Muslim 
Family Laws (Second Amendment) Ordinance (1961) [(XXX of 1961) 14 PC NP]. 
72 Muslim Family Laws (Amend) Ordinance (1985) [(XIV of 1985) 37 DLR (Sta) 244]. 
73 Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance (1986) [(XXIV of 1986) 38 DLR (Sta) 73. 74 See n. 66 above. 
75 (XLIX of 1982) 35 DLR (Sta) 76. 
76 (XXX of 1989) 41 DLR (Sta) 38. 
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The Family Courts Ordinance 1985 
After independence from Pakistan, a significant step towards legal reform was 
undertaken by the establishment of Family Courts by Family Courts Ordinance 
(1985)'. As will be seen in the discussion below, this step is not only significant for 
enhancing the legal status of women but also significant from the perspective of the 
uniformity of the family laws or personal laws. 
Under the Ordinance, the Family Courts have special procedures and reduced 
formalities. Under Section 5 of the Ordinance, Family Courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction to try and dispose of suits relating to the dissolution of marriage, 
restitution of conjugal rights, dower, maintenance, and guardianship and custody. 
One of the unique features of the Family Courts Ordinance (1985)78 is that it offers 
an opportunity for the conciliatory settlement of disputes between the parties. The 
scope for the settlement of disputes is given under Section 10 of the Ordinance. 
According to Section 10, after the written statement is filed, the Family Court will 
fix a date not more than 30 days later for a pre-trial hearing of the suit79. At the pre- 
trial hearing, the Family Court will attempt to effect a compromise or reconciliation 
between the parties80 after examining the plaint, written statement and documents 
filed by the parties. After the close of evidence of all parties and before the 
pronouncement of the judgment, the Court has scope to attempt another compromise 
or reconciliation between the parties under section 13 (1). 
77 See n. 67 above. 
78 See n. 67 above. 
79 Section 10 (1) of the Ordinance. 
80 Section 10 (3) of the Ordinance. 
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Another important feature of the Ordinance is that under section 1I (1) of the 
Ordinance, a Family Court may, if it deems fit, hold the whole or any part of the 
proceedings in camera. This provision is particularly useful and beneficial for 
women who want to prevent their private affairs become open to the public for the 
fear of social stigma. Under section 22 of the Ordinance, the court fees to be paid on 
any plaint presented to a family court is nominal (Taka 25) for any kind of suit. This 
was designed to curtail the cost of initiating a suit and making access to justice for 
everyone including women with no or little means easy and affordable. 
Unfortunately, this initiative has not achieved the expected result as in practise the 
lawyers' and notaries' fees etc. increase the costs considerably. 
Although the Ordinance has a number of features that as explained above are 
beneficial for women, it also has a number of features related to its procedure that 
can be deemed as problematic for women. For example, section 5 confines the 
jurisdiction of the Family Courts to the civil jurisdiction related to the issues such as 
maintenance, dower, custody etc. Thus, if any criminal offence arises in the context 
of a civil case, it comes under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts or the 
Magistrate Courts. As has been discussed, the Ordinance under section 5 gives 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Courts to try and determine among others the 
maintenance cases. But the Magistrates are also given the power to entertain these 
cases under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898)8I. This creates 
confusion as to whether Magistrate courts still have the jurisdiction to decide 
maintenance cases after the enactment of the Ordinance. The latest position of the 
case law in this regard has been decided in Pochon Rikssi Das v Khuku Rani Dasi 
81 (V of 1898) 4 BC 90,4 PC 10. 
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and Others (1998)$2 where the court affirmed that the criminal courts are no longer 
entitled to entertain cases related to maintenance. 
There also has been confusion as to whether the Ordinance applies to the Muslim 
community only or whether people from other religious communities such as Hindus 
and Christians, can take advantage of the Ordinance too. The source of confusion 
lies in the wording of section 5 which states: 
Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 
(Ordinance VIII of 1961) a family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
try and entertain any suit relating to and arising out of any suits, namely: 
(i) Dissolution of Marriage 
(ii) Restitution of conjugal rights 
(iii) Dower 
(iv) Custody and guardianship of children. 
Due to the words "subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 
1961" one may argue that the Ordinance is intended for the Muslims only. In this 
regard Amir-ul Islam however, observes that by enumerating subjects outside the 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) 93 such as guardianship and children, dower 
etc. it has been made abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the family court is not 
only available to the Muslims, nor it is so restricted to any particular religion or 
sex. 84 According to Islam the expression "subject to the provisions of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance 1961" is merely for qualifying the word "exclusive 
jurisdiction" affirming that in matters relating to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 
82 50 DLR 4. 
83 See n. 66 above. 
84 A Islam `The Uniform Family Code and Problems of Enforcement of Equal Rights of Women 
in Bangladesh: Legal, Policy and Social Dimensions', keynote paper at the Workshop on 
Uniform Family Code and Problems of Enforcement of Equal Rights of Warren in Bangladesh: 
Legal Policy and Social Dimension (September 22-23,1992) organised jointly by Bangladesh 
Institute of Law and International Affairs (BILIA) and the Mahila Parishad. Proceedings yet to 
be published. 
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(1961)5 the family court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Arbitration 
Council. 86 He concludes that the most likely and plausible interpretation may 
perhaps be that the expression "subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance 1961" refers to the exclusive matter of the jurisdiction of the family court. 
The intent of the legislature was therefore not to upset the existing jurisdiction of the 
Arbitration Council. 87 
In this regard it may be pointed out that some of the family courts have already 
started exercising jurisdictions in cases where the parties are non-Muslim. This issue 
was considered in Krishnapada Talukdar v Geetashree Talukdar (1995)88 where the 
division bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court held that the Family 
Courts have jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of suit between litigants who 
are Muslim faith only. But in Nirmal Kanti Das v Sreemati Biva Rani (1995)89 a 
single bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court held that a Hindu wife 
is not excluded from bringing a law suit for her maintenance against her husband 
under this Ordinance. This was also confirmed by the Division Bench of the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court in Meher Nigar v Moiibur Rahman (1995)90, 
holding that the scope of the Ordinance extends to the non-Muslim communities as 
well. These positive decisions of the judiciary regarding the applicability of the 
Ordinance to the non-Muslim community indicates an encouraging trend from the 
perspective of uniformity of the personal laws as this now shows that it is possible to 
lift the legal divide between the religious communities and apply laws uniformly, at 
85 See n. 67 above. 
86 Ibid. 
97 See generally-A Islam, n. 83 above. 
88 47 DLR 591. 
89 47 DLR 515. 
`x' 47 DLR 18. 
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least on the procedural level, for granting relief to women of all religious 
communities in matters of divorce, custody, maintenance etc. 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 
Since its independence from colonial rule, the most significant legal reform to 
Muslim personal law was undertaken by the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance91 in 1961. Fortunately, after independence from Pakistan, the newly 
independent Bangladesh also continued the application of the Ordinance with some 
amendments initiated in 1974. The Ordinance covers issues related to Muslim 
inheritance, marriage registration, polygamy, divorce, dowry and maintenance. The 
Ordinance prescribes formation of a "Salish council" to resolve disputes arising 
within the family. The Salish council comprises three members with chairman of 
local union council92 and two other members (having one from each of the parties). 
Some of the significant features of the Ordinance that it has restricted the practice of 
polygamy by introducing procedural restrictions (for example, the application 
process includes requiring the reasons for wanting to contract a polygamous 
marriage and certification attesting to the existing wife's or wives' consent etc. ) It 
has also established penalties for contracting polygamous marriages in contravention 
of the Ordinance. Another significant feature of the Ordinance is that it has 
abolished the practice of "triple divorce" -a particularly oppressive practise towards 
women and introduced a rational procedure for divorce. These features are further 
developed in Chapter II on Personal Laws and Their Impact on Women. 
91 See n. 66 above. 
92 A Pourasabha (municipal) chairman in the pourasabha area and a Mayor or administrator in 
the municipal corporation area would be the chairman of Salish (arbitration) council. 
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7. Conclusion 
The above discussions have explained the legal framework within which the 
religious personal laws operate. It has been observed that although the Constitution 
of Bangladesh has a gender equality guarantee it has been argued not to extend to the 
sphere of personal laws as one of the subsection of the equality provision (Article 
28 
subsection 2) if seen in isolation keeps silent about ensuring equality in the private 
life of the citizens where the religious personal laws operate. As seen in the 
discussion, this view is endorsed by the Government of Bangladesh but rejected by 
various women groups and NGO's. The position of the judiciary in this regard 
however, (specially the Supreme Court which is the highest court of the land and the 
ultimate authority for interpreting the constitution) is still not clear due to the fact 
that there has not been an attempt yet to challenge the validity of religious laws by 
invoking the gender equality guarantee of the Constitution. The study in this regard 
takes the position that there is scope to interpret Article 28 to extend its application 
to private sphere and bring the religious personal laws in line with the guarantee of 
gender equality. In support of this Chapter has highlighted various modes of 
interpretation endorsed by the judiciary of Bangladesh that calls for taking into 
account the overall spirit of the Constitution while interpreting a particular provision. 
In this regard it has been pointed out that other provisions of the Constitution such as 
Article 27 Constitution affirms, "All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to 
equal protection of law. " Also, Article 28 subsection I lays down a general equality 
guarantee without confining the guarantee to a specific sphere by stating, "the state 
shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race caste, sex 
or place of birth". In addition, the preamble to the Constitution states, "the 
fundamental aim of the State is to establish a society in which the rule of law, 
48 
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice would be ensured". This 
argument is further strengthened by the arguments put forward in Chapter III on 
Public Private Dichotomy and the Religious Personal Laws which offers a critique of 
the dichotomy and points out that because of the overlapping nature of the boundary 
between public and private, it is important to ensure equality in the private sphere in 
order to ensure it in the public sphere. 
It has also been observed in this Chapter that right to freedom of religion has been 
deployed to restrict the scope of the equality guarantee and to make it inapplicable in 
the personal sphere. In this regard, the discussions in this Chapter have already 
pointed out that this is not a viable argument because the freedom of religion is not 
an unconditional right. It has also been pointed out that the judiciary in Bangladesh 
have already invoked the notions of law, public order and morality to strike down 
practises which are particularly oppressive toward women such as fatwa. The next 
Chapter will discuss some of the discriminatory aspects of Islamic law that operate 
in Bangladesh and highlight the disadvantage they cause to women. 
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CHAPTER 11 
PERSONAL LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding Chapter, the status of personal laws in the legal system of Bangladesh 
has been discussed. It has been observed that despite the constitutional guarantee of 
equality, the state has always afforded recognition to and left scope for the application 
of religious laws in the personal sphere. In this regard, some of the impediments to 
reform and arguments in favour of the non-interventionist stand of the state into the 
personal laws have also been highlighted. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that 
various women's groups in Bangladesh have been campaigning for reforms of the 
religion-based personal laws on the grounds that they not only violate the Constitutional 
right to gender equality but also perpetuate women's subordination in the society and 
constitute discrimination between women of different religious groups. In the light of 
the above, this Chapter sets out to examine the impact of personal laws on Bangladeshi 
women. To this end, this Chapter makes a comprehensive exposition of personal laws 
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specially focusing on the points of discrimination. The Chapter also highlights the way 
in which legally entrenched discrimination results in significant disadvantage for women 
in Bangladesh. As the areas covered by the personal laws are too vast to allow 
exhaustive citation and discussion, for the purpose of highlighting discriminatory 
provisions, discussions are limited to various provisions of Islamic law and areas of law 
covered for this purpose are marriage, divorce, dower, inheritance of property and 
guardianship as prescribed by Islamic law in Bangladesh. The object of the Chapter is to 
set the background for developing the central argument of the thesis that refonns to 
personal laws are desirable and possible in line with the equality provision of the 
Constitution. 
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2. Islamic Law 
The majority of people in Bangladesh are Muslims'. Of them, most are Hanafi' Muslims 
and the basis for the law is classical Hanafifiqh. Only a small minority of the population 
belong to any other sects. The Muslim Personal Law (Shari'at) Application Act (1937); 
governs the application of Muslim family law in Bangladesh. Although the principles 
and rules of Shari'a law as settled by the classical jurists have been traditionally 
regarded as "sacrosanct and immutable", there have been some occasional changes to 4 
1 Religions in Bangladesh (Census 1991): Islam (88.3%), Hinduism (10.5%), Buddhism (0.6%) and 
Christianity (0.3%). Source: National Data Bank, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
http: //www. bbsgov. or /g (Last accessed on 20.12.2000. The total population of Bangladesh is 
approximately 130 million. Sunni Muslims constitute 88 percent of the population. About 10 percent 
of the population are Hindu. The remainder are mainly Christian (mostly Catholic) and Buddhist. 
Members of these faiths are found predominantly in the tribal (non-Bengali) populations of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, although many other indigenous groups in various parts of the country are 
Christian as well. There also are small populations of Shi'a Muslims, Sikhs, Baha'is, animists, and 
Ahmadias. Estimates of their populations vary widely, from a few hundred up to 100,000 adherents 
for each faith. US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report (October 26,2001) 
by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Full report available at International 
Freedom of Religion Homepage at http: //www. state. pov/Wdrl/rls/irf/2001/5556. htm (Last accessed 
on 02.12.02). 
2 Muslims are broadly divided into two main sects- Sunni and Shia. The Sunnis follow one of four 
different schools of law, the Hanafi school being the one to which most Muslims in the subcontinent 
adhere. As Uhlman/UmHani summarises, "following the death of the Prophet Mohammad, different 
schools of legal thought developed. While jurists generally agreed on the four sources of law (i. e. 
the Qur'an, sunnah, ijma and qiyas) their views differed regarding textual interpretation, the 
definition of consensus, and the value that should be attached to analogy. The two main juristic 
schools, the Sunni and Shia schools, developed as a result of a political dispute over the succession 
of the Prophet after his death. While the Shia held that leadership should remain in the Prophet's 
family, the Sunnis believed that leadership could pass to other worthy individuals. This political 
division gave rise to philosophical differences between the two sects. Over time, different schools of 
thought developed within the Shia and Sunni sects. Today, Sunnis comprise the majority of 
Muslims. Although many Sunni juristic schools existed in the past, only four main schools have 
survived: the Hanifi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafii schools. Shiaism consists of three main schools: the 
Ithna-Ashari (Imami, or Twelve Shias), Zaidi, and Ismaili schools. While the different schools agree 
on certain fundamental legal issues, their various interpretations and views of the sources of Shari 'a 
have given rise to different rules on many points of law. " For details, sec K Uhlman/UmHani 
`Overview Of Shari'a and Prevalent Customs In Islamic Societies - Divorce and Child Custody' 
paper presented in the California State Bar 2004 Winter Workshop on International Custody 
Abduction: Non-Hague, Islamic Countries. Online version available at: 
http: //www. lawmoose. com/Documents/UmHaniarticle. pdf (Last accessed 25.11.04). T (XXVI of 1937) 9 PC 404,11 BC 387. 
A Serajuddin Shari'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Subcontinent (Dhaka: 
Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991). 
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the Shari'a law. The most important of these changes have been brought by the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance (1961)5 which governs areas such as polygamy, divorce etc. 
a) Shari'a Law 
Shari'a is the Arabic teen for Islamic law. As Akaddaf points out, it first appears in the 
Qur'an to mean "path" or "way. "6 As a divine law and as the expression of God's will 
and justice, Shari'a governs all aspects of life.? Various provisions of Shari'a set forth 
among others rules regarding marriage, maintenance, divorce, child custody, inheritance 
and other matters regarding the family life of the Muslims. As Joseph Schacht describes, 
Shari'a is "the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic 
way of life, the core and kernal of Islam itself. "s 
Sources of Shari'a 
Shari 'a law is derived from four principle sources: the Qur'an, the Sunna, the Uma, and 
qiyas. The main source of Shari 'a is the Qur-'an which is a collection of revelations the 
Prophet Mohammed received from God. However, while the Qur'an sets forth certain 
fundamental legal rules, it does not provide specific legal direction in many areas. For 
this reason, Islamic jurists looked to other sources to compile a detailed body of 
5 (VIII of 1961) 14 PC 67. 
6F Akaddaf `Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles? ' 
(2001) 13 Pace Jut'! L. Rev. 16. 
J Nasir The Islamic Law of Persona( Status (2nd ed. ) (London: Graham and Trotman Ltd, 1990). 
8J Schacht Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). 
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law. 9 The second most authoritative source of Shari 'a is the Sunnah or the practice, 
conduct, and tradition of the Prophet. These two sources are further supplemented by 
other sources such as ijma and qiyas. In the event that neither the Qur'an nor the Sunna 
provides guidance on a given point, jurists generally look to ijma or consensus among 
Islamic jurists. If the jurists arrive at a consensus on the legal point at issue, their 
opinion becomes authoritative. When none of these above sources provide necessary 
legal authority, jurists may resort to qiyas or reasoning by analogy which allows them to 
reason from Qur'an, Sunnah or ijma. 
Shari'a has influenced and shaped the family laws of many Muslim societies. It also 
plays an integral role in the religious, social and cultural life of Muslims in Bangladesh. 
As the discussion in Chapter 1 on development of personal status law in the 
Subcontinent clearly demonstrates, although the principles and rules of the Shari 'a law 
as settled by the classical jurists have been for the most part regarded as sacred and 
immutable, there have been some major changes in the form of statute, case law and 
customs modifying the traditional understanding of the Shari 'a law to some extent10. 
Some of the key factors that can be said to have attributed to these changes are the 
impact of human rights activism, the relentless efforts of women's rights activists and 
the influence of western thought and ideas during colonial rule. " A close study of the 
historical discourse of the Subcontinent also reveals that "while the modernist Muslims 
have hailed these changes in the Shari 'a law as salutary, the traditionalists have 
9 Uhlman/UmHani, n. 2 above. 
10 Scrajuddin, n. 4 above. 
11As Serajuddin observes, "it is mainly because of these reasons that the term Shari'a Law which is 
popularly used is synonymous with Islamic law, Muslim law and Muhammadan law. It is also 
sometimes known as Anglo-Muhammadan law in the Indian Subcontinent because of the influence 
of English common law, equity and procedures. " For details, see- ibid., pp. 1-27. 
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continued to resist them, accusing reformers of subservience to Western ideas and 
12 norms and of distorting Islamic teaching and injunctions". 
In this Chapter, for the purpose of discussion first the classical Shari 'a law position on a 
particular topic is discussed and then each topic is reviewed in the light of the changes 
that have been brought by the relevant legislative and judicial reforms in Bangladesh. At 
the end of discussion on each topic, the impact of relevant laws on women in 
Bangladesh is discussed, highlighting the discrimination and disadvantages they cause 
women. 
(a) Marriage 
In Islam, marriage is a civil contract between husband and wife legalising intercourse 
and the procreation of children13. Therefore, unlike some other religions that consider 
marriage as a spiritual union, Islam perceives marriage as a civil union. As Fyzee 
explains, marriage in Islam is a contract for the legalization of intercourse and the 
procreation of the children14. Shari 'a prescribes certain preconditions to a valid marriage 




13 J Esposito Women in Muslim Family Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982) pp. 15-16. 
14 A Fyzee Outlines of Muhammadan Lain (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 90. 
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(a. I. ) Preconditions of and Prohibitions on Marriage 
In order to contract a valid marriage, a Muslim man or woman must be sane and must 
have reached puberty 15. However, most Islamic countries have enacted legislation 
setting the age limit for men and women for contracting a valid marriage. In 
Bangladesh, the Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929)16 as amended by Ordinance in 
198417, sets the minimum ages of marriage at 21 for men and 18 for women. The 
legislation provides penal sanctions for those who knowingly participate in the 
contracting of an under-age marriage, but does not invalidate such marriages. Islam and 
Ahmed observe that the rise in age at marriage in Bangladesh has been remarkably slow 
during the last 70 years as compared with other South Asian countries. Their study 
shows that a significant proportion (18 per cent) of women marry before they reach 
puberty. They conclude that of the several background variables included in their 
analysis, illiteracy emerges as the most significant factor in explaining the high 
incidence of early marriage. As they point out, although the Government of Bangladesh 
in 1984 established the legal age at marriage as 18 years for females and 21 for males, 
the law is hardly observed in rural areas. As a result, the age at marriage remains 
appreciably low in such places. According to the authors, "the traditional marriage 
system in rural areas places great emphasis on protecting family honour by ensuring that 
daughters are married off before they could bring disgrace to the family through either 
becoming pregnant outside marriage or reaching an age where they could be considered 
15 Uhlman/UmHani, n. 2 above. 
16 (Act XIX of 1929) 8 PC 430,11 BC 77. 
17 Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance (1984) [(XXXVIII of 1984) 36 DLR (Sta) 134. 
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to be "old maids". People start to worry about old-maid status if a woman reaches the 
age of 18 or 19 without marrying. Among rural people, a more sanguine attitude 
concerning this perception is that girls are considered old maids if they remain 
unmarried at 15"18. 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (1939)19 which remains in force in 
Bangladesh with the amendments initiated during the Pakistani era by the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance (1961)20 prescribes for the exercise of the "option of puberty" 
that entitles a girl contracted into marriage by her father or other guardian before the age 
of 18 to repudiate the marriage (provided it has not been consummated) before attaining 
the age of 19. 
Aside from these preconditions, a marriage may be prohibited on grounds of religion, 
kindred affinity and fosterage. These grounds can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Prohibition on grounds of religion: In Islam, while a Muslim man is allowed (by all 
the juristic schools) to marry a Jewish or Christian woman, a Muslim woman is not 
allowed to many a non-Muslim man. For example, in Bangladesh, the general rule is 
that a Muslim man may contract a valid marriage with a non-Muslim kitabia2' woman. 
He may also marry a Hindu or Buddhist woman in which context the marriage would 
18 MN Islam and AU Ahmed 'Age at First Marriage and its Determinants in Bangladesh' (June, 
1998) 13 Asia-Pacific Population Journal 2. 
kviii or iyJy) ym /10. 
`° n. 5 above. 
21 Either a Christian or a Jew. 
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not be "void" but "irregular". 22 A Muslim woman on the other hand, cannot contract a 
valid marriage with anyone other than a Muslim man. For example, a marriage between 
a Muslim woman and a kitabia man would be irregular while a marriage between a 
Muslim woman and a Hindu man would be invalid and any children born out of the 
wedlock would be illegitimate. 23 
(ii) Prohibition on grounds of kindred and affinity: Uhlman/UmHani24 summarises the 
position of different schools with regard to prohibition on the ground of kindred and 
affinity as follows: According to the Malikis, Shafiis, Hanbalis, and the Shias, men are 
forbidden from marrying their ascendants, descendants, the ascendants or descendants of 
their wives, or the wives of their ascendants or descendants. Under the Shia Itlma- 
Ashari school, a man is also prohibited from marrying the ascendants or descendants of 
a woman with whom he committed adultery. The adulteress is prohibited to his 
ascendants and descendants as well. 25 
(iii) Prohibition on grounds of fosterage: Generally, any prohibited degree on grounds 
of kindred is also prohibited on grounds of fosterage or suckling. Children breast-fed 
from the same woman are prohibited from marrying each other when they come of age, 
and are considered related as "milk-brother" or "milk-sister". 6 
22 In case of "irregular" marriage, the children born out of such wedlock would be legitimate but the 
parties would not inherit from each other. 
3S Sobhan Legal Status of Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of law and 
International Affairs-BILEA, 1978). 




(a. 2. ) Formation of the Marriage Contract 
The most important features of an Islamic marriage contract are an offer (jab) and 
acceptance (qabul) occurring at the same meeting. In order for the contract to be valid, 
it is imperative that the man and woman both hear and understand the offer and 
acceptance. 27 According to the Sunni schools, the marriage also must be witnessed by 
two male witnesses, or one male and two female witnesses. There is no requirement 
under any school that the marriage contract be made in a particular form or ceremony28. 
In Bangladesh, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act (1974)29 has been 
enacted to strengthen the requirement of civil registration. It states that "every marriage 
solemnised under Muslim law shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act" and establishes the licensing of Marriage (Nikah) Registrars. The punishment 
for not registering a marriage is a prison sentence and/or a fine although failure to 
register does not invalidate the marriage. 
27 In this regard, Nasir (see n. 7 above, pp. 46-50) observes that in all schools except the Hanafi 
School, the general consensus among jurists is that a woman must have a legal guardian to conclude 
the marriage contract on her behalf even if she possesses full legal capacity. 
28 Uhlman/UmHani examines the works of various scholars and summarise the different positions 
adopted by various Islamic schools regarding the content/provisions of a marriage contract. For 
example, under the Hanbali school, the bride and groom have the right to add provisions to the 
marriage contract at the time of marriage or afterwards by including additional clauses provided that 
such clauses further the object of the marriage and not violate the Shari 'a. For instance, conditions 
that the husband need not maintain the wife, or that the husband must divorce a previous wife are 
deemed void. On the other hand, imposing conditions on the husband's right to take a second wife, 
or adding provisions granting the wife greater freedom of movement or the power to divorce her 
husband at will, are valid. Many Hanifr jurists today recognize that certain conditions may be 
added. While such Hanifis accept conditions that give the wife the right to divorce the husband at 
will, they consider a condition prohibiting the husband from taking another wife void. For details, 
see Uhlman/UmHani, n. 2 above. 
29 (LII of 1974) 27 DLR (Sta) 4. 
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(a. 3. ) Problems associated with the marriage procedures 
1. Although the main object behind the enactment of the Child Marriage Restraint Act 
(1929)30 was to restrain child marriage which is a common practice in the Sub-continent, 
child marriage still prevails in many rural parts of Bangladesh. In this regard, one of the 
main flaws that can be identified in the legislation is that the Child Marriage Restraint 
Act (1929) does not declare the marriage contracted in violation of the Act to be invalid. 
2. Rules governing the prohibition of marriage on the ground of religion are clearly 
discriminatory. While it allows a man to enter into a perfectly valid interfaith marriage 
with a Christian or Jewish woman, it does not allow such a marriage for a Muslim 
woman. Moreover, a marriage between a Muslim woman and a Hindu man is clearly 
void and the children born out of the wedlock are illegitimate, whereas it is only 
irregular for a Muslim man to marry a Hindu woman. This sometimes has grave 
implications for a Muslim woman entering into an interfaith marriage because of the 
social stigma attached to an interfaith marriage unrecognised by her religion. In such 
cases, the only option left to a Muslim woman seeking to marry a non-Muslim man of 
her choice is either to convert him to the Muslim faith (in which case he has to renounce 
his original faith) or take recourse to the Special Marriage Act (1872). 
31 But this Act 
also fails to provide satisfactory solution because to take advantage of this Act, the 
30 n. 16 above. 
31 (Act III of 1872) 2 BC 66,2 PC 62. In 1872, the Act introduced in British India a common form of 
civil marriage for all communities making it possible for an Indian of whatever caste or creed to 
enter into a valid marriage with a person belonging to any caste or creed, provided the parties 
registered the contract of marriage declaring inter alia that they did not belong to any religion. This 
Act was amended by Act XXX of 1923, making it possible for Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains 
(but not for Christians, Jews, Mahavardans and Parsecs) to declare their religion and yet get their 
marriage registered. 
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woman has to denounce her own religion as the Act only allows Hindus, Buddhists, 
Sikhs and Jains to declare their religion and yet get their marriage registered. 
3. For conducting a valid marriage the presence of two witnesses comprising of two men 
or one man and two women is required. So it is clear that for the purpose of witnessing a 
marriage, one man is deemed to be equivalent to two women. Although in the context of 
present day it is difficult to see the logic behind this rule, it is still practiced in 
Bangladesh. 
(b) Dower 
Dower (commonly known as mahr) can be described as the sum of money or other 
property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the 
marriage. The amount of dower is usually settled on the basis of the bride's social status, 
personal traits, and beauty. 32 According to Shari 'a law, whether or not it is specified in 
the marriage contract, it is binding on all Muslim men to pay his bride dower which 
could be a sum of money or other property that is of monetary value. 33 
The dower is considered a debt of the husband to his wife and he has to pay her the total 
amount on demand. The dower is considered the property of the wife, not her guardian 
or relatives . 14. Although a dower becomes binding as an effect of the marriage, it may be 
32 Uhlman/UmHani, n. 2 above. 
33 Nasir, n. 7 above, pp. 46,48. 
34 Ibid., p. 46. 
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paid immediately in full or be deferred. A "deferred" dower is payable to the wife upon 
a date agreed to by the couple, or upon divorce or death, whichever occurs first. 35 
It however, needs to be mentioned that from the perspective of gender equality the 
concept of dower is a controversial one based on the argument that it serves to reinforce 
stereotypical ideals of women's subordination and dependence on men. It is also argued 
that the concept of dower can operate as "bride price" in disguise which can be used to 
justify problematic practices common in many Muslim societies such as the "duty of 
obedience" (i. e., ta'a) owed by the wife to the husband. 3' Reflections of some of these 
problematic views and perceptions are highlighted in a study37. In this study, when 
asked about dower, one of the interviewees, an Imam said "dower means that a woman 
is to be taken on payment of a certain "price" and 50 percent of such "price" must be 
paid before consummation of marriage. Without "payment" such consummation shall be 
illegal. "38 A religious instructor of a school said that men have to pay dower in order to 
make women halal or permissible for themselves. In his words, "after all, when you buy 
a "thing" from the market you necessarily have to pay some price. Dower is likewise a 
price paid for the woman. "39 On the other hand, it needs to be noted that in many 
Muslim societies including in Bangladesh, where most women are dependent on their 
35 Ibid., p. 49. 
36 For detailed discussion on ta'a, see Chapter IV. 
37 A total of 110 interviews (of which 59 were women and 51 were men) were conducted in 15 
districts of Bangladesh as part of the project Women and Law in the Muslim World conducted by the 
International Solidarity Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws. For details see, S Kamal 
Her Unfearing Mind: Women and Muslim Laws in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Ain 0 Salish Kendro-ASK, 
2001). 
36 A total of 110 interviews (of which 59 were women and 51 were men) were conducted in 15 
districts of Bangladesh as part of the project Women and Law in the Muslim World conducted by the 
International Solidarity Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws. For details see- Ibid. 
39 A total of 110 interviews (of which 59 were women and 51 were men) were conducted in 15 
districts of Bangladesh as part of the project Women and Law in the Muslim World conducted by the 
International Solidarity Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws. For details see- Ibid. 
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husband for their subsistence, dower and maintenance are the only two forms of 
financial security usually available to women during marriage or after divorce. A large 
deferred dower specified in the marriage contract can operate as a safeguard for wives 
against unilateral divorce by the husbands and can also serve as an important bargaining 
tool for a wife in a situation where the husband wants to conduct a second marriage 
without her consent. 
Although in the context of Bangladesh dower can generally operate beneficially for 
women, a number of difficulties can be faced by women in ensuring it in practice. For 
example, the fact that the dower payable by the husband can be divided into categories 
such as "prompt" and "deferred" according to Shari 'a, sometimes creates difficulties for 
women as it can result in the reduction of the total amount of dower payable if the 
husband can show that the prompt dower has been paid in the form of jewelry or other 
valuable items given to the bride at the time of the marriage ceremony and there is not 
much left to be paid in the form of deferred dower. In this regard, Monsoor40 examines 
some of the unreported judgment of the Family Courts which clearly show that the right 
of dower can be curtailed by reducing the amount payable by the husband using the 
customary concept of usool (or "paid")41. The concept of usool practiced in Bangladesh 
can be described as a practice by which the bridegroom and his relatives at the time of 
marriage assert that a portion of dower has been paid by jewelry or other valuable 
goods. This might be noted down in the kabinnama which is the document that 
evidences the contract of marriage. Monsoor in this regard cites cases which reveal that 
40 T Monsoor From Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Family Law and its Impact on Women in 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 1999). 
41 The term usool refers to the amount of money being paid or given to the wife or spent in relation to 
the marriage ceremony. 
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whether any portion of dower is actually paid or not, if it is mentioned in the registered 
kabinnama, the Courts tend to reduce the amount of dower by the alleged usool. 42 She 
further observes that the tendency to reduce the dower amount in the form of usool can 
also be found in cases where the registered kahinnama did not specify that a part of 
dower has been paid by the husband at the marriage ceremony43. In some cases the 
Family Courts even go so far as to decide that the usool in the form of jewelry and other 
items can substitute for the entire amount of dower so that the wife is entitled to no 
dower at al1.44 Side by side with this trend, Monsoor's analysis of unreported cases of 
the Family Courts also reveals that instances where the courts are enterprising in 
determining whether the husband actually paid the dower. For example, she cites Ambia 
Khatoon v Md. Yasin Bepari45 where the defendant husband, in order to evade the 
payment of dower, relied on out-of-court settlements and agreements. During trial, the 
husband contended that he paid a large amount of dower as usool. The Family Court 
rejected his claims by observing that his claims are contradictory in themselves and held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to the payment of the prompt dower as the marriage 
between the parties still subsisted. 46 
42 As evidence of this, Monsoor cites various unreported cases of the Family Courts such as Mst. 
Razia Akhtcr v Abul Kalam Azad Family Suit No. 193 of 1989 (unreported), Mst. Hafeza Bibi v 
Md. Shafiqul Alam Family Suit No. 28 of 1992 (unreported), Mst Roksana Begum v Md. Abul 
Khair Family Suit No. 96 of 1991 (unreported). For details, see Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
4n support of this, Monsoor cites a recent case Mst. Mahsina Tahassum Shirin v Abul Karim. 
Family SuitNo. 9 of 1992 (unreported). For details, sec- Ibid. 
44 Monawara Bcgum v Hanna Hawladar Family Suit No. 15 of 1991 (unreported) and the reference 
made to it in Monsoor (n. 40 above). 
4' Family Suit No. 98 of 1990 (unreported). For details, see-Ibid. 
46 Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
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The above discussion clearly illustrates some of the problems associated with the rules 
regarding dower and the difficulties the women encounter in claiming it in practice. 
They can be summarised as follows: 
1. As seen above, while Shari 'a law prescribes that the dower is payable on demand, a 
range of customary practices curtail this right by reducing the amount of dower in 
various ways. 
2. Also, it is interesting to note that while the law lays down that dower can be 
demanded anytime including during the subsistence of marriage, the socio-legal 
condition and subordinate status of women in the family and society make it difficult for 
a woman to demand or get the dower during the subsistence of her marriage. In this 
regard, Monsoor draws attention to recent studies revealing a dismal picture of how this 
right has been proved to be almost ineffective in reality for women in Bangladesh. 
According to one study conducted in the metropolitan city of Dhaka, 88 percent of 
Muslim wives did not receive any dower47. 
3. As has been discussed, in the context of Bangladesh where most of the women 
depend on their husband or father for survival, dower is one of the few forms of 
financial security available to women particularly after divorce. But, as discussed later 
in this Chapter, in the case of a Khula divorce (when the desire to separate emanates 
from the wife), the wife has to forego the right to dower. Therefore, the only possible 
situation when a wife can demand dower upon divorce is when the divorce is initiated 
by the husband. 
47 S Akhter How Far Muslim Laws are Protecting the Rights of the Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
1992) p. 35 and the reference made to her in Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
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(c ) Polygamy 
Polygamy is an issue that has given rise to a lot of debates over the years in many 
Muslim societies seeking to reform their personal status laws. One of the main obstacles 
to abolishing polygamy is the argument that polygamy is explicitly permitted by the 
Qur'an. Central to this argument is verse 4: 3 of the Qur'an which states: 
If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry 
women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not 
be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your 
right hand possesses. That will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing 
injustice. b 
This verse has been interpreted as giving permission to Muslim men to marry up to four 
women simultaneously. But many feminist writers and Muslim reformists do not accept 
this interpretation. According to them, permission to engage in polygamy is subject to 
the condition that the man can do full justice to all of the wives. "Justice" according to 
some commentators does not only mean equality in the provision of food, clothes, 
residence or money but also equality in love, affection and esteem. 
49 As it is arguably 
impossible for any man to give equal love, affection and esteem to all his wives, they 
argue that the Islamic view of polygamy is not that of encouragement, but rather the 
opposite. 
In support of this argument verse 4: 129 of the Qur'an can be cited which states: 
48 The Holy Qur'an see English translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali at 
http: //web. umr. edu/msaumr/Quran . 4 Serajuddin, n. 4 above, p. 118. 
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Ye are never able to be fair and just as between women, even if it is your ardent 
desire: but turn not away (from a woman) altogether, so as to leave her (as it 
were) hanging (in the air). "' 
Unfortunately, in many Islamic societies including Bangladesh, the above requirement 
of doing justice among co-wives is not established as a condition precedent to a 
polygamous marriage but acts as a mere guideline or private "recommendation" to 
individuals. However, some attempts have been made by statute in Bangladesh to 
provide remedies to a wife whose husband has taken a second wife against her wish or 
to a wife who is subjected to unequal treatment by the husband. Unlike countries such as 
Tunisia, Bangladeshi law does not prohibit polygamy altogether but only imposes some 
procedural restrictions on the practice by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961)51. 
Section 6 of the Ordinance provides that no man during the subsistence of an existing 
marriage shall enter into another marriage except with the prior permission of the 
Arbitration Council. Application for such permission must be made to the Chairman of 
the Union Council, 52 stating the reasons for the proposed marriage and whether the 
consent of the existing wife (or wives) to this marriage has been obtained. On receipt of 
the application the Chairman shall ask the applicant and the existing wife or wives each 
to nominate a representative and these representatives together with the Chairman shall 
constitute the Arbitration Council. If the Arbitration Council is satisfied that the 
proposed marriage is necessary and just, it may grant the permission requested, subject 
50 n. 48 above. 
51n. 5 above. 
52 "Union Council" is a unit of the local government administered by elected representatives. 
According to Section 2(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961), the term "Chairman" 
includes- Chairman of the Union Parishad; the Chairman of the Paurashava; the Mayor or 
Administrator of the Municipal Corporation and the person appointed by the Government to 
discharge the functions of a Chairman where the Union Parishad, Paurashava or Municipal 
Corporation is superseded and in the Cantonment areas. 
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to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose. The Arbitration Council must record the 
reasons for its decision and any party aggrieved by the decision may file a revision 
application to the Sub-Divisional officer. 53 His or her decision shall be final and cannot 
be challenged in any court. Section 6 further lays down that if a marriage is contracted 
without prior permission of the Arbitration Council, the husband shall be liable-a) to 
pay forthwith the entire amount of the dower which is due to the existing wife or wives, 
which amount, if not immediately paid, shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue; 
and b) on conviction upon complaint, to punishment with simple imprisonment which 
may extend to one year, or with fine or with both. In addition, it is well established by 
statute that a wife who is subjected to unequal treatment can seek judicial dissolution of 
her marriage according to section 2(viii) (f) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 
(193 9)54 and section 13 of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961), 55 
Although the intent behind passing the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) was to 
restrict the practice of polygamy, various loopholes in the law prevented it from 
achieving the expected success. For example, although it is laid down in the Ordinance 
that a marriage without the permission of the Arbitration Council is punishable with a 
fine and imprisonment, it does not declare the polygamous marriage itself to be illegal 
or void. It is, therefore, evident that the Ordinance does not directly affect the rights of 
the husband in any substantive way but only circumscribes that right to some extent by 
53 A bureaucrat at the local government level. 
54 n. 19 above. 
55 According to section 2(viii) (f) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act (1939), a woman 
married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on 
the ground, inter alia, that the husband treats her with cruelty. This has been reinforced by section 13 
of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) which established that a second marriage contracted 
against the first wife's consent constitutes a ground for divorce. 
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imposing some procedural impediments56. Since a second marriage contrary to section 6 
is a perfectly valid marriage, penalties prescribed in it are not a sufficient deterrent as 
this often enables a man to get away with just paying the monetary fine57. Furthermore, 
instead of making polygamy subject to prior authorisation of the court (as in Morocco 
where according to the recent amendment in 2004, the judge before authorising a second 
marriage must make sure that there is no "presumption of inequity" and that the husband 
has the ability to treat the second wife on an equal footing with the first), the Ordinance 
leaves it to the decision of a non-judicial Arbitration Council. As these Arbitration 
Councils are usually composed of men, their decisions often reflect a bias in favour of 
husbands in giving permission for a second marriage. Serajuddin in this regard draws 
attention to several studies which reveal that the applications for permission to contract 
a second marriage are hardly ever refused by the Arbitration Council. According to a 
survey, out of 32 men who applied for permission during the years 1966-68, all but one 
had been granted permission to remarry. Another survey also reveals a similar picture. 
Here 32 unions in eight Thanas covering all geographical divisions and social strata of 
the Country were surveyed. It was found that 35 per cent of the polygamous marriages 
that took place in one year came up before the Arbitration Council for settlement. 
Permission was granted in 70 per cent of these cases and refused in 13 per cent of 
cases. 59 Monsoor observes in this regard that although the Ordinance provides the 
56 Serajudin, n. 4 above. 
57 Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
sa Socially recognised grounds like barrenness or chronic ill health of the first wife or the 
need for an extra hand in the household work accounted for two-thirds of the 
polygamous marriages. A husband's wealth and influence, luxury, hobby, sex-urge, 
discord between spouses and the wife's bad looks were responsible for the remaining 
third. For details, see S Qadir Modernization of Agrarian Society: A Sociological Study Of the 
Operation Of Muslim Family laws Ordinance and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance in East 
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opportunity of an appeal against the decision of the Arbitration Council, the socio- 
economic reality in Bangladesh makes it very difficult for an aggrieved woman to do so 
as she often has to depend on her husband for her bare subsistence. 
59 Although the 
Ordinance requires the first wife's consent to enter into the second marriage, her consent 
can be extorted in many ways. For example, if she does not give consent to her husband 
to a polygamous marriage, he can simply divorce her and go ahead with another 
marriage which often leads to the problem of successive monogamy instead of 
simultaneous polygamy. 60 As the husband's power to initiate unilateral divorce without 
adjudication or showing any reason still remains intact, the wife is sometimes left with 
no other choice but to give her consent for fear of being divorced. In the same way, the 
wife, although given the right to seek divorce on the ground of polygamy, is seldom in a 
position to exercises this right for fear of being left alone in society without financial 
support and protection. The fact to be noted here is that although in other Muslim 
Countries, notably in the Middle East, divorce does not carry a stigma, in the Indian 
Subcontinent it does. ' Some of these problems have been further highlighted from the 
observations of the interviewees in a study. In that study, most of the interviewees 
agreed that the requirement of obtaining permission from the first wife before 
conducting a second marriage is totally ineffective because first of all, women who are 
entirely dependent on their husbands have no choice but to give consent. Secondly, 
refusal to give consent may entail torture and other forms of violence. And thirdly, she 
may have to confront the threat of divorce or even death. Fourthly, it is the children who 
Pakistan (mimeograph) (Mymensingh: Agricultural University, 1968) p. II and the reference made to 
him in Serajuddin, n. 4 above. 
59 Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
60 Serajuddin, n. 4 above, p. 169. 
61 Sobhan, n. 23 above, p. 23. 
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suffer most if the husband is punished by law for defying the conditions of the 
Ordinance. 62 
In this regard we should take notice of a decision of the High Court Division of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court in which the Court examined the issue as to whether Islam 
truly approves of polygamy. In Jesmin Sultana v. Mohammad Elias (1997)63, the High 
Court held that since section 6 of the Ordinance does not prohibit polygamy altogether, 
it is against the principle of Islamic Law. The Court by citing a number of Qur'anic 
verses and hadith affirmed that "to be able to deal justly" is the condition precedent to 
marry more than one woman and the impression implies equality in love and affection. 
Since this essential condition for polygamy is practically impossible to fulfil because of 
the "weakness of human nature" and also because of the "modem social and economic 
conditionsi64, the Court accepted the argument put forward by some modem 
commentators that the permission to take a second wife amounts virtually to a 
prohibition. The Court while considering various persuasive sources of law on this 
point, also noted that the Tunisian Code of Personal Status has given legislative effect to 
this interpretation by abolishing polygamy. As such, the Court concluded that section 6 
of the Ordinance is against the principle of Islam and recommended this section to be 
deleted and substituted with a section prohibiting polygamy altogether. The Court also 
62 A total of 110 interviews (of which 59 were women and 51 were men) were conducted in 15 
districts of Bangladesh as part of the project Women and Law in the Muslim World conducted by the 
International Solidarity Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws. For details sec, Kamal, 
n. 37 above. 
63 
17 BLD 4. 
64 This view was mainly adopted by Justice Mohammad Gholam Rabbani from the arguments of the 
Tunisian jurists. See Ibid., para 17 of the judgment. 
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referred the judgment to the Ministry of Law for amending the law accordingly. No 
action is known to have been taken on it. 
(d) Divorce 
There are generally three ways to dissolve a marriage during the lifetime of the spouses 
under Islamic law: (i) by mutual agreement of the parties, known as khula or 177uubarat, 
65 
(ii) by the act of the husband, called talaq, and (iii) by a judicial process known as faskh. 
The Islamic law of divorce is often criticised for granting unlimited and arbitrary power 
to men and for perpetrating injustice and disadvantage against women. The most 
controversial aspect of the Islamic law of divorce is talaq, i. e., a husband's freedom to 
terminate the marriage unilaterally. 66 While discussing the devastating effect of talq on 
65 One of the unique features of Islamic law of divorce is the dissolution of marriage by the common 
consent of the parties. When there is an agreement between the parties to dissolve the marriage at the 
initiative of the wife and the wife gives a consideration such as surrendering her dower to the 
husband for her release from the marriage, it is called khula. If the dissolution is effected by mutual 
agreement and aversion of the parties it is known as mubarat. In the cases of talaq, 4-hula and 
mubarat no decree of the judge is necessary to dissolve the marriage. 
66 According to classical Islamic law of divorce, a Muslim man may divorce his wife whenever he 
desires. The talaq operates from the time of pronouncement. The divorce may be either oral or in 
writing. The wife's consent or lack of consent in this regard is immaterial. Even her presence at the 
time of pronouncement of divorce is not an essential condition for the validity of the divorce. The 
traditional Islamic law recognises two kinds of talaq. s: (i) talaq al-Sunnah, and (ii) talaq-i-bid'at. 
Serajuddin summarises the classical Islamic position on different forms of talaq. Talaq al-Sunnah 
may be pronounced in two forms: ahsan or the most approved hasan or the approved form. In the 
ahsan form, the husband pronounces a single talaq in a tuhr or period of purity when the woman is 
free from her menstrual course and abstains from sexual intercourse during the iddat period. The 
husband may revoke the talaq at any time during the iddat and resume conjugal life with his wife. 
After the expiration of iddal the divorce becomes final. The hasan form of talaq consists of three 
successive pronouncement of talaq during three consecutive tuhrs or periods of purity. Unless the 
husband revokes the talaq earlier, the third pronouncement operates in law as a final and irrevocable 
dissolution of marriage. The husband cannot remarry the divorced woman unless she goes through 
the ceremony of marriage with another man which is consummated and is itself validly dissolved by 
the death of the husband or by divorce. Both these forms of talaq give opportunity and time for 
reconciliation between the parties. For details, see Serajuddin, n. 4 above, p. 203. 
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Muslim women Anderson observes: "The Muslim wife lives under the perpetual threat 
of divorce. She never knows when this may happen. Even her husband himself may not 
know when this may happen; for a husband who swears an oath by `triple divorce', or 
who makes divorce conditional on something which someone else may do, does not 
himself know when his wife may be divorced. Thus the happiness of the married couple, 
of their children and of the family may depend on some act extraneous to the will of the 
head of the family or on the will of the mistress of the family. "67 
It is important to note that while to men the Islamic law grants unilateral right to 
divorce, the wife's right in this regard is made subject to certain conditions. The 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (1939) in Bangladesh provides a list of specific 
grounds which a woman must prove in order to divorce her husband. 68 In addition to the 
above, courts can grant judicial khula which allow a woman to obtain divorce by 
waiving her financial rights. In Balgis Fatima v Naim-ul-Ikram Oureshi (1959)9, the 
Court observed that a woman can be granted khula by judicial decision in spite of a 
husband's refusal to end the marriage if the Court is of the opinion that the marriage has 
in fact broken down. This decision was reaffinned in the later cases such as Mst. 
67 J Anderson Law Reform In the Muslim World (London: Athlone Press, 1976), p. 125. 
68 According to section 2 of The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (1939) [n. 19 above], the 
grounds on which women may seek divorce include: desertion for four years; failure to maintain for 
two years or polygamy by the husband in contravention of established legal procedures, i. e., a 
polygamous marriage by the husband in contravention of the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance (1961)--husband's imprisonment for seven years; husband's failure to perform marital 
obligations for three years; husband's continued impotence from the time of the marriage; husband's 
insanity for two years or serious illness; wife's exercise of her option of puberty if she was 
contracted into marriage by any guardian before the age of 18 and repudiates the marriage before the 
age of 19 (as long as such marriage was not consummated); husband's cruelty (including physical or 
other mistreatment, unequal treatment of co-wives); any other ground recognised as valid for 
dissolution of marriage under Muslim law. 
69 PLD (WP) Lahore 566. 
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Khurshid Bibi v Muhammad Amin (1967)70 and Hasina Ahmed v. Syed Abul Fazal 
(1980)71. It is important to note that there is also an option to expressly delegate the 
"right of divorce" (known as talaq-e-tafweed) by the husband to the wife in the 
kabinnama or a marriage contract. The wife, if the power is delegated to her in this way 
can initiate divorce extra judicially. 
In 1961, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was passed which set out the procedure to 
be followed for divorce. According to section 7 of the Ordinance, any man who wishes 
to divorce his wife needs to give notice in writing to the Chairman of the Union Council 
and a copy of such notice to the wife after pronouncing talaq in any form72. A talaq 
will not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice is 
delivered to the Chairman73. Within thirty days of the receipt of notice, the Chairman 
shall constitute an Arbitration Council to bring about reconciliation between the 
parties. 74 Subsection 2 of section 7 provides that any person divorcing his or her partner 
in contravention of the Ordinance shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to one year or with fine or both. Another important contribution 
of the Ordinance is that it has abolished the extremely arbitrary and oppressive practice 
of talaq-i-bid'at or triple divorce by the husband75. Section 7(6) of the Ordinance also 
70 PLD SC 97. 
71 32 DLR 294. 
72 n. 5 above, Section 7 (1). 
73 Ibid., Section 7 (3). 
74 Ibid., Section 7 (4). 
75 Talaq-i-bid'at or triple divorce is an extremely abusive form of divorce in which three 
pronouncements of talaq are made either in one sentence, e. g., "I divorce you" thrice or in three 
sentences, e. g., "I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you". After such pronouncement the divorce 
becomes final and irrevocable. In this form of divorce, there is no room for reconciliation and 
remarriage with the husband is only possible if the wife marries another man and he then divorces 
her after consummation of the marriage. Before the enactment of the Ordinance the practice of talaq- 
74 
allows remarriage between the parties after divorce without an intervening marriage 
with a third person, unless such divorce is for the third time so effective. 
Despite the efforts made by legislators to restrict the abuse of divorce by men, some 
flaws still exist in the Ordinance which works against the interests of women. In the 
first place, instead of referring the matter of divorce to a court, as in Morocco and 
Tunisia, the Ordinance refers it to a non judicial body, i. e., an Arbitration Council. 
Secondly, as Serajuddin76 points out, the Ordinance simply freezes for ninety days 
the talaq pronounced by the husband for the purpose of bringing about a 
reconciliation between the spouses. But unlike the divorce procedure in Tunisia and 
Morocco, the reconciliation effort under section 7 does not precede the 
pronouncement of talaq, it follows it. In this regard, it is important to note that 
according to the Ordinance, if the reconciliation process does not succeed (which 
most of the time depends on the husband's will) the divorce automatically takes 
effect ninety days after the notice. So, the husband's unilateral right to divorce 
remains intact under the Ordinance, except that there is a procedure of notice and 
reconciliation to which he has to adhere77. 
(e) Maintenance 
The issue of maintenance is a significant one in the context of Bangladesh where the 
majority of women have to depend on their husband or father for their subsistence. 
According to Shari 'a law it is the responsibility of the husband to maintain his wife and 
i-bid'at was quite common in the Subcontinent. Unfortunately it is still practiced in some rural parts 
of Bangladesh in contravention of the Ordinance. 
76 Serajuddin, n. 4 above. 
77 Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
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children and to provide for their daily necessities such as shelter, housing, food clothes, 
educational and other expenses. The basic Shari 'a principles and rules governing the 
maintenance of wife and children are based on the following three verses of the Qur'an: 
Let the man of means spend according to his means: and the man whose 
resources are restricted, let him spend according to what Allah has given him. 
Allah puts no burden on any person beyond what He has given him. After a 
difficulty, Allah will soon grant relief. 78 (Verse 2: 233 of the Holy Qur'an) 
Let the women live (in 'iddat) in the same style as ye live, according to your 
means: Annoy them not, so as to restrict them. And if they carry (life in their 
wombs), then spend (your substance) on them until they deliver their burden: 
and if they suckle your (offspring), give them their recompense: and take 
mutual counsel together, according to what is just and reasonable. And if ye 
find yourselves in difficulties, let another woman suckle (the child) on the 
(father's) behalf. 79 (Verse 65: 6 of the Holy Qur'an) 
Let the man of means spend according to his means: and the man whose 
resources are restricted, let him spend according to what Allah has given him. 
Allah puts no burden on any person beyond what He has given him. After a 
difficulty, Allah will soon grant relief. 80 (Verse 65: 7 of the Holy Qan"'an) 
Under Shar-Pa law the maintenance of the wife is obligatory upon the husband 
irrespective of any impediments on his part, such as, financial difficulties. Moreover, 
any agreement between a husband and wife stipulating that no maintenance shall be 
payable by the husband or any undertaking given by the wife that she will not claim 
maintenance is void as being contrary to public policy. 8' As Syed Ameer Ali, J., says: 
"it makes no difference in the husband's liability to maintain the wife, whether he be in 
health, or suffering from illness, whether he be a prisoner of war or undergoing 
punishment, "justly or unjustly" for some crime, whether he be absent from home on 
78 See English translation of the Holy Qur'an, n. 48 above. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Serajuddin, n. 4 above. 
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pleasure or business, or gone on a pilgrimage, and whether he be rich or poor. "82 The 
husband is thus legally bound to maintain his wife and provide her with all the 
necessities such as clothing, housing, food and medicine at his own expense. 
83 The 
matrimonial home is a central aspect of maintenance and a wife is expected to follow 
her husband to the matrimonial home provided it complies with Shari'a requirements84. 
According to the Shari 'a, the home must be suitable based on the husband's financial 
status, habitable and private. She cannot be required to share it with any other relatives 
of the husband against her will. If the husband has more than one wife, he has to treat 
them equitably and provide their maintenance even ly8s 
The statutory law that governs disputes related to maintenance is the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance (1961)x6 section 9 of which provides that if the husband fails to 
maintain his wife adequately, or where there are more wives than one, fails to maintain 
them equitably, the wife or wives, may in addition to seeking any other legal remedy 
available apply to the Chairman of the Union Council who shall constitute an 
Arbitration Council to determine the matter, and the Arbitration Council may issue a 
certificate specifying the amount which shall be paid as maintenance by the husband. 
The amount if not paid in due time, shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. 
From this it becomes evident that the amount of maintenance to be paid can be 
82 SA Ali Maliommedan Law (Vol. 11) (Lahore: Law Publishing Company, 1965-reprint) 
83 J Nasir in this regard observes that maintenance "is the right of the wife to be provided at the 
husband's expense, and on a scale suitable to his means, with food, clothing, housing, toilet 
necessities, medicine, doctors' and surgeons' fees, baths, and also the necessary servants where the 
wife is of a social position which does not permit her to dispense with such services, or when she is 
sick. " For details, see Nasir, n. 7 above, p. 59. 
84 Serajuddin, n. 4 above. 
85 Ibid. 
86 n. 5 above. 
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determined by the Arbitration Council. But unfortunately the Ordinance does not lay 
down any rules by which the quantum of the maintenance can be determined. 
It is important to point out that the wife can add to the marriage contract provisions 
protecting her right to maintenance for future. As Serajuddin observes, a stipulation by 
the husband to pay separate maintenance to his wife in case of disagreement, dissention, 
ill feeling or separation between the spouses is not against public policy and is 
enforceable in law. Similarly, a stipulation making a settlement for life for the wife's 
maintenance or entitling her to live away from her husband and yet receive maintenance 
if the husband ever takes a second wife is not opposed to public policy. But stipulation 
that she may leave the matrimonial home for any reason or that she will have an 
unconditional right to maintenance have been held to be against the public policy and 
invalid. 87 
In addition, a wife can seek divorce on the ground of a husband's failure to maintain. 
Section 2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act (1939)88 provides that the wife 
is entitled to obtain a decree of divorce if the husband has neglected or failed to provide 
for her maintenance for a period of two years. 
It is important to note that while in Shari 'a law the maintenance of a wife during the 
subsistence of a marriage is obligatory upon the husband, such a duty is also conditional. 
The wife's right to maintenance is generally based on two conditions: (1) the wife 
granting her husband sexual access to herself at all lawful times (tamkeen); and (2) the 
87 Serajuddin, n. 4 above, p. 268. 
98 n. 19 above. 
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wife obeying her husband's lawful commands. If the wife fails to fulfil any of these 
conditions, she loses her right to maintenance. For example, according to the majority of 
Islamic jurists, a wife who works outside the home without her husband's permission is 
not entitled to maintenance. 89 
According to the provisions of Shari 'a the husband is thus bound to maintain his wife so 
long as she remains faithful to him and remains "obedient". But he is not liable for her 
maintenance when she takes employment outside the house without his consent, goes on 
a voyage without her husband's permission even if it is for the hqj pilgrimage, or she is 
guilty of nushuz or disobedience 90. Nashiza is a special juristic term meaning "the wife 
who leaves the matrimonial home without a lawful reason or denies her husband access 
to the home which she owns without first requesting him to accommodate her 
elsewhere. i91 Thus, if the wife leaves the husband's house against his will without any 
valid reason or denies him access to her house, she would disentitle herself to 
maintenance. But if she is living with her husband, although refusing to cohabit with 
him she is not deemed to be nashiza or disobedient and does not, therefore, lose her 
right to maintenance. 92 For example in Ahmad Ali v Sabha Khatun Bibi (1952)9, the 
Court observed, "It is no doubt true that the husband is bound to maintain his wife so 
long as she is faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders. But he is not bound to 
maintain her if she refuses herself to him or is otherwise disobedient unless the refusal 
'9 Nasir, n. 7 above, p. 102. 
90 Serajuddin, n. 4 above. 
91 J Nasir, The Status of Women Under Islamic Law and Under Modern Islamic Legislation (London: 
Graham and Trotman, 1995), p. 63. 
92 Scrajuddin, n. 4 above. 
934DLR613. 
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or disobedience is justified. " In Begum Harnida v Abdul Hamid (1974)94 the Court 
observed that: 
In view of the circumstances which made it impossible for her to live with 
her husband and compelled her to have a separate residence for her and her 
children, her claim for maintenance cannot be refused if the claim is 
otherwise not sustainable. 
According to Shari 'a law, a wife is entitled to receive maintenance not only during the 
subsistence of the marriage but also reasonably after dissolution of the marriage. 
95 
Although it is now well established that the husband is bound to maintain the wife for 
three months (known as iddat period) after the dissolution of marriage, it has been 
argued by various women's groups and academics that the provision for post divorce 
maintenance should be extended beyond that period. It can be argued that in the context 
of Bangladesh where husbands have unilateral and arbitrary right to divorce, it is not 
justified that the right to maintenance (which is often the only means of survival for 
many women in Bangladesh) should be limited to the iddat period only. In India it has 
been argued in Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum (1985)96 that maintenance 
after divorce is an obligation of the ex-husband. In Bangladesh similar attempt was 
made to extend the post-divorce maintenance beyond the iddat period. In Muhammad 
94 26 DLR (SC) 26. 
95 The Qur'an, 2: 228 and 2: 241. See English translation of the Hole Qur'an, n. 48 above. 
96 AIR (SC) 945. The Supreme Court in this case decided in favour of Shah Bano and granted her 
maintenance for life under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that 
since Criminal Procedure Code is common for all citizens she can claim maintenance under the Code 
and that Muslim personal law will not be applicable in this matter. In response to the judgment, 
thousands of Muslims led mostly by the conservative Ulamas (Muslim leaders) organised protests 
against the Supreme Court decision. Ultimately a new legislation was enacted (The Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Law 1986) to prevent such a court decision in the future exempting 
the Muslim women from application of section 125 of the Code and keeping the classical position on 
maintenance in tact. 
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Hefzur Rahman v. Shamsun Nahar Be gum (1995)97 the Court held that a husband is 
bound to provide his divorced wife with maintenance until she remarries by 
progressively interpreting relevant verses of Qur'an. Unfortunately this decision was 
later overturned by the Supreme Court on 3 December 1998 leaving the classical Hanafi 
position (that post divorce maintenance should not extend beyond the iddat period) 
intact. 
From the above discussion a number of problems can be identified regarding the piles of 
maintenance followed in Bangladesh. 
First, as has been pointed out earlier although the duty of maintenance has been made 
obligatory on the husband, it has also been made subject to the duty of obedience by the 
wife which often serves as a big obstacle to women taking work outside the home or 
participating in the public domain. A double standard is clearly visible here. On the one 
hand, Shari'a law as operated in Bangladesh prescribes specific gender roles, i. e., male 
protector/provider female obedient/care giver. But the same law fails to give her 
sufficient financial protection by closing all the doors to her becoming self sufficient. 
Second, there is also a problem associated with the quantum of maintenance. It has been 
pointed out that there is no clear policy or guideline indicated either in the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance (1961)98 or in the Family Courts Ordinance (1985)99 to 
determine the amount of maintenance. 
97 It n. -- ID tSLU ý4. 
n. 5 above. 
9R 
99 (XVIII of 1985) 37 DLR (Sta) 159. 
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Third, if the husband evades paying maintenance, the only option left to the wife is to 
execute the decree as arrears of land revenue. As has been discussed in Chapter I, the 
Family Courts who are given the power to decide disputes related to maintenance are 
not given any criminal jurisdiction in the matter under the Family Courts Ordinance 
(1985). Monsoor in this regard observes that men in patriarchal society have the power 
to use social harassment, family slander and, in the extreme, physical threats so as not to 
implement the law. She therefore suggests that the sanctions of the Family Courts in this 
regard should be strengthened by providing them with a criminal court's power to attach 
the property of the husband to pay maintenance to the wife. 100 
(f) Restitution of conjugal rights 
Legal provisions governing the Restitution of Conjugal Rights were introduced during 
the British colonial rule under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859101. Furthermore, in 
1877, refusal of restitution of conjugal rights was made punishable by the same Code 
with attachment of property and imprisonment and it was enforced under the civil law of 
the country. Subsequently in 1908, the British made the punishment of imprisonment 
discretionary and in 1923 the punishment of imprisonment was withdrawn. 102 According 
to this law, both the Muslim husband and wife were entitled to the remedy of restitution 
00 For details, see Monsoor, n. 40 above, p. 218. 
01 Act XV of 1859. This earlier Code went through a number of revisions and amendments in the 
hands of various Law Commissions appointed during the British Period. The reformed version of the 
Code is now known as the Code of Civil Procedure (1908) [(V of 1908) 6 BC 1,5 PC 1]. For details 
on the evolution of the Code, see- Government of Pakistan Reports of Ad hoc Law Reform 
Commissions, available at: httD: Hxvww. licl2. gov. pk/menu%20items/item-09/3-. 
(Last accessed 11.10.04). r- Monsoor, 
n. 40 above, p. 73. 
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of conjugal rights. 103 But as Monsoor observes, such a remedy was not actually useful to 
Muslim women as the husband could always unilaterally or extra judicially divorce the 
wife. ' 04 
Fortunately, in Bangladesh some legal development has occurred in this field through 
case law. In Nelly Zaman v. Giasuddin Khan (1982)105, the Court ruled that, with the 
passage of time, the husband's right to sue for forcible restitution of conjugal rights 
against an unwilling wife is both outdated and unsustainable if considered in the light of 
the principle of equality of men and women enshrined in Articles 27 and 31 of the 
Constitution. The Court observed-- 
in a husband's unilateral plea for forcible restitution of conjugal rights as 
against a wife unwilling to live with her husband, there is no mutuality 
and reciprocity between the respective rights of the husband and the wife, 
since such plea for restitution of conjugal rights is not available to a wife 
as against her husband apart from claiming maintenance and alimony. A 
reference to Article 28(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh guaranteeing 
equal rights of women and men in all spheres of the state and public life 
would clearly indicate that any unilateral plea of a husband for forcible 
restitution of conjugal rights as against a wife unwilling to live with her 
husband is violative of the accepted state and public principle and 
policy. '06 
The unpublished judgments of the Family Court with regard to the issue of restitution of 
conjugal rights indicate that the progressive judgments of the higher judiciary have had 
effects on the lower tier of the judiciary. 107 
(g) Custody and Guardianship of Children 
103 T Mahmood The Muslim Law of India (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1980), p. 84. 
04 Monsoor, n. 40 above, p. 73. 
105 34 DLR 22 1. 
106 Ibid., at p. 222. 
107 For details, see- Monsoor, n. 40 above, p. 175. 
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The prevailing law in Bangladesh draws a distinction between custody and guardianship 
of children. According to classical Islamic law, a father is the natural guardian (al 
waley) of his children's persons and property. For custody the general rule is that the 
mother is entitled to the care and physical custody over male children until the age of 7 
and over female children until puberty. The right of a mother to the custody of her 
children continues when she is divorced by her husband, but she forfeits the right if she 
marries a stranger10s or changes her religion. In Bangladesh, the main legislation in this 
area is the Guardians and Wards Act (1890)109. Section 17 of the Act prescribes that the 
courts are to be guided by the personal law by which the minor is governed. The courts 
are also directed to consider the age, gender and religion of the minor and the character 
and capacity of the proposed guardian, as well as considering the minor's own opinion. 
In all cases, the interests of the child should be the paramount consideration by the 
courts. In addition, the Act also provides the court with the power to appoint someone 
(including the mother) as the guardian of a child upon application if the court is satisfied 
that it is for the welfare of the child. 
In her analysis of judicial trends regarding the cases of custody and guardianship of 
children, Monsoor observes that in the cases of guardianship, the judiciary of 
Bangladesh is mainly following a conservative line of interpretation by not recognising 
a woman as the natural guardian of her children but in the cases of custody the judiciary 
of Bangladesh seems to be protecting women more by recognising a mother's right to 
A non-relative or a relative who is not in a prohibited degree of relation to the child. 
109 (VIII of 1890) 3 BC 292,3 PC 300. 
84 
the custody of her children as almost an absolute right. 
110 This has been confirmed in a 
number of judgments, such as Md. Abu Baker Siddigue v. S. M. A. Bakar & Others 
(1986)111. In this case the ruling of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh deviated from the classical dictates of Hanafi law according to which the 
mother's custody over a male child ends at 7. The Court stated that: 
[i]ndeed, the principle of Islamic Law (in the instant case, the rule of 
hizanal or guardianship of a minor child as stated in the Hanafi school) has 
to be regarded, but deviation there from would seem permissible as the 
paramount consideration should be the child's welfare. 
This reveals an interesting contradiction in Islamic personal law. On the one hand, the 
traditional Islamic stance accords almost absolute familial authority to the father. On the 
other hand, the assumption that women's natural role is that of caregiver provides a 
compelling reason for granting custody to women. This contradiction, which is also 
evident in western social and legal conceptions of the family, offers a rare example 
where women can sometimes legally benefit from the traditional gender role assumed by 
the religious laws. 
(h) Inheritance 
To understand the rules regarding inheritance in Islam we need to understand first, 
which of the relatives of the deceased are entitled to inherit and secondly, what is the 
quantum share entitlement of each of the heirs concerned. In this regard some of the 
I 10 Mosoor, n. 40 above, p. 193. 
'' ` 38 DLR (AD) 106. 
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verses of the Holy Qur'an give specific details on inheritance shares. These verses are 
as follows: 
Allah (thus) directs you as regards your Children's (Inheritance): to the 
male, a portion equal to that of two females: if only daughters, two or 
more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance; if only one, her share is a 
half. For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the deceased 
left children; if no children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother 
has a third; if the deceased Left brothers (or sisters) the mother has a sixth. 
(The distribution in all cases ('s) after the payment of legacies and debts. 
Ye know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to you in 
benefit. These are settled portions ordained by Allah and Allah is All- 
knowing, All-wise. 112 (Verse 4: 11 of the Holy Qur'an). 
In what your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave no child; but if 
they leave a child, ye get a fourth; after payment of legacies and debts. In 
what ye leave, their share is a fourth, if ye leave no child; but if ye leave a 
child, they get an eighth; after payment of legacies and debts. If the man or 
woman whose inheritance is in question, has left neither ascendants nor 
descendants, but has left a brother or a sister, each one of the two gets a 
sixth; but if more than two, they share in a third; after payment of legacies 
and debts; so that no loss is caused (to any one). Thus is it ordained by 
Allah. and Allah is All-knowing, Most Forbearing. ý3 (Verse 4: 12 of the 
Holy Qur'an). 
Serajuddin summarises the extremely detailed Sunni law of inheritance as follows: 
Where the propositus is survived by both sons and daughters, each son gets double the 
share of the daughter. If there is only one daughter and no son, the daughter takes half 
the property and if there are two or more daughters, they take two-thirds of the property. 
In an event where the propositus is survived by the parents and a child or children, male 
or female, each parent gets one-sixth of the property and in the absence of any children 
the mother takes one-third and the father the remaining two-thirds. If there are brothers 
and sisters but no children, the mother inherits one-sixth and the father the balance five- 
1: 2 See English translation of the Holy Qur'an, n. 48 above. 
ý3 Ibid. 
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sixths (the brothers and sisters in this case are excluded by the father). If a woman dies 
childless, her husband takes half of her estate, and if there is a child, he gets one fourth 
of the property only. On the other hand, where the husband dies childless, the wife 
receives one-fourth of her husband's estate, and one-eighth if there is a child. If there is 
one uterine sister or brother, she or he will take one-sixth of the inheritance and if there 
are more, they share in one-third. If the propositus leaves no parents or children but only 
a sister, whether consanguine or of full blood, she gets one-half of his estate; and two or 
more share in two-thirds. But if there be both brothers and sisters, each brother takes 
double the share of the sister. 114 
With the exception of son and brother of the propositus' 
15, the other shares in the estate, 
twelve in number-four males, i. e., father, true grandfather, uterine brother and 
husband, and eight females, i. e., wife, mother, true grandmother, daughter, son's 
daughter, uterine sister, full sister and consanguine sister- form a group of heirs called 
Qur'anic heirs or sharers (ashab al fiu-ud). These heirs when entitled to inherit are given 
their fixed shares and the remaining estate is inherited by the residuaries (asaba) who 
are divided into four classes, i. e., descendants, ascendants, descendants of the father and 
descendants of the grandfather. In the absence of sharers and residuaries the property 
will go to the distant kindred, i. e., those relations by blood who are neither sharers nor 
residuaries; they include paternal aunts, maternal aunts and uncles, the daughters of a 
brother and daughters of a paternal uncle116 . 
14 Serajuddin, n. 4 above, pp. 73-74. 
15 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. Scrajuddin also points out that two fundamental principles govern the application of the 
rules of inheritance. First, testamentary disposition of property is limited to one-third of the net estate 
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There are certain heirs referred to as primary heirs who are always entitled to a share of 
the inheritance and are never totally excluded. These primary heirs consist of the spouse, 
parents, the son and the daughter. All remaining heirs can be totally excluded by the 
presence of other heirs. There are several rules of exclusion which determine the 
exclusion of some heirs by the presence of others. The general principles in this regard 
can be summarised as follows: 
a. A person (e. g. brother) who is related to the deceased through another (i. e. father) 
person is excluded by the presence of the latter. b. An individual nearer in degree 
(proximity) to the deceased excludes the one who is remoter within the same class of 
heirs (son excludes all grandsons). c. Full blood excludes half-blood through father (so a 
full brother will exclude a consanguine brother but not a uterine brother). ' 17 
From the perspective of gender equality, the most problematic aspect of the Shari'a law 
of inheritance is the fact that women do not have an equal share in the deceased's 
property. In this regard it is significant to note that while the Qur'an provides that some 
women (i. e. daughter, mother and wife) would under all circumstances be entitled to 
some share and cannot be excluded from inheritance, they are not treated as equal to 
their male counterparts, i. e. son, father and husband for the purpose of allocation of 
share. In this regard the general rule is that the female is given one-half the share of the 
male. As seen above, in paternal property as well women get far less share compared to 
their brothers. The rationale behind a brother receiving double his sister's share is based 
and any bequest to a legal heir is ultra vires. Second, the nearer in degree excludes the more remote 
from inheritance. 
117 For details, see DF Mulla Principles of Mohamedan Law (17th ed. ) (Bombay, Tripathi Pvt. Ltd, 
1972), p. 70. 
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on the Islamic legal presumption that he has an obligation to provide for her financial 
needs. Hence, brothers are given larger shares than their sisters, together with the legal 
obligation to spend a portion of this share for their sisters. But in this regard it needs to 
be pointed out that the prevailing socio-cultural situation of Bangladesh often makes it 
difficult for a woman to ask for a share in their paternal property. In this regard it is 
interesting to note that there is a common perception in the society specially in the rural 
parts of Bangladesh that since the financial needs of a women are usually taken care of 
by her husband after marriage and since she also inherits a share from her husband's 
property, she should not claim her share in her paternal property but leave it with her 
brothers or other male relatives from the father's side. "s As an example of this Monsoor 
refers to a study of two villages in Bangladesh can be mentioned which reveals that 77 
percent of women from families with land did not intend to claim their legal share in 
their parental property to retain better links with their natal family. 
119 
3. Conclusion: 
This Chapter has examined some of the discriminatory aspects of Islamic family law 
that operates in Bangladesh in areas such marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, 
inheritance etc. The Chapter has highlighted provisions of Islamic law which blatantly 
18 This is author's own observation as a Muslim woman in Bangladesh formed through interactions 
with women from different strata of the society. This view was also developed on the basis of 
experience gathered while working as an activist working in a legal aid NGO (Bangladesh Legal Aid 
and Services Trust) dedicated to providing free legal aid to rural women and engaging in advocacy 
and awareness raising activities on issues related to women's rights. Although no specific study 
evidencing this view could be found, similar view have been expressed in the works of several other 
socio-legal researchers. For example, see Monsoor n. 40 above, p. 4 and SR Khan The Socio Legal 
Status of Bengali Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2001), p. 98. 
119 See K Westergaard Pauperization and Rural Women in Bangladesh-A Case Study (Comilla: 
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development-BARD, 1983), p. 71 and the reference made to her in 
Monsoor, n. 40 above. 
89 
discriminates women and causes significant disadvantage to them and therefore are in 
urgent need for reform. It has been pointed out that while there has been some statutory 
development such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961)'0 and the Dissolution 
of the Muslim Marriages Act (1939)121 to mitigate some of the oppressive rules, some 
flaws still exist in the statutes that work against the interest of women. Chapter IV will 
explore whether some of the discriminatory aspects of Islamic law are truly condoned 
by Islam or a product of bias interpretation. The next Chapter will explore the public 
private dichotomy that operates in the legal system of Bangladesh in light of the feminist 
critics developed in this area with a view to challenge the division and put forward 
argument for extending the equality guarantee of the Constitution to the sphere of 
religious personal laws. 
)20 n. 5 above. 121 
n. 19 above. 
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CHAPTER III 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY AND THE PERSONAL LAWS 
1. General-Personal versus Public-Private 
The idea that lies at the root of the division of the legal system of Bangladesh into 
general and personal laws is the idea of separate spheres, with the underlying 
presumption that personal or domestic sphere governed by the religious laws is not 
legitimate a sphere for state interventions and therefore, the state does not have 
legitimate authority to intervene and bring them in line with the equality guarantee of 
the Constitution. 
As it is the conceptual device of the public-private division that influenced the shaping 
the legal system of Bangladesh, the dichotomies of public/private and general/personal 
have many ideological meeting points. Most important of them all is the shared ideology 
of keeping family life free from state intervention. 
91 
An analysis of the public/private dichotomy shows that the set of values and perceptions 
underlying the public/private dichotomy also operate in the general/personal dichotomy. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the method of deconstruction of the public and private 
can be effectively used to understand and critique the dichotomy between the general 
and personal and its gender implications in the context of Bangladesh. In the light of 
existing feminist critiques developed in this area this chapter seeks to demonstrate that 
the state's reluctance to intervene in the personal sphere and to infuse personal laws with 
the constitutional guarantee of equality is not based on any overriding and determinative 
principle but is purely a product of political expediency and ideology and is therefore 
amenable to change. To this end, this chapter puts forward arguments in favour of 
extending the guarantee of gender equality to the personal sphere. 
2. The "Public" and "Private" 
Any discussion relating to the public/private dichotomy presents one immediate 
question, that is, what do public and private denote in this context? 
The origin of the division between public and private can be traced back to Greek 
thought where a clear separation existed between the polls or the public sphere and the 
oikos (the home) or the private sphere. The oikos was the site of production and 
reproduction where the master exercised dominion over his wife, children, and slaves., 
Central to the understanding of the separation between public and private spheres was 
the perceived symbiosis between them. That is, the inequality that existed within the 
M Thornton `The Cartography of Public and Private' in M Thornton (ed. ) Public and Private: 
Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 1-2. 
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oikos was necessary in order to allow the master the freedom to participate within the 
polis. 2 
Although the historical authority for the mapping of the public and private has been 
accorded to Greek thought and especially to Aristotle, it was from classical liberal 
thought that the conception of privacy as a sphere first emerged. This sphere surrounded 
3 
the individual to protect (him) first from other individuals and then from the State. 
Thus in liberal theory the public sphere was often understood as a realm open to 
government regulation while the private realm was perceived to be outside the scope of 
state intervention except in limited circuinstances4. Sexuality and the family were in this 
context understood to be private. 5 Although the idea of individual autonomy has been 
central to the liberal tradition, interestingly "the individual" perceived by traditional 
liberal thought was the adult male head of the household. Moreover, his right to be free 
2 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
3 Ibid. 
4 In this regard Mill's "harm principle" may be mentioned. John Stewart Mill in his work On Liberty 
laid out the ethical foundation of democratic individualism and considered the circumstances under 
which individual liberty might be justifiably restricted. This later came to be known as the "harm 
principle". According to Mill, a person's liberty may justifiably be restricted only in order to prevent 
harm that the person's actions would cause to others. For details, see- JS Mill On Liberty (London: 
Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869); On line edition available at 
http: //www. bartleby. com/br/i 30. html (Last accessed 05.06.04). 
The Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution also known 
as the Wolfenden report 1957 is a classic example of this position. The report stated that homosexual 
behaviour between consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence. It said society 
and the law should respect "individual freedom of actions in matters of private morality" and stressed 
it was neither condoning nor condemning homosexual acts. Private morality or immorality was 
according to the report, "not the law's business". The report led to the replacement of the Offences 
Against the Person Act (1861) with the Sexual Offences Act (1967). Sec- Lord Wolfendon Report of 
the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (fl'olfendon Report) 
(London: Government of UK, 1957). 
httD: //www. litenevc. com/pho/stol2ics. php? rec=truc&UID=1382 (Last accessed 02.08.03). 
6 For details see: N Lacey 'Theory into Practice: Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy' 
(1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society. 
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from interference by the state included his rights over those in his control in the private 
realm, i. e., women, children, and servants. 7 
As far as the identification of public and private spheres is concerned, two basic 
accounts have been influential. 8 In the first, the division is between the state and the 
civil society. Particularly in nineteenth-century laissez faire versions of liberalism, a 
central idea was that the role of the state should be strictly limited, with the market 
governing relations other than family relations in civil society. 9 In the second account, 
the division is between the state and/or the market on one hand and the family on the 
other. The family is constructed as the private sphere in which human relations must be 
allowed to develop away from the scrutiny, let alone intervention by the state or market 
institutions. 10 
As O'Donovan summarises, in recent scholarly writing, the concepts of public and 
private stand for a variety of referents. "Public" denotes state activity, the values of the 
market place, work, the male domain, or that sphere of activity which is regulated by 
law. On the other hand, civil society and personal areas like sexuality, biological 
reproduction, family, home, which are particularly identified socially as women's 





11 K O'Donovan Sexual Divisions in Lmv (London: Butler & Tanner, 1985) p. 3. Cooper in this 
regard observes that private does not denote a specific place such as home or domestic sphere. 
Rather, it identifies "a particular set of norms: feelings of belonging, comfortability, knowing, 
derived from familializing practises, symbols, and physical structures. " For details see, D Cooper ` 
"And You Can't Find Me Nowhere": Relocating Identity and Structure within Equality 
Jurisprudence' (June 2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 2. p. 269. 
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(home, body), relations (sexual), activities (intercourse and reproduction), and feelings 
(intimacy, selfhood) that feminism finds central to women's subjection form the core of 
private doctrine. " 12 
3. Gender Implications of the Dichotomy 
a) The domestic sphere remains a sphere of inequality 
It has been argued that the dichotomy assumed between "public" (non-domestic) and 
"private" (domestic) has enabled the family to be excluded from the values of "justice" 
and "equality". This is because the family, as a private sphere institution, is assumed to 
operate on the basis of values like love and sacrifice as opposed to individualism, 
competition and those notions of equality and justice operating in the public sphere. 
Feminists scholars have pointed out that, since women's lives have in many societies 
been lived to a greater extent than men's within the so-called private sphere, the 
implication of the public/private division has meant that fundamental sources of 
women's oppression are politically invisible and hence ignored. 
" As has been pointed 
out, "in discussion of the privacy of marital relations or of the boundaries of state 
intervention, the home, the family and the married couple remains an entity that is taken 
for granted. The couple is a unit, a black box, into which the law does not purport to 
peer. What goes inside the box is not perceived as the law's concern. The belief is that it 
is for family members to sort out their personal relationships. What this overlooks is the 
12 C MacKinnon `Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence' 
(1983) 8 Signs 635 at 657. 
13 Lacey, n. 6 above. 
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power-inequalities inside the family which are of course affected by structures external 
to lt. "14 
Similarly, in Bangladesh, relationships and the allocation of resources within the family 
are governed by religious laws that fundamentally deny equality to women in almost all 
basic facets of their lives. A close analysis shows that almost all the key provisions of 
Muslim and Hindu law (In support of this discriminatory aspects of the provisions 
related to marriage, divorce, custody and guardianship of child and inheritance of 
Islamic law operated in Bangladesh has been discussed in details in Chapter 11) are 
designed to define and support the differential power relation within the family. In 
maintaining the division between general and personal law and leaving the personal 
sphere to be regulated by discriminatory religious laws allow the personal sphere to 
remain as a domain of inequality where women's lives are largely spent. 
The division also serves as a pretext for excluding discriminatory personal laws from the 
scrutiny of the Constitution and allows the State to turn a blind eye to the various forms 
of discrimination and even violence that continue to operate in the personal sphere. As 
has been discussed earlier, although the Constitution by Article 28(1) guarantees 
equality to all citizens irrespective of their sex, religion and caste, this guarantee has 
been seen to be inapplicable to personal sphere and as has been discussed in Chapter 1, 
there is a considerable amount of debate as to whether the State has the power to 
intervene and bring substantial changes in the religious laws in order to bring them in 
line with the equality principle or to strike them down on the ground of 
unconstitutionality. 
14 O'Donovan, n. 11 above. 
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In spite of vigorous campaigns by numerous women's right organisations for decades, 
the State has failed to address even the most glaring provisions of inequality existing in 
the personal laws, like the issues of polygamy in case of Islamic law or divorce in case 
of Hindu law15, whereas some of these issues have already been resolved in other 
Muslim and Hindu dominated countries such as Tunisia and India. The construction of 
the personal-private sphere as a realm beyond state intervention is at the heart of the 
exclusion of constitutional equality guarantee from key areas of women's lives in 
Bangladesh. 
l) Obstructs participation of women in public life 
A salient feature of the division between public and private is the representation of the 
public sphere as superior to the private (domestic) sphere. 
16 The public sphere is 
consistently represented as the sphere of rationality, culture, and intellectual endeavour, 
whereas the domestic sphere has been represented as the sphere of nature, nurture, and 
non-rationality. 17 In this context, it is significant to note that the public sphere is the 
designated sphere of male activity. Domestic activity is relegated to the private sphere 
and its relationship with public activity is mediated by men who move between both 
15 As has been explained in Chapter II, Islamic law grants to men unilateral and unrestricted power of 
divorce. In contrast, women's power in this regard has been made restricted. Hindu law, on the other 
hand, considers marriage as a religious sacrament and does not give women any power to divorce. 
16 F Olsen `The Myth of State Intervention in the Family' (1985) 18 University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform p. 835. See also, F Olsen `The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform' 96 Harvard Law Review. 
17 Ibid. 
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spheres. Women traditionally have a place only in the private sphere. 
" As Boyd points 
out, the ways in which the public sphere is organised-arguably along the lines of a 
presumed married man's lifestyle-rely on a particular way of organising the private 
sphere. The ability of the unencumbered individual (man) to participate in the public 
sphere of work and politics assumes that someone, usually a woman, is preparing his 
food, cleaning his house, and raising the next generation of labourers through her 
reproductive labour. 19 
Much of women's history over the last century in the Western world and elsewhere has 
been characterised by the struggle for acceptance within the public sphere on the same 
terms and conditions as men. Conventionally, "a `public woman' was a prostitute, a 
figure of derision, in contrast to a `public man' a figure of approbation who acted in and 
for the universal good". 20 In the context of Bangladesh, although the state under the 
Constitution has the obligation to ensure equal participation of women in public life, it 
can be argued that by leaving the personal sphere to be regulated by discriminatory 
personal laws, it plays a significant role in obstructing women's participation in the 
public life. 
The main religions (both Hinduism and Islam) ascribe some virtues to women that tend 
to confine them to a narrow sphere of behaviour which is reinforced by various 
provisions of the religious laws operating in the personal sphere. Both Hindu and 
18 O'Donovan, n. l I above, p. 3. 
19 S Boyd `Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview' in S Boyd (ed. ) Challenging the 
Public/Private Divide. - Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (London: University of Toronto Press, 
1997). 
20 Thornton, n. 1 above, p. 13. 
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Muslim law perceives women's role as a mother and wife as the most sacred and 
essential one. A good Muslim or Hindu woman is one who remains faithful to her 
husband and sacrifices her own aspirations and dreams for the sake of her family and 
her children. This can leave women, whose major energy, labour and time is spent in 
domestic chores, in a state of acute and permanent dependence. 
The provisions of the religious laws are based on the perception that women need 
protection in return for their subordination. Men on the other hand are entrusted with the 
responsibility of protecting and taking care of women. As seen in Chapter 11, this 
attitude is manifested in several key areas of Islamic law like dower, maintenance, 
inheritance, and guardianship. 
For example, although it is well established that according to the provisions of Islamic 
law the maintenance of the wife is obligatory duty of the husband, such duty is also 
conditional. According to Shari'a the husband is bound to maintain his wife so long as 
she remains faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders. He is not liable for her 
maintenance if she goes on a voyage without her husband's permission, or she takes 
employment outside the house without his consent, or she is guilty of nushuz or 
disobedience. 21 
Again, in the case of inheritance, a Muslim woman is entitled to only half of what her 
brother inherits, and a Hindu woman is not entitled to inherit her paternal property at all. 
The underlying perception here is that since a Muslim woman does not have the 
21 See Serajuddin and the detailed discussion on maintenance of women under Islamic law in -- A 
Serajuddin Shari'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Subcontinent (Dhaka: 
Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991), Chapter 11. See also-- J Nasir The Status of Women Under 
Islamic Law (London: Graham and Trotman, 1990) p. 63. 
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mandatory obligation and responsibility to maintain her family, it is only fair that she 
gets half the share compared to her male legatee/inheritor. In the case of the Hindu law 
of inheritance, the perception behind the subordinate position of women can be better 
understood from the statement of the arch lawgiver Manu: "Their father" says Manu, 
"protects them in childhood; their husbands protect them in youth; their sons protect 
them in age: a woman is never fit for independence. "" 
The public sphere is known to be the sphere of activity of the autonomous individuals. 
On the other hand, the religious laws governing the personal sphere perceive women as 
all time dependants, a protected species, who for their every need (from food to shelter) 
depend on their male counter part. It therefore appears impossible to comprehend that a 
woman can participate in the public sphere as an autonomous individual when she is 
located within a relationship of dependence and subordination in the personal sphere. 
Thus it can be argued that by leaving the personal sphere to be operated by religious 
personal laws that embed women's subordination, the state in turn, limits their 
participation in the public sphere where the equality principles purport to govern. 
22 F Agnes Law and Gender Inequality the Politics of Women's Rights in India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 6. 
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4. Deployment of Public-Private Critiques by the Feminists 
General Critique 
For feminist scholars the traditional conception of the unregulated private is the prelude 
to an explanation of the division between women and the men in law. 
23 According to 
them, the fiction of non-intervention often serves to disguise the multifarious ways in 
which the state actively fashions the family and gender relations. 
24 It is from this point 
of view that the famous feminist slogan "the personal is political" emerges, arguing that 
issues of sexuality and family are and should be of political significance. The argument 
arising from this line of thinking is that law is not only deeply entrenched in concepts of 
private and public but also plays an important part in the construction of that division. 25 
As the dichotomy is constructed and contingent it is negotiable and may even be 
reshaped to women's advantage (if not dissolved altogether). 
As has been discussed in Chapter I, women's right activists, scholars in Bangladesh as 
elsewhere in the world operate from the point of view that it is possible to force a 
patriarchal state and its legal system to bow to women's ends by extending the equality 
guarantee of the Constitution in the sphere of personal laws. Their project has been to 
put the issue of the reform of personal laws squarely on the public agenda. They claim 
that what occurs in the so-called personal sphere should be the legitimate concern of the 
23 O'Donovan, n. I l above, p. 1. 
14 Thornton, n. 1. above, p. 14. 
25 Ibid. 
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state. Their initiatives26 have directly challenged the barriers surrounding the family as 
sacrosanct private sphere. 
Feminists across the political spectrum are agreed that the public and private are not in 
any real sense two distinct and separate spheres. 27 They have contested the distinction as 
conceptually flawed and misleading. They argue that the terms "intervention" and "non- 
intervention" are largely meaningless since the terms do not accurately describe any set 
of policies. 28 The state constantly defines and redefines the family and adjusts and 
readjusts the family roles whether or not it is designated as "private". Non-intervention 
is therefore a false ideal because it has no coherent meaning. 
29 This conclusion becomes 
even clearer when we take into account the difficulty of attaching any general 
significance to a distinction between regulation and non-regulation, or between 
intervention and abstention. 30 This is because, as the following discussions on "indirect 
intervention" will demonstrate, in some cases it can be unclear whether to characterise 
the state's position as one of regulation or non-regulation. Thus, any argument which 
presupposes the personal sphere as legally unregulated is simply unsustainable. More 
importantly, any position which denies the extension of equality guarantee of the 
Constitution to the personal sphere on the ground that it should remain unregulated is 
based on plainly false premises. 
26 One of their demands is to have a unified personal status law applicable to all citizens irrespective 
of religion. This is discussed in more details in the concluding Chapter of the thesis. 
27 See generally O'Donovan n. I l above and M Thornton n. l above. 
28 Olsen, n. 16 above, p. 835. 
79 Ibid. See also, F Olsen `The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform' 
(1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 7. 
30 Ibid. 
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As the following discussion shows, in the light of the feminist arguments developed in 
this area, the conventional line of demarcation between the general and the personal 
sphere can be effectively challenged by highlighting their contradictory and shifting 
strands. 
The Myth of the Unregulated Private Sphere 
Feminist scholarship points out that the public private division (general-personal in 
Bangladesh context) is not grounded in reality but is ideological, adopted to defend and 
justify certain positions taken by the state. There exists an ever-shifting boundary 
between what is considered to be public and personal matters by the State. As can be 
seen from the following discussion, in spite of a great deal of rhetoric about the non- 
intervention in the personal sphere, on numerous occasions the State has practically 
intervened in the personal sphere by legislation, judicial intervention, and policies. 
(a) Direct Intervention through Legislation 
In independent Bangladesh, Family Courts were established by the Family Courts 
Ordinance (1985)31, which is considered as a significant step towards legislative reforms 
with reference to the legal status of women in the personal sphere. There had also been 
some amendments to existing legislation operating in the personal sphere. Prominent 
among these are, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages (Amendment) Ordinance 
(1986)32, 
_the 
Muslim Family Laws Amendment Ordinances of 196133,198534, and 
31 (XVIII of 1985) 37 DLR (Sta) 159. 
32 (XXV of 1986) 38 DLR (Sta) 105. 
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198635, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) (Amendment) Ordinance 
(1982)36 and the Family Courts (Amendment) Act (1989)37. 
Although registration is not essential for the validity of marriage under classical Islamic 
law 39, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act (1974)9 was enacted to 
strengthen the process of civil registration requiring that every marriage under Islamic 
law should be registered before the marriage-registrars. The punishment for not 
registering a marriage is a prison sentence and/or a fine. 
Similarly, the minimum ages of marriage40 were gradually increased by a series of 
statutes to 21 for men and 18 for women of all communities. 41 The Child Marriage 
Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance (1984)42 provides penal sanctions for those who 
knowingly participate in the contracting of an under-age marriage. 
Among all legislative interventions the most important and most controversial is perhaps 
the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961)43 which imposed limitations on the arbitrary 
rights of men in the two most significant areas of Islamic law, divorce and polygamy. 
33 Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance (1961) (XXI of 1961) 14 PC NP and Muslim 
Family Laws (Second Amendment) Ordinance (1961) (XXX of 1961) 14 PC NP. 
. 54 Muslim Family Laws (Amend) Ordinance (1985) (XIV of 1985) 37 DLR (Sta) 244. 35 Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Ordinance (1986) (XXIV of 1986) 38 DLR (Sta) 73. 
36 (XLIX of 1982) 35 DLR (Sta) 76. 
37 (XXX of 1989) 41 DLR (Sta) 38. 
38 T Mahmood The Muslim Law of India (Allahbad: Law Book Co., 1982), p. 56. 
39 (LII of 1974) 27 DLR (Sta) 4. 
40 There is no fixed age for marriage under Shari 'a law while under the Hindu law minors are not 
only eligible but are considered to be fittest to be taken into marriage. 
41 For details see: Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929) [(Act XIX of 1929) 8 PC 430,11 BC 77], the 
Muslim Family Law Ordinance (1961) [(VIII 1961) 14 PC 67], the Child Marriage Restraint 
(Amendment) Ordinance (1984) [(XXXVIII of 1984) 36 DLR (Sta) 134]. 42 (XXXVIII of 1984) 36 DLR (Sta) 134. 
43 (VIII 1961) 14 PC 67. 
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As has been discussed in details in Chapter 11, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 
(1961) imposed restrictions on the practice of polygamy sanctioned by the Islamic law. 
The Ordinance provides that the first wife's consent and previous permission in writing 
of the Arbitration Council will be required to conduct a second marriage by the husband. 
If a marriage is contracted without such permission of the Arbitration Council, the 
husband shall be liable to punishment with simple imprisonment which may extend to 
one year, or with a fine which may extend to taka 10,000, or with both. 
45The Ordinance 
also established that a second marriage contracted against the first wife's wishes 
constitutes a ground for divorce by the wife. 
Similarly, we have seen in Chapter 11 that to the husband, Islamic law grants unilateral 
and arguably arbitrary power to divorce. On the other hand, the wife's right in this 
regard is conditional. To prevent easy divorces the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 
(196 1)46 attempted to introduce a rational procedure for effecting divorce. 47 Most 
importantly, as has been discussed in Chapter II, the Ordinance abolished the extremely 
oppressive practice of talaq-i-bid'at or triple divorce of the wife by the husband and 
allowed remarriage after such a divorce without an intervening marriage with another 
man. 
It is needless to mention that the passing of the Ordinance was met with approval and 
enthusiasm by the women rights activists of that time but by universal disapproval by 
the orthodox Islamic groups who accused it of distorting the fundamental principles of 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., Section 6. 
46 Ibid, n. 43 above. 47 For details see: Serajuddin, n. 21 above, p. 203. 
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Islamic jurisprudence and giving it a western slant and bias. 48 They also questioned the 
right of the state to intervene and reform the sacred provisions of Islamic law. 
Fortunately, in spite of all the opposition, the Ordinance has not been repealed and 
continues to remain in force in Bangladesh. 
(b) Intervention by the Judiciary 
In spite of the non-interventionist stance purportedly taken by the State, occasionally the 
judiciary has come forward and intervened by providing progressive interpretations of 
various personal law provisions. Sometimes the Courts have even gone far enough to 
deviate from some of the established provisions of religious laws in order to bring them 
in line with the spirit of the Constitution. 
For instance, in a case of the restitution of conjugal rights, 49 the Court ruled that, with 
the passage of time, a husband's right of forcible restitution of conjugal rights against an 
unwilling wife has become an outmoded and unsustainable concept when considered in 
the light of the principle of equality between men and women under the Constitution. 
The Court observed, "in husband's unilateral plea for forcible restitution of conjugal 
rights as against a wife unwilling to live with her husband, there is no mutuality and 
reciprocity between the respective rights of the husband and the wife, since such plea for 
restitution of conjugal rights is not available to a wife as against her husband apart from 
claiming maintenance and alimony. Thus, reference to Article 28(2) of the Constitution 
of Bangladesh guaranteeing equal rights of women and men in all spheres of the state 
48 Ibid. 
49 Nelly Zaman v. Giasuddin Khan (1982) 34 DLR 221. 
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and public life would clearly indicate that any unilateral plea of a husband for forcible 
restitution of conjugal rights as against a wife unwilling to live with her husband is in 
violation of the accepted principles and policies"50. The unpublished judgments of the 
Family Court with regard to the issue of restitution of conjugal rights indicate that the 
recent progressive judgments of the higher judiciary have had effects on the lower tier of 
the judiciary. 51 
In Jesmin Sultana v. Mohammad Elias (1997)52, the Court held that polygamy can be 
considered as against the principle of Islamic Law. Referring to the works of various 
modernist Islamic scholars the Court stated that to treat the co-wives justly and equally 
is an essential condition for polygamy and since this essential condition is practically 
impossible to fulfil because of weakness of human nature and also because of the 
modern social and economic conditions, the Quranic injunction that a second wife may 
be taken under specific conditions amounts virtually to a prohibition. Noting that 
Tunisia has given legislative effect to this interpretation, the Court concluded polygamy 
should be prohibited altogether in Bangladesh. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, 
the Court also referred the judgment to the Ministry of Law for amending the law 
accordingly but no action is known to have been taken on it yet. 
In Bangladesh, the Guardians and Wards Act (1890)53 which governs the issue of 
custody of a child provides that the courts are to be guided by the personal law of the 
50 Ibid, p. 222. 
51 For details, see: T Monsoor From Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Family Law and its Impact on 
Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1999) p. 175. 
52 17 BLD 4. 
53 (VIII of 1890) 3 BC 292,3 PC 300. 
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minor while deciding the custody issue. The courts are also directed to consider the age, 
gender and religion of the minor and the character and capacity of the proposed 
guardian, as well as considering the minor's own opinion if s/he is old enough to form 
an intelligent preference. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, for Muslims, the 
classical Hanar position is that the mother is entitled to custody over male children until 
the age of seven and over female children until puberty. The right of the mother to the 
custody of her children continues after her divorce but she can forfeit the right in certain 
circumstances, for example, if she marries a stranger or changes her religion. In cases of 
custody, the judiciary of Bangladesh seems to protect women more, as they see the 
mother's right of custody of young children as almost an absolute right. 54 This has been 
confirmed by a number of judgments, such as Muhammad Abu Baker Siddigue v. 
S. M. A. Bakar & others (1986)55. The Court's ruling deviated from the classical dictates 
of Hanafi law according to which the mother's custody over a boy ends at seven. The 
Court stated that the principle of Islamic Law has to be regarded, but deviation there 
from would seem permissible as the paramount consideration should be the "child's 
welfare". 56 As has been pointed out in Chapter 11, this reveals an interesting 
contradiction in the personal laws which on the one hand, accords almost absolute 
familial authority to the father and on the other hand, by assuming women's natural role 
as a caregiver, grants custody of children to women. This contradiction, which is also 
evident in western social and legal conceptions of the family, offers a rare example 
where women can legally benefit from the personal-general dichotomy. 
54 -,, -t ---- -I nl 
C( 
JC0 Monsoor, n. J 1 aoove, P. 1-. 
38 DLR (AD). 
sý Ibid. 
108 
(c) Indirect Intervention 
As feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy point out, it is wrong to see direct 
legal regulation as the touchstone for state involvement. In all sorts of indirect ways, 
state institutions often have a crucial and deliberate impact on the conduct of family 
life. 57 For example, the exemption of married men from charges of rape of their wives, 
which persists in many jurisdictions including Bangladesh, is generally perceived as 
non-regulation. Yet it discloses a certain view of the marriage relationship which is 
positively inscribed in law. 58 As Boyd points out through the state's failure to 
criminalise or prevent violence and discrimination against women or children in the 
home, men have been accorded significant "privatised" power by laws on marriage and 
family relations. 59 Thus, in fact, the state always plays a role in regulating social and 
economic relations, even in its apparent absence. 60 
Generally, the "personal sphere" is considered personal because of the State's reluctance 
to intervene. However, it also needs to be borne in mind that it is the law that constructs 
the personal sphere by closing off that arena as inappropriate for its own intervention 
and leaving it in the open to be operated by disadvantageous religious laws. The 
decision not to intervene and to allow women's disadvantage to continue made by the 
state or other institutions with the power to do so are as much political decisions as are 
S7 Ibid. 
ss Lacey, n. 6 above. 
59 Boyd, n. 19 above. 60 DE Chunn `A little Sex Can Be a Dangerous Thing: Regulating Sexuality, Venereal Disease, and 
Reproduction in British Columbia' in Susan B Boyd (ed. ) Challenging the Public/Private Divide: 
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (London: University of Toronto Press, London). 
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decisions to intervene. 61 In other words, the State's policy of non-intervention and/or 
omission is precisely another form of intervention, which facilitates and legitimates 
male dominance. 
For example, even though the state may not intervene overtly in the sphere of the 
religious personal laws, it implicitly sanctions the unequal status quo between men and 
women by its non-intervention. It has been pointed out in Chapter II that some of the 
discriminatory provisions of Islamic law such as unilateral right to divorce by the 
husband and the right to conduct polygamous marriage often lead to endless sufferings 
of women and leave them and their children destitute. Also, the duty of obedience (this 
will be discussed in more details in the next Chapter) owed by the wife to the husband 
common in many Islamic societies including Bangladesh is extremely oppressive 
towards women and can be seen as approving use of force or violence against women. It 
has also been pointed out that the underlying value of many provisions of the religious 
laws such as maintenance and dower in Islamic law that men are protector and provider 
and women are in need of protection and dependent- reinforces dependence and 
subordination of women and obstructs their participation in the public arena or 
workplace as fully autonomous individual. Not intervening in the sphere of personal 
laws therefore, means condoning the violence, oppression and subordination that 
continues in the personal sphere and thus facilitating and legitimising dominance of men 
over women. This decision of non-intervention in the sphere of personal laws is 
therefore just as political as the decision to intervene. 
6) Lacey, n. 6 above. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the boundary between 
public/general and private/personal sphere is an ideological construction, which shifts in 
time depending on the varying socio-historical contexts. The division is contingent on 
factors such as beliefs about morals and gender, legal theories about law enforcement, 
and social and economic conditions etc. 62 Although political and legal discourses often 
insist on maintaining the idea of a clear dichotomy between the public and personal, it is 
not possible to sustain the boundary analytically over time. 
63 Hence, labelling an area of 
conduct, as `private' or `personal' does not necessarily mean that it will be able to retain 
that label forever. 
It has been demonstrated in the earlier sections that maintaining the so-called general- 
personal division in the laws inevitably links the state with male dominance and 
operates as a rhetorical device against the application of equality guarantee to a number 
of significant aspects of women's lives in Bangladesh. Therefore, the next obvious 
question is whether it is open to the state to intervene in the sacrosanct personal sphere 
to make it embrace the principle of justice and equality. 
As has been discussed, although the concept of personal sphere denotes a sphere of 
behaviour free from state intervention, this idea of a sphere free from intervention 
simply collapses when subjected to scrutiny. It is therefore irrelevant to question the 
state's authority to intervene as the state is already implicated by its numerous direct and 
62 O'Donovan, n. 1 I above, p. 160. 
63 Ibid. 
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indirect policies and legislative attempts in the sphere of personal laws. The discussion 
on public private dichotomy in this Chapter clearly shows that maintaining a divide does 
not mean complete separation of public and private. This Chapter therefore, continues 
the argument that what happens in one sphere influences the other and consequently it is 
an illusion to think that complete separation can occur. 64 To ensure equality in one 
sphere it is absolutely imperative to ensure equality in the private sphere as well. 
As has been pointed out earlier in this Chapter and also in Chapter 1, the equality 
guarantee enshrined in Article 28(2) of the Constitution expressly affirms the 
responsibility of the state to ensure women's equality in the state and public life. In light 
of the discussions and the arguments put forward in this Chapter highlighting the 
overlapping and shifting nature of the public and private, it can be argued that in order 
to fulfil this constitutional responsibility of ensuring equality in the public sphere, the 
state has to ensure it in the personal sphere as well. In this regard it has been pointed out 
that religious personal laws governing the private sphere assigns and perpetuates a 
specific gender role (i. e., men provider and protector-women dependent and in need of 
protection) that in turn discourages and sometimes obstructs women's participation in 
the public life. In this regard, the duty of obedience owed by the wife to the husband 
under Islamic law can be mentioned which sometimes directly obstructs women's 
participation in the public life or job market when their husbands do not permit them to 
take work outside home. On the other hand, various provisions of Hindu and Muslim 
laws that are based on the idea of traditional gender roles and stereotyping such as, 
maintenance indirectly obstructs women's participation in the public life as fully 
64 Sec generally-O'Donovan n. 1 I above. 
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autonomous individuals. Hence, the policy that propagates to achieve equality ignoring 
the overlapping nature of the spheres cannot succeed. As O'Donovan observes, reforms 
which do not confront this fact will fail, for within each proposed reform are the seeds 
of conflict. 65 It is therefore, an illusion to think that it is possible to achieve equality in 
one sphere (i. e. in public) independent of the other sphere (i. e. sphere of personal laws) 
where inequality flagrantly exists. 
It is therefore concluded that the confinement of equality principles to the public sphere 
is legally and conceptually unsustainable. Finally, it is the proposition of this Chapter 
that State's constitutional obligation to ensure gender equality can only be achieved, if, 
side-by-side the public sphere, equality in the personal sphere is also effectively 
ensured. 
65 Ibid., p. 159. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROSPECTS OF EQUALITY 
AND THE RELIGIOUS PERSONAL LAWS 
1. Introduction 
In Bangladesh, like many other democracies, "equality" is a key political and legal 
principle. The last few decades have seen a wave of critical analysis and debate 
particularly in the West, focusing on the concept of equality, resulting in a transition 
and development in the understanding of equality from a narrow approach of formal 
equality to a more sophisticated and context-based approach of substantive equality. 
Some of the major contributors to the equality-based scholarship are feminist 
scholars and activists from around the world who have long been critical about the 
strategic value of the liberal concept of formal equality relied upon by democracies. 
As has been discussed in the earlier Chapters, the Constitution of Bangladesh 
guarantees equality to all its citizens irrespective of their religion and sex. This 
Chapter therefore, reviews of some of the debates associated with equality as 
identified by feminist scholars and activists. The nature, scope and possibilities of 
114 
the equality guarantee in the context of Bangladesh are also examined in light of 
these debates. In this regard, the Chapter draws attention to a very recent case' that 
involves interpretation of the equality guarantee of the Constitution and its 
significance in developing the concept of "substantive equality" in the equality 
jurisprudence in Bangladesh. 
2. Feminist Critiques of Equality 
Before focusing directly on the scope and nature of the equality as enshrined in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, it is necessary to consider the concept of equality, both 
as a norm and as a strategic goal, in the context of feminist legal scholarship aimed 
at improving the status of women in societies across the world. In this regard, it must 
first be noted that although equality has been and continues to be a central concept in 
feminist legal scholarship, there have also been ongoing debates among feminists 
revolving around the question of what legal equality truly entails and how it might 
be attained in different socio-economic and cultural contexts. Feminist scholars and 
activists, both inside and outside the West, have long been critical of the strategic 
value of the liberal concept of "formal equality" which invokes notions of sameness 
and difference to determine the application of equality norms. In the 1980s, what 
became known as the "sameness/difference debate" gained momentum in feminist 
legal scholarship, essentially revolving around the question of whether the liberal 
concept of formal equality required sameness with men or accommodated difference. 
1 Shamima Sultana Seema and Others v Bangladesh and others (2003) WP No. 3304/2003. The 
verdict came out on 16 August 2004. The case has not been reported in the journals and the 
written copy has not been made available to the parties yet. As such the details of the judgment 
are not known at the time of submission of the thesis. 
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By invoking Aristotle's famous maxim "likes should be treated alike and un-likes 
un-alike" the formal approach to equality holds that only similarly situated 
individuals are entitled to be treated in the same way and any difference in treatment 
between similarly situated individuals constitutes discrimination. This "sameness 
approach" has found its way into constitutions like that of the USA, India, and 
Bangladesh in the form of the equal protection doctrine. In Bangladesh, it has been 
used to strike down law or provisions that treat men and women differently. For 
example, in Uttar khand Mahila Parishad v Uttar Pradesh (1992)2, when women 
teachers and employees in the education department were given lower salaries and 
less promotion as compared with their male counterparts doing the same work, it was 
found to be unconstitutional. Also in a very recent case, Shamima Sultana Seema 
and Others v Bangladesh and others (2003) the High Court Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh held that a governmental circular purporting to provide women 
ward Commissioners elected from reserved seats4 with reduced powers and functions 
2 
AIR SC 1695. 
3 n. I above. The facts of the case are as follows: A Writ Petition was filed by ten women 
commissioners impugning a Circular issued by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
Development and Cooperatives as being without lawful authority and in violation of their 
fundamental rights as guaranteed under Arts. 27 and 28, read with Arts. 9,10 and 1I of the 
Constitution. On 25.4.2002, the ten petitioners were elected from "reserved seats" to the Khulna 
City Corporation, namely seats "reserved" for the election of women, pursuant to section 4(3) of 
the Khulna City Corporation Ordinance 1984. Another 31 Commissioners were directly elected 
from the "general" seats, namely seats for which both men and women may contest. The 
petitioners were directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, and from a 
constituency equivalent to three wards, as opposed to a constituency limited to one ward in the 
case of "general" seats. On 23.9.2002, the Ministry of Local Government Rural Development 
and Cooperatives (Local Government Division) issued a circular which set out sixteen separate 
sets of powers and functions and purported to impose certain disabilities on Commissioners 
elected from "reserved" seats. Some of these power and functions have been pointed out in n. 5 
below. These facts have been collected from the Written Submission in support of the Petitioners 
prepared by Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a Dhaka-based human rights and legal aid centre, which 
was an Intervenor in this Petition. 
° In 1999, the government amended the local government laws and introduced reserved seats for 
women in the local government bodies in an effort to empower them politically. As such, in 
every City Corporation in Bangladesh now, in addition to the general seats (to which both men 
and women may be elected) one third of the commissioners' posts are "reserved" by law for 
women. 
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(as compared to the Commissioners elected from General Seats)5, to be in violation 
of the Constitution. As will be seen later in his Chapter this case is of great 
significance for equality jurisprudence in Bangladesh because of its reference to the 
equality guarantee of the Constitution and because of the fact that "substantive 
equality" argument was put forward in the Written Submissions in support of the 
Petitioners' for the consideration by the Court while interpreting the Constitutional 
guarantee of equality. 
As mentioned above, the corollary to the Aristotelian principle "likes should be 
treated alike" is that "un-likes may be treated un-alike". Thus, if an individual or 
group is "different" in some way, according to this approach, it is legitimate to treat 
that group or individual differently, even if such treatment results in disadvantage. 
Interestingly, as feminist critical scholarship developed in this area reveals, the norm 
underlying this model of equality - that from which the individual or group is 
deemed to be different - very often conforms to a prototypical person who is, inter 
alia, male; and it is this prototype that represents the goal and the standard by which 
the right to equality is measured. Therefore, to qualify for equal treatment according 
5 As the arguments submitted on behalf of the Petitioners by the Intervenor (i. e., Ain O Salish 
Kendro) points out, the Circular lays down sixteen separate sets of powers and functions, which 
accordingly impose certain disabilities on the Commissioners who are elected from the 
"reserved" seats. Some of them are as follows: 1. According to the Circular the Commissioner 
elected from the "reserved seats" may serve only as an advisor to a local Law and Order 
Preservation Committee, while a Commissioner elected from a "general seat" may not only 
establish such a Committee but also serve as its Chairperson; 2. Commissioners from the 
"reserved seats" are not permitted to take part in the census proceedings or issue certificates in 
their constituencies regarding nationality, births/deaths, inheritance and character etc; 3. 
Commissioners from the "reserved seats" must serve as the Chairperson of the Committee to 
Resist Dowry Violence, Acid Attacks and undertake Marriage Registration as well as take steps 
for the welfare of women and children. In addition, according to a leading newspaper report, 
Commissioners elected from the reserved seats in Khulna City Corporation have also been 
receiving a lesser amount as honorarium for their attendance in the official meetings etc 
compared to the "general-seat" commissioners. See, The Daily Star, 22 August 2004 at 
www. thedailystar. net (Last accessed 02.12.04). 
" Written Submission in support of the Petitioners were prepared by Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), 
a Dhaka-based human rights and legal aid centre, which is an Intervenor in this Petition. See n. 1 
above. 
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to the formal equality approach, women are expected to demonstrate that they are 
same as the prototype (i. e., men). Moreover, even where women assert rights based 
upon their "difference", they are invariably invoking a male benchmark. Of 
significance here is the analysis of Catherine MacKinnon. MacKinnon rejects the 
sameness and difference dichotomy in the context of sex discrimination, arguing that 
in both cases (sameness or difference) "man" is the standard against which all others 
are measured. Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to their 
correspondence with "man". Under the difference standard, women are measured 
according to their lack of correspondence with him. ' 
Historically, women have been regarded as inherently different from men or the 
prototype, and this has served as a justification for the proposition that there is no 
obligation to treat them equally. For a substantial part of the history of women's 
movement in every society (including Western societies), we can see women 
struggling to fit within the liberal equality paradigm, to prove that they are equal to 
the prototype and to obtain the same rights and privileges accorded to men under 
law. 8 In law reform efforts and litigation, women's fight for equality was, during this 
period, largely a fight for inclusion9 which was premised on a version of equality 
that stressed the similarity of the needs and concerns of men and women and called 
for equal treatment of law to all, irrespective of sex, class, ethnicity etc. In reality, 
however, it can be argued that women often have different needs and concerns. 
Differences in biology, for example, may warrant differential treatment in some 
For details, see C MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 34. 
S The history of the Canadian women's movement is mentionable in this regard. Majury 
discusses the history of Canadian women's struggle to fit in with the liberal equality paradigm in 
the pre-Charter era which insisted on similarity of needs and concerns of men and women. For 
details, see D Majury `Women's (In) Equality before and after the Charter', in R Jhappan (ed. ) 
Women's Legal Strategies in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), pp. 103-106. 
9 Ibid. 
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important areas10. Moreover, men and women are often differently socially 
situated". By assuming identical/similar experience, needs and concerns among men 
and women, the formal equality approach thus denies significant factors such as 
unequal power relations in the private or domestic sphere, the implications and 
consequences of child birth and child care etc. As such, it can be argued that formal 
equality fails to address the underlying disadvantage and structural inequalities 
which belie the appearance of equality (understood in terms of sameness of 
treatment), thus serving to perpetuate prevailing patterns of social, economic and 
cultural disadvantage. In addition, critical race theorists 12, building upon the 
experiences of women across the globe, have raised serious questions about the 
strategic value of equality in non-white/non-western contexts by highlighting the 
forced essentialism common to invocations of equality, viewed in terms of sameness 
or difference, and in which equality operates normatively to affirm and promote 
western values and lifestyles. 13 Indeed, even where equality is invoked to 
accommodate difference, the tendency is to assume a generically different woman 
who departs from the male prototype. Thus whether equality operates to require 
sameness or to allow for difference, the concern is that equality cannot accommodate 
the needs and aspirations of women from different social, cultural, and geographical 
10 EH Wolgast Equality and the Rights of Women (London: Cornell University Press, 1980), 
22-23. ýrIbid. 
12 See-- A Harris `Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory' (1990) 42 Stanford L Rev 
581, AK Wing Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) and R Hunter `Deconstructing the Subject: The Essentialist Debate in 
Feminist Theory and Practice' (1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal. 
13 According to such a critique, equality is essentialist in the sense that it relies on the 
construction of generic female identity that denies significant differences between women 
derived from race, ethnic background, class, sexuality etc and hence assumes identical 
experiences and interests among women. In reality, women from different social, cultural, and 
geographical backgrounds often have completely different experience and needs. For a detailed 
critique, see R Jhappan `The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice' (1998) 10 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law pp. 60-107. 
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backgrounds. 14 In this way, critical analysis by feminist scholars and activists raises 
serious doubts about the strategic value of equality for societies in the third world, 
Muslim world, and in the black community. 
To combat some of these problems arising from applications of formal equality, 
Western feminist scholarship has shifted its focus towards developing a more 
substantive understanding of equality, insisting that equality analysis should not 
focus on the sameness or difference of a claimant from some preconceived norm but 
rather on the social relationships and institutions which use differences to justify and 
enforce disadvantage, and on the ways in which such disadvantageous practices can 
be changed. According to the substantive approach, the primary purpose of an 
equality provision should be to eradicate past patterns of disadvantage and to 
interpret discrimination within the context of past and existing social, political, and 
economic disparities. 15 Feminist scholars have therefore placed the notions of 
difference and disadvantage at the heart of their substantive equality analysis. 16 But 
is not difference per se which is regarded as the source of discrimination or 
inequality, but difference rooted in disadvantage. Thus, unlike liberal legalism, 
feminist legal scholarship advocating substantive equality sees difference in more 
positive light by arguing that differences are only problematic when they perpetuate 
disadvantage among groups such as women or racial minorities. The focus is not 
14 As Taslima Mansoor observes, the concept of equality dominating current legal scholarship 
undermines key factors of the social reality of countries like Bangladesh which is dominated by 
patriarchal norms, traditions, values and religious beliefs. For details, see T Mansoor From 
Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Family Law and its Impact on Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 4. 
15 S Jagwanth and C Murray `Ten years of transformation: How Has Gender Equality in South 
Africa Fared? ' (2002) 14 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2, pp. 255-299. 16 A York `The Inequality of Emerging Charter Jurisprudence: Supreme Court Interpretations of 
Section 15(1)'(1996, Spring) University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, p. 332. 
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therefore on difference as such but rather on the disadvantage resulting from this 
differentiation. 
In line with the substantive equality approach, both the South African and Canadian 
courts have repeatedly affirmed and embraced a context-based analysis which 
requires courts to examine the actual impact of an alleged violation of the right to 
equality on the individual within and outside different socially relevant groups in 
relation to prevailing social, economic and political circumstances. '7 The substantive 
approach developed by the South African and Canadian Jurisdictions is discussed in 
detail in Chapters V and VI. 
3. Equality Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh combines the English concept of 
equality before law and the American concept of equal protection of the law. ls It 
guarantees that "[a]ll citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal 
protection of law. " "Equality before law" is understood to mean that among equals 
the law shall be equal and shall be similarly administered. "Equal protection of law" 
means that all persons in like circumstances shall be treated alike and no 
discrimination shall be made in conferment of privileges and imposition of 
liabilities. 19 
17 For an overview, see generally Majury, n. 8 above. See also, Jagwanth and Murray, n. 15 above, 
pp. 255-299. For development in a South African context, see National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (1998) 12 BCLR 1517 (CC); President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Hugo (1997) 6 BCLR 708 (CC); Brink v Kitshoff (1996) 6 BCLR 752 (CC); 
Harksen v Lane (1997) 11 BCLR 1489 (CC). For development in Canadian courts, see Andrews 
v Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 1 SCR 143; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration (1999) 1 SCR 497. For a detailed account of the development of substantive 
equality jurisprudence in South Africa and Canada, see Chapter V and Chapter VI. 
18 M Islam Constitutional Law of Bangladesh (Dhaka: BILIA, 1995) p. 88. 
19 Ibid. 
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Subsection 1 of Article 28 provides that no differential treatment can be made on the 
ground of race, caste, religion, sex or place of birth and subsection 2 provides that 
women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and public life. 
Similarly, subsection 3 of Article 28 provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only 
of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or 
resort, or admission to any educational institute. Subsection I of Article 28 can be 
contrasted with subsection 4 of Article 28 which provides that state is not prevented 
from making special provisions in favour of women or children or for the 
advancement of any backward section of the citizens. In addition, Article 29 (3) (c) 
allows the state to reserve for members of one sex any class of employment or office 
on the ground that it is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members of the 
opposite sex. From the above subsections of Article 28, it can therefore, be 
summarised that classification on the basis of race, caste, religion, sex or place of 
birth will be found to be invalid unless they can be shown to serve a legitimate 
governmental objective 20. 
It is seen that Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh contains the general equal 
protection provision while subsection I of Article 28 encompasses enumerated 
grounds upon which discrimination is prohibited. It is interesting to note here that 
the requirements of Article 27 are placed only upon the state, and private action is 
thus not covered by the provision. Also from the wording of subsection 27, the 
20 Islam concludes this by referring to Chittaranjan v Secretary, Judicial Department (1965) 17 
DLR 451. For details, see Islam, n. 18 above. 
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provision appears to operate as a restriction on government and unlike the directive 
principles of the state21 it does not impose any positive obligations upon the state. 
Equality before law which is enshrined in Article 27 is a Diceyan principle which 
also has some significance for women's equality rights. As seen in the Canadian case 
laws there is scope to interpret it narrowly by using "difference" to justify 
discrimination so that a distinguishing feature in a particular group such as 
pregnancy can justify different and discriminatory treatment of that group22 To 
overcome some of these problems the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982)23 ("Canadian Charter") included the guarantee of "equal benefit of law" 
which enabled the courts to break away from the narrow application and judge the 
actual impact of the law in question. 24 
As has been mentioned earlier the equal protection clause of Bangladesh 
Constitution has been influenced by the United State's equality protection clause. 25 It 
may therefore be interesting to compare the general equal protection under Article 27 
and the equality guarantee enshrined in various subsections of Article 28 of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
21 Part II of the Constitution of Bangladesh narrates the fundamental principles of State policy, 
setting out the economic, social and political goals for which the state is required to strive. 
According to Article 8 of the Constitution, the Fundamental Principles of State Policy are not 
only fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh but they are also to be applied by the state in 
the making of laws. However, these principles are not judicially enforceable as fundamental 
rights under the law. For details, see discussion on Constitutional framework in Chapter I. Z Dicey outlined three components of the rule of the law the third of which stipulated that every 
person is equally subject to the law. As some early cases under the Canadian Bill of Rights 
(1960) ("Bill of Rights") in Canadian jurisprudence demonstrate, it can be used to justify and 
uphold any law that infringes on a particular group's equality rights, so long as it applies to 
everyone in that group equally. Some of these cases have been discussed in Chapter V. For the 
Bill of Rights, see - (1960, c. 40). Available at: 
http: //laws. justice. gc. ca/en/C-12.3/text. html (Last accessed 10.09.04). 23 (1882,79). Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act (1982) (U. K., 1982, c. 1 I), which came 
into force on April 17 1982. Available at: http: //Iaws. iustice. gc. ca/en/charter/index. httnl (Last 
accessed 10.09.04). 
z4 For details, see Chapter V. 
25 Islam, n. 18 above. 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution. The US Equal Protection Clause 
provides that "[no State shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. "26 However, unlike the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the language of Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh is coupled 
with an additional requirement of "equality before the law", implying that no one 
shall receive special treatment under the laws of the state. Both provisions however, 
adhere to a negative approach in the sense that they impose a prohibition on 
government's action so that although the state cannot abridge equality rights, it is not 
required to act affirmatively to protect them. 27 
Although they have some similarities, the equality guarantee under the Constitution 
of Bangladesh however, is also different in an important respect as it surpasses the 
scope of the United States Equal Protection Clause by providing explicit equality 
protection for women. In contrast to the United States, Article 28 (4) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh provides "affirmative action" for women, permitting the 
government to make "special provisions" for women in order to redress their 
historical disadvantage. The United States Equal Protection Clause gives no express 
"affirmative action" power. Only through judicial interpretation has the government 
been able to enact laws that ameliorate the disadvantage of women. 28The fact that 
Bangladesh has an explicit affirmative action provision in its constitution enables it 
26 Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution in section 1 states: "All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " Full text of the Amendment available at 
httv: //caselaw. lp. findlaw. com/data/constittition/amendment 14/ (Last accessed 10.10.04). -K Davis `Equal Protection for Women in India and Canada: An Examination and Comparison 
of Sex Equality Provisions in the Indian and Canadian Constitutions' (1996, Spring) 13 Ariz. J. 
Int'1 & Comp. Law, p. 31. 
28 Ibid. 
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to avoid some of the difficulties that the United States has had in establishing 
affirmative action power for the government. For example, unlike the United States, 
Bangladesh does not have to struggle with the question of whether "benign" 
discrimination is permissible in order to further its equality goals. 29 
a) Equality and the Constitution: formal equality v substantive equality 
In the light of the above discussion, the next obvious question that comes to 
mind is to what kind of equality does the Constitution adhere? Does it adhere to 
the sameness approach of equality or does it offer scope to accommodate gender 
difference? And if difference is accommodated, is it difference formed in terms 
of disadvantage, allowing for the development of a substantive concept of 
equality? Although Article 28(1) prescribe a gender neutral application of 
equality provisions30, by conferring a power upon the state to make special 
provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any 
backward section of the citizens under Art 28(4), the constitution does seem to 
accommodate difference, to a certain extent. Also from the wording of this 
subsection which lays down "nothing in this article shall prevent the State from 
29 As Davis observes, in the United States, "benign" discrimination has been used to describe the 
process by which preferential economic legislation and treatment has been used to compensate 
for past economic discrimination against women. In the United States, preferential treatment for 
women has been upheld where it is compensation for past discrimination against women as a 
class, but not when it has unreasonably denied benefits to men. For example, Davis refers to 
Califano v Webster (1977) 430 U. S. 313, where the Court upheld a statutory scheme permitting 
women to eliminate low-earnings years from the calculation of their retirement benefits. The 
Court stated that the statute was enacted to redress the long-standing disparate treatment of 
women in society and was not based upon assumptions about women as the "weaker sex". Davis 
also points out some judicially imposed limitations that have been placed upon United States 
legislatures when implementing programmes to remedy past discrimination. For example, it has 
been noted that "quota" programmes would be difficult to defend as a valid affirmative action 
measure under the United States Equal Protection Clause because of the Supreme Court decision 
in Regents of the Univ. v Bakke (1978) 438 U. S. 265. For details, see - Davis, above. 30 Article 28 (1) of the Constitution states: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen 
on grounds only of religion, race caste, sex or place of birth. " 
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making special provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement 
of any backward section of citizens" it appears that the Constitution recognises 
past pattern of disadvantage and where such disadvantage exists, provides the 
scope for preferential treatment. In other words, Article 28(4) provides the scope 
for taking into account difference and context in addressing the disadvantage and 
to achieve equality. The focus of this subsection is therefore not on similarity or 
difference as such but on impact of the differential treatment, disadvantage and 
on the context in which such disadvantage continues. Seen from this light, this 
subsection clearly holds the possibility for adopting a substantive understanding 
of equality. 
In this regard the thesis draws attention to the recent case Shamirna Sultana Seema 
and Others v Bangladesh and others (2003)31 where it was argued that: 
While Articles 28(1) and (2) provide for the application of the doctrine of 
"formal or strict equality" that is, a principle of equal treatment: individuals 
31 WP No. 3304/2003 (see- n. I above). The verdict of the High Court in this case came out on 16 
August 2004 after 10 women Ward Commissioners from reserved seats of Khulna City 
Corporation (Municipal Corporation) filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the 
circular. In the Written Submissions in support of the Petitioners, the Intervenor in the case 
argued that the Circular constituted discrimination against the women commissioners and is in 
violation of their fundamental rights as guaranteed under Arts. 27 and 28, read with Arts. 9,10 
and 11 of the Constitution and also in violation of the state's legal obligations under international 
law (particularly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR), and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 
(CEDAW)), as well as its policy commitments as contained in the National Policy for Women's 
Advancement in Bangladesh and the National Action Plan Towards Implementing Being 
Platform for Action (For reference details, see Chapter I). They also argued that the provision for 
direct elections to reserved seats had been made as a "temporary special measure" to ensure 
women's effective political participation, in conformity with Art. 28(4) of the Constitution and of 
the state's obligations under the international law. They further argued that the Circular by 
discriminating between Commissioners negates the very purpose of providing for such 
reservations which is to ensure women's effective participation in all spheres of national life, 
including local government. By observing that several commonwealth jurisdictions, such as 
Canada, India and South Africa, have entrenched constitutional provisions which enable special 
measures to be adopted to redress past disadvantage faced by women, they argued that "the 
circular, by negating the impact of the special measures adopted to ensure women's participation 
through the provision of reserved seats, runs counter to the growing trend, both internationally 
and in other democratic countries, of adopting special measures in order to redress past 
disadvantage faced by women". 
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who are alike should be treated alike, according to their actual 
characteristics rather than stereotypical assumptions made about them. 
... 
Article 28(4) of the Constitution, however, helps us move beyond the 
strict or formal application of equality and takes into account the notion of 
"substantive" equality - to take into account certain differences in order to 
avoid gender-related outcomes that are considered unfair. ..... 
In other 
words, Article 28(4) provides the scope to undertake remedial measures to 
reverse the effects of this past discrimination. 32 
As has been mentioned earlier, the written copy of the judgment has not been 
available at the time of submission of this thesis. Therefore, it is not yet known if the 
High Court has endorsed the "substantive equality" approach put forward by the 
Petitioners while interpreting the scope of various subsections of Article 28. 
b) Equality and the Constitution: protectionist approach v corrective approach 
To determine the nature and consequences of this recognition of gender difference 
by the Constitution of Bangladesh, one needs to know the underlying presumptions 
behind such acknowledgements of difference. There are two approaches that seem 
particularly relevant for understanding the conception of gender difference 
acknowledged by the Constitution. Two of these approaches are termed by Ratna 
Kapur and Brenda Cossman33 as the "protectionist" approach and the "corrective" 
approach. These approaches can be summarised as follows: 
32 It was further argued in the submission that - "Article 28(4) provides the scope for 
unrepresented communities or individuals to have an entry point that they hitherto lacked. Once 
this is achieved, Articles 28(l) and (2) operate to prohibit any further discrimination on the 
ground of gender. Thus, once women have been able to access this entry point and have been 
elected as Commissioners, they may not be treated from other Commissioners of the City 
Corporation. " 
33 R Kapur and B Cossman, `Women, Equality and the Constitution: Through the Looking Glass 
of Feminism' (1993, Special Issue) 1 National Law School Journal, p. 18-21. 
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(i) The protectionist approach 
According to the protectionist approach, women are constructed as subordinate to 
men and therefore, are considered to be in need of protection. According to Kapur 
and Cossman, this approach essentialises difference by taking the existence of 
difference as the natural and inevitable point of departure. In this approach, there is 
virtually no interrogation of the basis of difference, or any substantive consideration 
of the impact of differential treatment on women. According to this approach, any 
differential treatment is usually deemed to be preferential treatment whether or not it 
is in fact so. 34 This protectionist approach by the state is evident in Bangladesh 
where family laws are left to be regulated by religious laws. As has been highlighted 
in Chapter II, various underlying values of two of the major religious laws (i. e. 
Islamic law and Hindu law) assume women as inherently different from men and 
assigns different role to men and women in the society. These laws as understood 
and applied in the context of Bangladesh, operate on the basis of stereotypical gender 
roles, in which men are viewed as the providers and protectors and women are 
considered subordinate to men and in need of protection. 35 In Bangladesh 
subordination and dependence of women in the sphere of personal laws is often 
justified by the argument that women are inherently different from men and since 
they receive protection and support from men for their survival, it is natural that they 
34 Ibid. 
35As has been explained in Chapter II, various provisions of Islamic laws such as maintenance, 
dower, inheritance and duty of obedience sees women as dependent and in need of protection. 
Hindu law as operated in Bangladesh also sees women as all time dependent on man and not fit 
for independence. As has been pointed out in Chapter III, Manu observes: "Their father protects 
them in childhood; their husbands protect them in youth; their sons protect them in age: a woman 
is never fit for independence" F Agnes Law and Gender Inequality: the Politics of Women's 
Rights in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6. See also, G Banerjee, 
Gooroodass The Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana (Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri & Co, 
Calcutta, 1913), p. 116. 
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are not treated in the same way as men either in the public or in the personal sphere. 
Monsoor's work is a classic example of this position. According to Monsoor, Islam 
believes in the complementary roles of different sexes and assigns special rights and 
duties for both men and women. As such, she suggests that women of Bangladesh 
should insist that men should fulfil their respective obligations of maintaining and 
protecting women as prescribed by Islam instead of striving for gender equality. 36 In 
her opinion, women often benefit from the traditional roles assigned to them by the 
society, as she observes, "women in Bangladesh cannot simply be dismissed as 
submissive and subordinate, there are real powers behind their veils which are not so 
easy to understand"37. This is so because they are considered to be the goddesses of 
the home. 38 
In this regard, this thesis however argues that in the name of protecting women, the 
protectionist approach often serves to reinforce their subordinate status. More 
interestingly, such approach identifies women as a "protected species"39 and operates 
against their dignified existence. It does not need to be mentioned that in the real 
world, terms like "obedience", "subordination", "control", "protection" etc. are often 
used in relation to inferior and naturally subordinate class, and are also used to 
describe species which are in danger of permanent extinction40. 
36 Monsoor, n. 14 above, p. 57. 37 Ibid., p. 49. 38 .,. Lola., p.. ) i. In 
" The analogy of `protection-endangered species' was drawn by S Sobhan in Legal Status of 
Women in Bangladesh, BILIA (1978). 
40 N Tamanna `Book review' (2003) 11 Feminist Legal Studies 1. 
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(ii) The corrective approach 
The other approach is the corrective approach, in which women are seen to require 
special treatment as a result of past discrimination. Under this approach it is argued 
that failure to take difference into account will only serve to reinforce and perpetuate 
the disadvantage which, historically, difference has induced . 
41 Thus, the corrective 
approach argues that gender difference must be taken into account in order to 
produce substantive equality for women. 42 
As Kapur and Cossman points out, although, both the protectionist approach and 
corrective approach are similar in the sense that both of them acknowledge that 
gender difference is relevant and therefore must be recognised by law, there are 
important distinctions as well. Most important of them is that the protectionist 
approach is more likely to accept both gender difference and special protection as 
natural and essential. On the other hand, the corrective approach is more likely to 
consider the basis of the difference and the impact of the recognition or non- 
recognition of such difference on the lives of women. 43 Seen in this light, the 
corrective approach seems to be more in line with the substantive approach to 
equality as it inquires into the impact of the differential treatment rather than seeing 
difference as natural and, therefore, essential. 
41 Kapur and Cossman, n. 33 above. 42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
130 
If we examine various provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh, we can see 
that there is scope to interpret them in line with both these competing approaches. 
The Constitution reinforces the protectionist approach by appearing to guarantee 
equal rights only in the public sphere by Article 28(2), leaving the private sphere to 
be regulated by religious personal laws. Further, while providing equal opportunity 
to women in respect of employment, the Constitution in Article 29(3)(c) gives the 
right to reserve certain employment and offices to a certain sex alone if it is 
considered that members of the opposite sex are, by their nature, unsuited for such 
employment and office. The use of the words "by its nature unsuited" clearly 
demonstrates the protectionist attitude of the framers as it takes the difference as a 
natural and inevitable point of departure without any enquiry into the bases or causes 
behind such "difference". In practice, this provision has been used in the past to 
reserve certain employment like service in the armed forces exclusively for men. 
However, in the recent years, the Government has taken steps to include women in 
the armed forces as well. 44 On the other hand, the Constitution, by categorising 
women with children and other "backward" section of the citizens and reserving the 
right of the state to make special provisions or preferential treatment under Article 
28(4) also indicates the willingness to embrace a corrective approach (and as has 
been argued earlier, the "substantive equality" approach). Exercising the power 
given under this provision, the government has reserved 10% of all new recruitment 
in the public sector for women. 45 The same approach is also revealed in other 
44 Consequently, in the year 2000, women were recruited for the first time in various areas of the 
armed forces. For details, see Bangladeshi women fit to fight, BBC news South Asia, 31 
December, 2002 available at littp: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/south asia/2617737. stm Last accessed 
on 12 July 2005. 
45 The reserved quota for women was introduced in 1972 (became effective after a government 
order was issued in 1976) which reserved 10% women quota in all categories of vacancies 
subject to their fulfilment of basic qualifications. However, this reservation of quota was not to 
be applied in respect of recruitment to certain technical posts, posts in the defence services, and 
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provisions of the Constitution. Article 9 under Fundamental Principles of State 
Policy of the Constitution of Bangladesh stipulates the representation of women in 
local government institutions. In 1997 through an Act, the Government reserved 
three seats for women in the union parishad (union councils) where women members 
are elected from each of the three respective wards. 46 Under Article 65(3), 15 seats in 
the parliament were initially reserved for women which was subsequently increased 
to 30 in 1990. Recently, this has been increased again to 45 by the Jatiya Sangsad 
(National Parliament) Reserved Women Seats Election Bill (2004)47. However, it 
needs to be mentioned that the bill has invoked protests from the women's groups 
and civil society members who argued that the bill is unconstitutional and 
undemocratic as it has provided reservation of women's seats without any direct 
such other posts, which may be considered unsuitable for women. In July 1985 another order 
revised and partly modified the quota system with a view to increasing women's participation in 
the services. The order was made mandatory to all government, semi-government and 
autonomous bodies and different sector corporations in case of direct appointments. Now 10% 
gazetted posts and 15% non-gazetted posts are kept reserved for women in addition to merit, 
which is applicable in all types of public employment. There is also a provision for reserving 
60% posts of primary school teachers for women. For details, see 
hq: //ban2laDedia. search. com. bd/HT/W 0067. htm Last accessed on 12 July 2005. 
46 Apart from the reserved seats women can also contest for any of the general seats. Previously, 
the process of selection of the women representatives was on the basis of nominations and/or 
indirect election. Around 12,828 women were elected as embers in the 1997 local level elections. 
A total of 20 and 110 women were elected as chairpersons and members, respectively, for 
general seats. For details, see Global Database of Quotas for Women 
http: //www. quotaproiect oriz/displaCountry cfm? CountryCode=BD 
and Online Women in Politics 
h_ptt : //www. onlinewomeninpolitics ory/bangla/bangmain htm 
Last accessed on 12 July 2005. 
47 The bill provides for allocation of 45 reserved seats to women by political parties and alliances 
on the basis of their proportional representation in parliament. The seats will be allocated to 
parties in proportion to their overall share of the vote. The bill has also increased the 
number of the members of the parliament from 300 to 345. On May 16,2004 the 14th 
amendment to the Constitution was passed to add 45 new seats to the present 300 members of the 
parliament. Two writ petitions were filed to the High Court challenging the provision of 45 
reserved seats by women's rights activists and civil society members. The Court issued show 
cause notices to the government. The matter is now pending with the court. For more information 
on the bill, see http: //www. bssnews. net/index. Q1ip? genlD=BSS-09-2004-09-13&id=7 (Last 
accessed on 02.12.04). 
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election. Seen in this light, the bill can also serve as an example of the "protectionist 
approach" by the state. 
4. Equality and the Personal Laws 
Chapter I and II have exposed the discriminatory and disadvantageous aspects of 
various provisions of Islamic law that violate the principle of equality. In the 
preceding discussion different approaches to equality, as incorporated in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and as reflected in the judicial interpretations of such 
provisions, have been analysed. It is evident from the discussion that although the 
Constitution seems to accommodate and adhere to a version of equality in the public 
sphere, it does not seem to extend it to the private sphere where personal laws 
operate. It has already been argued in this thesis4x that this existing dichotomy 
between private and public is incoherent and does not offer a viable account of the 
legal system of Bangladesh. 
Given the assumption that personal laws in general discriminate/disadvantage 
women and violate principles of equality, the objectives of this part of the discussion 
are--(a) To reconsider various provisions of Shari 'a law to see if this assumption is 
necessarily compelled by Islam. In this regard this section looks at the works of the 
Islamic feminists revealing the gender stereotyping in the development of the Islamic 
jurisprudence as a whole; and (b) To examine if there is a way of reconciling Islam 
to a particular notion of equality. 
48 For details, see Chapter III. 
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a) Equality and Islam 
Although, as has been discussed in Chapter II that various provisions of Shari'a law 
such as polygamy, divorce, maintenance, guardianship etc. discriminate against 
women, in the sense both that they make explicit sex-based classifications and, by so 
doing, contribute to women's substantive disadvantage, there exist strong arguments 
(put forward especially by Islamic feminists) that these provisions are neither divine 
nor condoned by the divine but are the result of patriarchal local customs and 
patriarchal judicial perspectives. 9 It is contended that what is understood as 
women's position in Islam today is a product of biased interpretation and selective 
acknowledgement of textual sources from which rights have been derived. 50 
To understand the true position of women in Islam, we first need to understand the 
basic principles of Islam. As has been discussed in detail in Chapter II, Islamic law is 
based on Islamic Shari 'a which is informed by the Qur'an and Sunnah (words and 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). These two sources are further supplemented by 
other sources such as ijºna (consensus of the jurists) and giyas (analogy which allows 
the jurists to reason from the Qur'an, Sunnah or ijma). 
b) Equality and the Qur'an 
Some provisions of Shar'ia law which explicitly discriminate against women such as 
the duty of obedience, polygamy, maintenance and divorce, are claimed to be based 
49 A al-Hibri `Deconstructing Patriarchal Jurisprudence in Islamic Law: A Faithful Approach', in 
AK Wing (ed) Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) pp. 221-233. 
50 D Eissa Constructing the Notion of Male Superiority over Women in Islam: The Influence of 
Sex and Gender Stereotyping in the Interpretation of the Quran and the Implications for a 
Modernist Exegesis of Rights (Occasional Paper No. 11) (London: Women Living Under Muslim 
Law-WLUML, 1999). 
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on certain Qur'anic verses and are therefore considered sacrosanct and immutable. It 
is therefore, important to discuss the Qur'anic verses from which some of these 
provisions are claimed to have obtained legitimacy. 
In the beginning of the discussion, it is important to take note of some of the verses 
of Qur'an that recognise equality between men and women. 
For example, verse 4: 1 declares that: "0 mankind! Be careful of your duty to your 
Lord Who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and from them 
twain bath spread abroad a multitude of men and women. Be careful of your duty 
toward Allah in Whom ye claim (your rights) of one another, and toward the wombs 
(that bare you). Lo! Allah hath been a watcher over you". 51 
According to Riffat Hassan, what is interesting to note here is that there is no 
reference in this verse to the idea that Adam was created first and Eve was created 
from his rib, a theory that is commonly believed by Muslims, Christians and Jews. 
52 
Rather, men and women are created simultaneously and from the same source, i. e., a 
"single soul". According to the Qur'an woman is not blamed for the "fall of man". In 
narrating the story of Adam and Eve, the Qur'an frequently refers to both of them, 
never singling out Eve for the blame. 53 Pregnancy and childbirth are not seen as 
punishments for "eating from the forbidden tree. " On the contrary, the Qur'an 
51 See M Pickthal's translation of the Holy Qur'an at 
http: //www. use. edu/dept/MSA/guran/004. qmt. html#004.034 tt R Hassan `Equal before Allah? Women-man equality in the Islamic Tradition' (Jan-May, 1987) 
WVII Harvard Divinity Belletin 2. 
53 The Holy Qur'an 7: 19-27. J Badawi Gender Equity in Islam, published by the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth--WAMY Studies on Islam, 1999). Full text of the publication is 
available at 
http: //www. witness-pioneer. org/vil/Books/JB/genderequityinislam. html See also-- 
http: //www. sotindvision. com/Info/gender/ (Last accessed 10.11.04). 
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considers them to be grounds for love and respect. Similarly, in several other verses 
the Qur'an emphasises the importance of women's equality with men before God. 54 
(i) Verse 4: 34 
The verse or ayah which is most controversial from the perspective of gender 
equality is verse 4: 34 of the Our'an. Although this verse is often cited as proof that 
Islam allows male dominance over women, there is a considerable amount of 
controversy among academics regarding the interpretation of the verse and the rights 
and obligations derived from it. In particular, some Islamic feminist writers such as 
al-Hibri55 and Eissa56 have provided an interesting challenge to the traditional 
meaning attributed to this verse. Their analysis of 4: 34 provides interesting insights 
about how gender stereotyping influenced the interpretation of this verse by the 
traditional jurists. 
Al-Hibri begins by pointing out how gender stereotyping influenced the 
interpretation of some of the key words of the verse to suit the patriarchal ends of the 
interpreters. She then presents an alternative interpretation of the verse which is 
more in line with the egalitarian principles of the Qur'an. Al-Hibri first provides a 
partial interpretation of the verse in order to highlight the words that play a 
54 Ibid. Badawi refers to various verses of Qur'an as proof of this. For example, in the Qur'an- 
men and women have the same religious and moral duties and responsibilities. They both face 
the consequences of their deeds (Qur'an 4: 124) (Qur'an 33: 35) (Qura, 1 57: 12). The Qur'an 
effectively ended the cruel pre-Islamic practice of female infanticide (wad): "When the female 
(infant) buried alive is questioned for what crime she was killed" (Qur'an 81: 8-9). The Qur'an 
went further to rebuke the unwelcoming attitudes among some parents upon hearing the news of 
the birth of a baby girl, instead of a baby boy: "When news is brought to one of them of (the 
birth of) a female (child) his face darkens and he is filled with inward griefl With shame does he 
hide himself from his people because of the bad news he has had! Shall he retain her on 
(sufferance and) contempt or bury her in the dust? Ah! what an evil (choice) they decide on! " 
(Vur'an 16: 58-59). For details, see Badawi referred above. 
5 See- Eissa, n. 50 above. 
56 Ibid. 
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determining role in the interpretation of the verse. From the perspective of gender 
equality, these words which are crucial to the ultimate outcome of the verse (i. e., 
whether it propagates women's subordination to men or not), largely depend on the 
meanings that the interpreter has chosen to attribute to them. 
As Al-Hibri observes the partial translation of the first part of the ayah is as follows: 
Men are qawwamun over women bima God faddala some of them over 
others, and bima they spend of their own money. 57 
The traditional interpretation of the verse stands as follows: 
Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one of them 
to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the 
58 support of women). 
A]- Hibri is of opinion that the reason for this patriarchal outcome of this verse is 
partially rooted in the relational meaning of the word qawwam. In this regard, she 
points out that the word qawwain can be interpreted variously to mean "head, " 
"boss, " "leader", "protector", or sometimes "manager", "guide" and "advisor". She 
points out that while one of the old Arabic dictionaries defines the related word 
qiyam in the context of this ayah as "having the meaning of preservation or 
betterment", another dictionary defines the word gayyim as "one who manages 
peoples' affair, leads and straightens them out". As she observes, both these 
meanings, while not necessarily hierarchical, are open to hierarchical interpretation 
57 It translates as: "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the 
one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. " See 
Pickthal's translation of the Holy Qur'an at 
http: //www. usc. edu/dept/MSA/guran/004. gint. html#004.034 (n. 51 above). On the other hand, 
Yusuf Ali's translation of this part of the verse is as follows: "Men are the protectors and 
maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and 
because they support them from their mean" (see-- littp: //web. umr. edu/msaumr/Ouran ). 
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and, as seen from the above, the traditional interpretative approaches by Islamic 
jurists are based on their own patriarchal perspective. 59 
Another significant word in the above verse is the word bima. Linguistically, it is 
composed of two parts: bi and ma and the meaning of the word binia revolves mostly 
around the bi segment. 60 As a result, bima could mean (a) "because"; (b) "in 
circumstances where"; and (c) "in that which". 6' 
In the light of the above, the first part of the verse can alternatively be read as 
follows: 
Men are (advisors/providers of guidance) to women (because/in 
circumstances where/in that which) God made some of them different 
from some others and (because/in circumstances where/in that which) 
they spend their own money. 62 
Al-Hibri concludes that the first statement that men are ggwwaºnun (advisor or 
providers of guidance) over women is a general statement. It is operative only: 
(i)where God has endowed a male (in certain circumstances or at a 
certain time) with a feature, ability, or characteristics that a 
particular woman lacks (and presumably needs in those 
circumstances or at that time); and (ii) where that male is 
maintaining that particular woman63. 
According to al-Hibri, only under both of these conditions may the man presume 
to offer guidance or advice to the woman. 64 In other words, the verse informs us 
that God gave the man the responsibility (not privilege) of offering the woman 
guidance and advice in those areas in which he happens to be more qualified or 









experienced. The woman, however, is entitled to reject both. 65 In support of this 
interpretation she cites another verse of the Qur'an which states that Muslims, 
male and female, are each other's walis (protectors or even guardians). 66 
The prevailing interpretation of the second part of verse 4: 34 reads as follows: 
So good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which God 
hath guarded. As for those of whom ye fear rebellion, admonish 
them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them beat them. 
Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! God is 
ever High, Exalted, Great. 67 
On the basis of the prevailing interpretation of this verse, traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence provides that a wife owes a duty of obedience or ta'a to her husband, 
failure to comply with which will make her a nashiz. 68 The duty includes not leaving 
the house without the husband's permission. The concept of ta'a or that of nashiz 
has particular significance in maintenance cases. As we have seen in the discussion 
on maintenance in Chapter II, a wife may lose her right to maintenance if it can be 
proved that she is guilty of nushuz or disobedience. The concept of ta'a has also 
been associated with tanikin, or availability which prescribes that a woman's consent 
to sexual intercourse with her husband is given while the marriage contract is 
concluded and therefore, can be relied upon at any time by the husband. 69 The most 
problematic aspect of the prevailing interpretation is perhaps contained in the last 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid. 
67 Pickthal's translation (n. 51 above). Yusuf Ali's translation (n. 57 above) of this part of the 
verse is as follows: "Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the 
husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear 
disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) 
beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them Means (of annoyance): 
For Allah is Most High, great (above you all). " 68 Eissa, n. 50 above. 
69 Ibid. 
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part of the verse. As seen from the traditional interpretation above, this part of the 
verse is interpreted to give power to the husband to beat or strike his wife if she is 
not obedient. 
(ii) Alternative reading of the Second Part of Verse 4: 34 
For our discussion, the most important three words that are contained in this part of 
the original Arabic verse are ganitat, nushuz and drubuhunna. 
As seen above, qanitat is traditionally interpreted as "obedient, " implying that 
women should be obedient to their husbands. In this regard Eissa observes that, in 
other verses of Qur'an the term qanital as well as nushuz is used to describe both 
men and women, and in these verses the term clearly refers to a state of obedience to 
God. 70 Eissa further argues that the term nushuz is used in the Arabic version of the 
verse in feminine form nushuzahunna because there is no neuter in the Arabic 
language. This does not imply, as she points out that the disobedience is 
disobedience to one's husband. As nushuz is gender neutral and refers to 
disobedience to God, the feminine form in this instance refers to a woman 
disobeying God. 71 
Eissa further observes that drubuhunna is related to the verb daraba, which is 
traditionally interpreted as "to strike". However, daraba does not necessarily 
indicate force or violence. There are other meanings that can be attributed to this 
term. For example Eissa points out that the term can be used when someone "strikes 
70 As a proof of this Eissa refers to verses such as (2: 238; 3: 17; 33: 35) (4: 34; 33: 34; 66: 5; 66: 12) 
for nushuz (4: 128). For details, see generally Eissa, n. 50 above. 
71 Ibid. 
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out" on a journey. Referring to other verses such as verses 4: 128,30: 21 and 2: 187, 
she argues that the Qur'an endorses harmony, love, mercy and mutual understanding 
in the marriage relationship. The meaning "to strike" therefore is not appropriate, as 
it cannot possibly fulfil the objective of Islam of protecting the institution of 
marriage and securing the physical and emotional integrity of women. 72 
In light of these, Eissa concludes that the second part of this controversial verse can 
alternatively read as "good women are God fearing, and that when a man fears that 
his wife's conduct is disobedient to God, he should admonish her for such conduct, 
take separate sleeping quarters, and possibly "strike out" of the marriage". 73 
(iii) Verse 4: 3 
Another controversial verse of the Our'an is the verse 4: 3 which has been 
traditionally interpreted to allow polygamy by men. The verse is as follows: 
"If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of 
your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal 
justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hand possesses. That 
will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice. "74 
Following the traditional interpretation, in many Muslim societies, permission is 
given to a man to marry up to four women. But as has been discussed in Chapter II, 
this interpretation has also been challenged on the ground that permission of 
polygamy is subject to the condition that the man can do full justice to all the 
existing co-wives and since justice does not only require equality in food, clothes, 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See-A Yusuf Ali's translation, n. 57 above. 
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residence or money alone but also requires equality in love, affection and esteem, it 
is not possible for any man to fulfil this requirement. It can be therefore, argued that 
seen from this perspective, this verse Qur'an actually encourages monogamy and 
discourages polygamy. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, this view is endorsed 
by the highest part of the judiciary in Bangladesh as well. 
c) Equality and Sunnah 
Feminist scholars have also provided interesting challenges to the authenticity of 
some of the hadith75 forming the second most important source of Shari 'a law which 
is Sunnah. 
There is considerable controversy surrounding the authenticity of many reports of 
the practices and pronouncements that are attributed to the Prophet. Eissa points out 
that Sunnah came to incorporate not only the words and practices of the Prophet but 
also the words and practices of the first generation of Muslims which facilitated a 
departure from the Sunnah of the Prophet that God intended the Muslims to follow. 
76 
The matters became even more complicated because of the absence of written 
records of the Sunnah in the first centuries of Islam. The delay in recording the 
Sunnah in writing resulted in the fabrication of many hadith and consequently 
various traditions developed in different communities. 77 In the process, many pre- 
Islamic tribal law and cultural constructs that discriminated against women were 
internalized by early Muslim communities. 78 This also influenced the Sunnah of the 
early Muslims and the exercise of ýtihad or juristic interpretation of text. According 
75 Hadith (or "ahadith ") are reports attributed to the Prophet. Hadith are accounts of the practice, 
conduct, and tradition of the Prophet that have formed Sunnah or tradition of the Prophet. 76 Eissa, n. 50 above. 77 Ibid. 
78 Sobhan, n. 39 above. 
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to Al-Hibri, Shari'a law understood today is based in substantial part on medieval 
Islamic jurisprudence clouded by deeply rooted cultural assumptions that were rarely 
challenged and "that gave rise to a then common model of state and family 
relationships which are best described today as authoritafian/patriarchal 1179 As an 
example of this she cites some of the practices and pronouncements of the second 
Caliph, 80 Umar ibn aI-Khattab, who was known to be restrictive about the freedom 
of women. He was reported to have said as follows: 
Women are of three types: a modest, honest Muslim woman who helps 
her people live and will not ally herself with life against her people; 
another woman is a mere container for conceiving babies; and the third is 
a plague like lice with which Allah tests whoever He wills of His 
bondsmen. 8' 
Fatima Mernissi offers an interesting challenge to the authenticity of some of the 
hadith. For example, she questions the authenticity of a hadith which is quoted in al- 
Bukhari as an authentic report and has been used to prescribe that women are not fit 
to be rulers or to hold positions of political leadership. The hadith goes as follows: 
"Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity". 92 
Mernissi observes that after the death of the Prophet, Ali ibn Abu Talib, the fourth 
Caliph was not in good terms with the Prophet's wife Aisha as she did not accept 
him as the Caliph. She took a command of an army of insurgents and fought him at 
Basra in the famous battle of Kamel. She was defeated and it is after this battle, more 
than twenty years after the Prophets death that this hadith was reported. Merinissi 
79 Al-Hibri, n. 49 above. 90 The practices and pronouncements of the first four Caliphs (who were in close touch with the 
Prophet during his lifetime) in Arabia are considered authoritative as they were known as the 
"trustees of Islam". 
81 See generally the references made to Anas Ismail Abudawood, Daleel Al-Saileen in F 
Mernisssi The Veil and the Male Elite: a Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Books, 1991). 
82 See references made to al-Bukhari's Sahih Hadiths (collection of Authentic Hadiths) and to the 
commentary by al-Sindi in Memisssi, Ibid. 
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argues that particular political and economic factors were responsible for the 
fabrication of hundreds of thousands of hadith like this. 83 Merinissi also challenges 
the authority of Abu Hurayra84 to transmit hadith. Giving examples of many 
disagreements between him and Aisha, Mernissi argues that his dislike of Aisha and 
women generally caused him to fabricate many reports attributed to the Prophet. 
5. Devices for Reform within the Framework of Islam 
With regard to initiating equality-seeking reform within Islamic law there are other 
devices that have been used in the past for introducing reform to the Islamic law in 
the Subcontinent and may still have the potential to bring Islamic law more in line 
with gender equality. Serajuddin summarises these as (a) procedural devices, (b) 
eclecticism or takhayyur and (c) ýtihad. 85 According to him, "procedural devices" 
leave the substantial law unchanged but preclude the courts from applying it in 
specific circumstances. He points out that the doctrine of siyasah allows an Islamic 
state to control the jurisdiction of courts and also to enforce new rules of procedure 
and evidence. As an example of this he points out that child marriage which was and 
still is a serious social problem in the Indian Subcontinent has been discouraged by 
issuing regulations that the courts must not hear any action where the wife is under 
sixteen and the husband under eighteen years of age at the time of marriage; nor are 
such marriages to be registered. Thus, under the procedural device the Shari 'a rule 
itself is not tampered with but is no longer enforced by the courts. On the other hand, 
"eclecticism" or takhayyur is a device for searching for precedents, not only in the 
83 Ibid. 
xa Who was a companion of the Prophet and is well known for having complied and transmitted a 
large number of hadith. 
85 A Serajuddin Shari 'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Subcontinent 
(Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991). 
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four orthodox schools but also in the opinion of individual jurists, which would 
conform most to the needs of modern life. As Serajuddin observes, an effective use 
of this method was seen in the enactment of the Dissolution of the Muslim Marriages 
Act (1939)86 that brought substantive changes in the divorce law applicable to the 
Muslims of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, regardless of the school to which they 
belong (The Act has been discussed in details in Chapter II). 97 
The most important of the above devices is ijtihad or juristic interpretation. Ijtihact8 
means juristic interpretation of text which is open to all qualified Muslims, whether 
male or female, having the knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunnah, important 
commentaries and other related works. 89 ijtihad provides Islamic jurists the scope to 
develop or adopt the Islamic jurisprudence most suitable to their societies and to 
supplement that with local custom, so long as it does not conflict with Islamic law. 90 
Unfortunately, with the crystallisation of legal thought and the setting up of schools, 
the scope of the ijtihad has been gradually curtailed 91 
As the legal history of the Sub Continent reveals, the power of the courts to 
exercise "judicial" ijtihad has long been an established one. The exercise of the 
power of ijtihad by the courts was evidenced in various decisions throughout the 
Pakistani era which was fortunately carried on by the superior courts of 
86 ...,.. _. , k v111OI1YJy)yYl 716. 
V7 
°' Under the Hanafi School (which is followed by the Muslims in Bangladesh) the wife can claim 
divorce only on the ground of her husband's impotence. On the other hand Maliki jurists 
recognise other grounds for the dissolution of marriage by the wife. As a solution, the grounds of 
Maliki law for divorce were incorporated in the Act and made applicable to all Muslims alike. 
For details, see - Serajuddin, n. 85 above. 88 Today, there are five major schools of i tihad, i. e., Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Ja'fari 
schools. 
89 Among other qualifications, it is important that the person who is who is engaging into ýtihad 
(Mujtahid) should be familiar with the conditions of his or her society. This recognition was 
derived from the Quranic verse encouraging diversity. 90 Serajuddin, n. 85 above. 
91 Ibid. 
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Bangladesh after independence. 92 As a result of this, two very important rights 
were asserted which have profound significance for women's rights and the reform 
of Islamic law. These are as Serajuddin points out: (1) The right of the courts to 
independent interpretation of Qur'an where necessary and (2) their right to differ 
from the doctrines of traditionally authoritative legal texts which are not based on 
any specific injunction of the Qur'an and Sunnah. 93 
In a more recent case as well, the High Court reaffirmed the position that the power 
to interpret law is vested with the Court and observed that- 
Fatwa means legal opinion which therefore, further means legal 
opinion of a lawful person or authority. The legal system of Bangladesh 
empowers only the Courts to decide all questions relating to legal 
opinion on the Muslim and other Laws as in force. We therefore, hold 
that any fatwa including the instant one are all unauthorised and 
illegal. 94 
The above decisions clearly demonstrate the power of the courts of Bangladesh to 
exercise judicial ijtihad to reinterpret the discriminatory provisions of Shar'ia law. 
6. Equality within the Framework of Islam: the Debates 
The next obvious question therefore, is whether there is scope within Islamic law to 
develop a framework for the reinterpretation of these provisions in line with equality 
92 Serajuddin concludes this by reffering to various cases such as Md. Abu Baker Siddique v. S. 
M. A. BBakar (1986) [38 DLR (AD) 106], where the matter before the court was regarding the 
custody of a eight year old boy and the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court 
held that it is permissible for courts to differ from the traditional/orthodox rules of hizanal or 
custody of children laid down by the classical jurists. The Court observed that the paramount 
consideration in these cases should be the child's welfare and decided to grant custody to the 
mother. The principle of ijlihad was also used in Jamila Khatun v. Rustom Ali (1996) [48 DLR 
(AD) 110] to grant past maintenance to the wife. Similarly in Hasina Ahmed v. Syed Abut Fazal 
(1980) [32 DLR 294] the court, relying on the decision of the Pakistan Supreme Court in Mst. 
Khurshid Bibi v. Mhammad Amin (1967) [PLD SC 97] held that a wife could obtain divorce by 
way of khula even if the husband did not agree. For details see- Serajuddin, n. 85 above. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Editor, The daily Banglabazar Patrika and two others v District Magistrate and Deputy 
Commissioner, Naogaon (2000) Writ Petition No. 5897 of 2000. 
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and in accordance with the needs of modem times. In this regard it should be noted 
that as in the West, in Muslim societies, ranging from North Africa to South Asia, 
the concept of gender equality elicits a wide range of interpretations and opinions- 
from the argument that gender equality is fully compatible with Islam to the claim 
that gender equality is a product of Western cultural imperialism and represents 
values that are incompatible with Islam. There are, on the one hand, conservatives 
who describe those who advocate equality-based reforms as agents of West aiming 
to destroy Islam in the name of promoting gender equality. On the other hand, there 
are scholars who reject many traditional interpretations of the Islamic sources and 
conclude that authentic Islamic doctrine actually supports reforms of Shari 'a rules 
designed to ensure gender equality. As has been demonstrated in the preceding 
discussion, Fatima Mernissi95, Azizah al-Hibri 96 and Riffat Hassan97 are among 
contemporary Muslim scholars who have re-examined original sources and 
concluded that Islam, properly interpreted, calls for equal rights for men and women. 
Acknowledging the fact that various provisions of Muslim law such as polygamy, 
divorce, maintenance, guardianship etc. discriminate against and cause disadvantage 
to women, they argue that these provisions are neither divine nor condoned by the 
divine but are the result of patriarchal local customs and patriarchal judicial 
perspectives. 98 They conclude that what is understood as women's position in Islam 
today is a product of biased interpretation and selective acknowledgement of textual 
sources from which rights have been derived. 99 
95.. 
mermsssi, n. zsl above. nc 
"' A aI-I-Iibri `Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights' (1997) 12 Am. U. J. 
hat 'I L. & Pol 'y 1. 
97 Hassan, n. 52 above. 98 Al-Hibri, n. 96 above. See also - n. 49. 99 Eissa, n. 50 above. 
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Side by side with these two views, there remains yet a third view that maintains that 
any reform movement or discourse carried out within an Islamic framework is a 
limited project not capable of bringing any substantive change in the status of 
women in the direction of equality. Instead, it is argued that feminists should opt for 
a secular legal regime where laws will be uniformly applied irrespective of religious 
beliefs and gender. Supporters of this view maintain that the activities and goals of 
the scholars operating within an Islamic framework are circumscribed and 
compromised and as such are not capable of improving the status of women in any 
substantial way100. Moghissi in this regard observes, 
Of course, there are significant differences among various interpretations 
of the Qur'an and the Islamic laws and instructions. The fact has already 
been stressed that Islam, like other religions and ideologies, has a 
contingent character; it has a remarkable capacity to adapt to different 
indigenous cultures and societies and economic and political conditions. 
This means that there are many different ways that Islam can be adopted. 
But no amount of twisting and bending can reconcile the Qur'anic 
injunctions and instructions about women's rights and obligations with 
the idea of gender equality. Regardless of the interpretation of the Qur'an 
and the Shari'a, if the Qur'anic instructions are taken literally, Islamic 
individuals or societies cannot favour equal rights for women in the 
family or in certain areas of social life-'01 
The demand for a secular and uniform personal law regime is particularly vociferous 
in Bangladesh led mainly by NGO-based activists concerned with the promotion of 
women's rights. To understand the position of those who argue that Islamic law is 
compatible with gender equality, it is important to note that the concept of equality 
has a different connotation to these scholars and activists than it has for 
contemporary feminist western scholars engaged with the equality debates. 
Compared to the feminist struggles in the West, the engagement of Islamic feminists 
100 For details, see H Moghissi Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of 
Postmodern Analysis (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 2000), and H Shahidian `The Iranian 
Left and "The Women Question" in the Revolution of 1978-79' 26 international Journal of 
Middle East Studies 2, pp. 223-47. 101 Moghissi, ibid. 
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with equality-based reform is narrower in both theory and practice. While their 
western feminist counterparts are concerned with the development of more 
sophisticated understandings of equality such as is evidenced by substantive equality 
approaches, Muslim feminists and women's rights activists are mostly taken up in a 
struggle for inclusion, aimed at ensuring equal participation of women in public life 
and on the same terms as men. As seen in the preceding discussion, in an attempt to 
eradicate some of the glaring inequalities and improve the status of Muslim women, 
Muslim feminist scholars are seeking to promote the egalitarian ethics of Islam, 
highlighting women-friendly verses of the Qur'an and hadith and using re- 
interpretation of the sources of Islamic law in their fight to secure rights such as the 
right to work, equal rights to divorce, custody and guardianship of children, as well 
as the eradication of polygamy and the duty of obedience (ta'a). In this respect it 
appears that Islamic feminists are demanding equality in law in much the same way 
that liberal feminists once advocated formal equality. But as Mojab102 in her critique 
of Islamic feminism observes "unlike western liberalism, which despite its 
shortcomings, has succeeded in instituting an extensive regime of rights 
guaranteeing legal equality, "Islamic feminism" is not even ambitious enough to 
demand universal formal equality. " 
As has been noted earlier in this discussion, with regard to the debates related to 
gender equality and Islam in the context of Bangladesh, there remain arguments that 
see gender equality as a Western concept and advocates for a solution within the 
framework of Islam. Monsoor in this regard argues that if the concept of gender 
equality is incorporated into the sphere of family law, it will disturb the equilibrium 
102 S Mojab `Theorizing the Politics of "Islamic Feminism" ' (2001, Winter) Feminist Review 69 
pp. 124-146. 
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of the social fabric that has been developed over centuries103. A more sustainable 
strategy in her opinion is to pursue "sexual equity" rather than "sexual equality" 
which according to her, can be meaningfully developed by better enforcement of 
existing rights guaranteed by Islam. ' 04 
From the perspective of women's empowerment in Bangladesh, the position 
Monsoor adheres to is problematic from several perspectives. Firstly, the proposition 
of introducing the concept of gender "equity" in the legal system appears to be 
hardly in line with the scope of the Constitution which specifically guarantees gender 
"equality" of all citizens and does not acknowledge the concept of gender "equity", 
either directly or indirectly. Secondly, there exists a strong argument in feminist 
scholarship against the notion of "home" as women's dominion. The position 
Monsoor's supports, basically accepts the idea of separate gender roles in the 
private/personal sphere which in turn it reinforces the public private dichotomy that 
operates in the legal system of Bangladesh. As seen in Chapter III this division tends 
to conceal the reality of discrimination and violence suffered by women in the home 
and discourages state intervention in the personal sphere. As has been pointed out 
already, her proposition also risks adopting (at best) a "protectionist" approach to 
equality which essentialises/naturalises women and their roles in the family. 
7. Conclusion 
The discussions in this Chapter clearly highlight the scope and possibilities of the 
equality provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh. It also traces the development 
of equality analysis and some of the debates associated with equality as a norm and 
103 Monsoor, n. 14 above, p. 57. 
104 Ibid. 
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strategic goal within feminist legal scholarship. The following Chapters consider 
some of these debates in specific contexts. Chapters V and VI look at Canada and 
South Africa to trace developments in substantive equality analysis in non Muslim 
secular contexts while Chapter VII looks at two Tunisia and Morocco to examine the 
possibilities of equality based reforms in Muslim societies. 
The analysis put forward by Islamic feminists of the development of Islamic 
jurisprudence highlights how gender stereotyping and patriarchal cultural assumption 
may have influenced the interpretation of the Qur'anic verses and Sunnah. The 
discussion also demonstrates the possibility of reforming some of the areas of 
Shari'a law by invoking the method of reinterpretation in the light of the egalitarian 
principles of Islam. Although it is doubtful that this could bring the Shari'a law fully 
in line with substantive equality or even formal equality, this can still serve to secure 
some important rights for women and help to bring changes in some areas where 
glaring inequality exists. 
The above discussion on ijtihad clearly demonstrate the power of the courts of 
Bangladesh to exercise judicial i tihad to reinterpret the discriminatory provisions of 
Shar'ia law that cause disadvantage to women by invoking the egalitarian principles 
of Islam. Furthermore, these cases also highlight the judicial trend of 
acknowledgment that the interpretations of the classical jurists are not necessarily 
sacrosanct and immutable. In this light, it is also argued that the Courts, by asserting 
their right to independent interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah, should continue 
its role in freeing the areas of Shari 'a law such as polygamy, guardianship, 
inheritance etc., from the patriarchal interpretation so as to reform them according to 
the true spirit of Islam. 
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In addition to judicial ijtihad, attempts should also be made to engage in re 
interpretation of religious texts in order to challenge the orthodox and patriarchal 
interpretations. Previous discussions have already established that the inferior status 
and disadvantageous position of women under personal laws is mostly a product of 
biased interpretation and some of the provisions can be made compatible with the 
notions of equality if understood in their true spirit. Overall, the conclusion of the 
Chapter is that while Bangladesh law, as currently understood within the present 
religious context, is still a far way short of bestowing on women a comprehensive 
substantive right to equality, there is room for further interpretation, both within 
Shar'ia law and in the context of constitutional jurisprudence, to enhance women's 
social and legal position in ways which concretely combat disadvantage and foster 
more egalitarian ideals. 
152 
CHAPTER V 
EQUALITY: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
1. Introduction 
Previous discussions on equality have highlighted the multi-dimensional nature of 
equality as a concept. It has been pointed out that although equality has been, and 
continues to be a central concept in the feminist legal movement, there has also been 
ongoing debate among feminists about what equality truly means and how it may be 
attained in different socio-cultural-economic contexts. 
In attempting to think strategically and critically about our engagement with equality 
and to explore the possibilities equality may offer for elevating the status of women 
in Bangladesh, the current Chapter and the following aim to look at the development 
of equality jurisprudence in two different jurisdictions providing a constitutional 
guarantee of gender equality namely, Canada and South Africa, to see how the 
concept has been applied as a strategic and normative goal and what form of legal 
equality is emerging in these two countries. 
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The reasons for choosing Canada as a case study are as follows: firstly, as a pluralist 
and multicultural society, Canada provides a fertile ground for the development of a 
more dynamic understanding of equality because of its complexities and socio- 
cultural undercurrents. This study in turn may be helpful to identify and understand 
the complexities of developing a substantive understanding of equality in a multi 
religious society such as Bangladesh where the question of gender equality is 
inextricably linked with various religious group based rights. Secondly, feminist 
scholarship in relation to equality jurisprudence in Canada has developed 
considerably during the last few decades due to the strong presence of various 
women's groups, and other advocacy organisations. Feminist engagements with 
equality in Canada and the resulting critique developed in this area can be useful to 
analyse the problems of equality as a strategic goal as well as to identify the 
possibilities it offers for improving the legal status of women in Bangladesh. 
The Chapter begins with a brief background to the history and development of the 
equality guarantee in Canada. While doing so, it looks at some of the gender-equality 
decisions made by the Supreme Court of Canada. It then examines feminist 
engagement with equality in Canada and examines some of the critiques made and 
some of the possibilities raised by feminists scholars of the equality guarantee under 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982)1 ( hereinafter 
referred to as the "Charter" or the "Canadian Charter"). 
(1882,79). Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act (1982) (U. K., 1982, c. 1 1), which came 
into force on April 17 1982. Available at: http: //laws ustice. gc. ca/en/charter/index. html (Last 
accessed 10.09.04). 
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2. Equality before the advent of the Charter 
a) Formal equality 
Prior to the interpretative developments of Section 15(1) of the Charter, equality 
jurisprudence in Canada was dominated by a liberal understanding of equality (also 
referred to as formal equality) premised on the understanding that equality means 
treating likes alike and un-likes unalike. The norm underlying this model of equality 
was that of sameness or difference and a prototypical person that represented the 
goal and the standard by which the right to equality was measured2. This prototypical 
person was from the dominant groups in all aspects, such as, white, heterosexual, 
non-disabled, Christian, middle-class, and male. Members of non-dominant groups, 
such as, racial minorities, working class people, non-heterosexuals including women 
were expected to demonstrate that they were the same as the prototype to qualify for 
equal treatment under this model of equality3. 
Historically, women have been regarded in Western societies as inherently different 
from men, that is, they were not seen as like the prototype, and hence there was 
perceived to be no obligation to treat them equally. In keeping with the liberal model 
of equality, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century Canada, women's legal 
status was very much one of inferiority 4. For instance, it was not until the 1930 
landmark decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Edwards v 
2D Majury `Women's (In) Equality before and after the Charter' in 
Radha Jhappan (ed) Women's Legal Strategies in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002). 
3 See n. 2 above and M Liu `A "Prophet With Honour": An Examination of the Gender Equality 
Jurisprudence of Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada' (2000, 
Spring) 25 Queen's Lam Journal 417. 
C L'Heureux-Dube `Symposium: Women, Justice and Authority: It Takes a Vision: The 
Constitutionalization of Equality in Canada' (2002) 14 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 363. 
155 
A. G. for Canada (1930)5 (the "Persons" case), that women were finally recognised 
as "persons" within the meaning of section 24 of the Constitution Act (1867), and 
therefore eligible to be appointed to the Senate. 7 The status of racial minorities was 
also not much different from that of women. For example, federally, Japanese 
Canadians could not vote until 1948, and status Aboriginals gained the franchise 
only in 19608. Like women in other Western societies, Canadian women struggled 
for a long time to fit within the liberal equality paradigm and achieve similar status 
as the prototype i. e., male. In law reform efforts and litigation, women's fight for 
equality was, during this period, largely a fight for inclusion focusing primarily on 
obtaining the same rights and privileges accorded to men under law. 9 
b) Bill of Rights 
The original written constitution of Canada contained no express guarantee of human 
rights or civil liberties. 10 As noted earlier, the struggle for obtaining full legal 
personhood and broader recognition of rights by women continued and gradually 
some of the most blatant limitations on women's rights, such as right to work and to 
own property, were removed. In this process, the first major change came in 1960 
A. C. 124 (P. C. ). 
6 (30 & 31 Victoria c. 3), also known as The British North America Act (1867). Available at: 
httn: //www. solon. org/Constitutions/Canada/En lig ish/ca 1867. html (Last accessed 10.10.04). 
7 L'Heureux-Dube, n. 4 above. S Ibid. 
9 Majury, n. 2 above) observes that these fights for inclusion were largely waged by women who, 
with the exception of their gender, were from the dominant groups. This, in turn, gave rise to a 
"feminist prototype" of the white, Christian, non-disabled, middle-class, heterosexual woman 
which transposed many of the same assumptions and expectations that underlay the male 
prototype. And just like prototypical males, this feminist prototype operated to exclude the 
concerns of other women such as, women of colour, non-Christian women, lesbians, disabled 
and working class women. 
10 Majury, n. 2 above. 
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when the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960)" ("Bill") was passed. It applied to all 
federal laws of Canada. 
Section 1 of the Bill provides in part: 
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and 
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, namely,... (b) The right of the individual to equality before the 
law and the protection of the law. 
By the 1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada had decided fewer than ten cases 
involving the equality section under the Canadian Bill of Rights and two of these 
dealt with sex equality''. Unfortunately, despite the strong affirmation of equality in 
the Bill, equality jurisprudence failed to escape the prevailing formal equality model 
because of the narrow interpretation of the equality guarantee under the Bill by the 
courts. In a series of cases, the courts embraced the concept of formal equality while 
interpreting the equality guarantee by applying the Aristotelian principle "likes 
should be treated alikei13, and Dicey's notion of "equality before the law" 14. As the 
cases discussed below demonstrate, the Courts, by adhering to a formalistic 
reasoning, used "difference" to justify discrimination. As such, in those cases, a 
11 (1960, c. 40). Available at: http: //Iaws. iustice., c. ca/en/C-12.3/text. htmi (Last accessed 
10.09.04). 
12 Majury gathered and discussed the cases which have bearing on this topic, for details see 
Majury, n. 2 above. 
13 The corollary to this is that un-likes should be treated un-alike. Thus, as York observes, 
according to this analysis, if an individual or group were "different" in some way, it would be 
legitimate to treat that group or individual differently even if such treatment resulted in 
disadvantage. A York `The Inequality of Emerging Charter Jurisprudence: Supreme Court 
Interpretations of Section 15(1)' (Spring 1996) University of Toronto Faculty gfLaw Review. 14 Dicey outlined three components of the rule of the law, the third of which stipulated that every 
person is equally subject to the law. See- AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law and of the 
Constitution (10th edition) (London: MacMillan, 1982). Unfortunately, as the early cases under 
the Bill of Rights (1960) demonstrate, it can be used to justify and uphold any law that infringes 
on a particular group's equality rights, so long as it applies to everyone in that group equally. 
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distinguishing feature in a particular group (such as race, sex, or pregnancy) justified 
different (and discriminatory) treatment for that group 15. 
For example, Attorney General of Canada v Lavell (1973)16 may be mentioned 
which involved a challenge to section 12(1) (b) of the Indian Act " According to this 
provision, Indian women who elected to marry non-Indian men lost their Indian 
status and were struck from the band list while the non-Indian women who married 
Indian men gained Indian status as result of the marriage. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the distinction between the treatment of Indian women and Indian 
men in this regard did not constitute inequality under the Bill of Rights (1960) which 
enshrined the right of the individual to equality before the law. 
In his judgment, Justice Ritchie gave a Diceyan interpretation of the "equality before 
the law" provision under the Bill by defining it as meaning "equality in the 
administration or application of the law enforcement authorities and the ordinary 
Courts of the land. " Justice Ritchie observed that the Indian Act was a structure 
created by Parliament for the internal administration of the life of Indians on reserves 
and their entitlement to the use and benefit of Crown's lands. In his observation, 
section l2(l)(b) was an essential component of this structure and way of life. '8 
In Bliss v Attorney-General of Canada (1979)19( "Bliss"), the equality guarantee was 
interpreted similarly narrowly and, as a result, a provision of law that clearly 
discriminated against pregnant women was upheld. In this case, Stella Bliss 
15 A York `The Inequality of Emerging Charter Jurisprudence: Supreme Court Interpretations of 
Section 15(1)' (Spring 1996) University of Toronto Faculty of Lawv Review p 328. 16 - .-. -. ,... e. .. 
. sb LLLK (3--) 425 1. I/ /r nir. .... .... ,.. .. tx. a, c. 1-0). Available at: nttp: //laws. iustice. ¬ýc. ca/en/1-5/ (Last accessed 12.10.04). Io 
'" See- n. 16 above. 19 1 SCR 183. 
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challenged section 46 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (1971)20 that disentitled 
pregnant women and new mothers from regular unemployment insurance benefits 
for the period during which maternity benefits were available. Stella Bliss had 
worked over eight weeks to qualify for ordinary employment benefits, but this was 
not long enough to qualify for maternity benefits. 21 Section 46 of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act (1971) prevented her from claiming ordinary benefits as it was 
assumed that during the maternity period women were not capable of working. Stella 
argued that this disentitlement constituted discrimination which denied her equality 
before the law. Justice Ritchie, applying the same narrow "rule of law" definition of 
equality before the law as applied in Lavell held that "the enforcement of the 
limitation... does not involve denial of equality of treatment in the administration and 
enforcement of the law before the ordinary Courts of the land. " Justice Ritchie 
stated: "any inequality between the sexes in this area is not created by the legislation 
but by nature"22. 
As these two cases demonstrate, despite the guarantee of equality under the Bill, no 
immediate change toward substantive equality came as a result. This was, as noted 
earlier, due to the fact that, the equality guarantee as interpreted by the courts relied 
on the sameness and difference approach and a narrow interpretation of "equality 
before law". According to this approach, women along with minorities and the 
disabled were held to be equal only to the extent that they were no different from 
what society considered the "norm" (i. e., from the white, Christian, able-bodied, 
heterosexual male). 
(S. C. 70-71-72, c. 48). 
To qualify for maternity benefits, she needed to have at least ten weeks of insured earnings. 22 Bliss at 190. 
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It is also important to note here that one of the important limitations of the Bill of 
Rights (1960) was that although it could invalidate another federal law, it was an 
ordinary law and not a constitutional document. According to Justice L'Heureux- 
Dube23, this is probably be the reason why the equality guarantee under the Bill of 
Rights was interpreted so narrowly, i. e., as a formal and procedural right rather than 
as a substantive one. 
3. The Charter and substantive equality 
On 16 April 1982 Canada formally amended its written Constitution by adding the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The obviously unfair results of equality 
claims determined under the Canadian Bill of Rights inspired a concerted effort by 
Canadian women under the leadership of lobby groups to obtain greater recognition 
and greater protection of their rights. Justice L'Heureux-Dube, 24 writing extra 
judicially observes that when a move from the Bill towards the Charter was made 
three very important changes took place. First, equality rights were elevated to a 
constitutional level. Second, the measure of equality rights was broadened. Third, the 
reach of equality rights was broadened. All three of these changes constituted 
essential elements of a trend intended to promote and achieve substantive equality. 
She also observes that, the initial drafts of the Charter presented before the public 
show that the then government was using the framework of international human 
rights conventions as a model, rather than the civil liberties model found in the 
American Bill of Rights. L'Heureux-Dube points out that the human rights approach 
insists that human beings should be treated with dignity and should have the means 
23 L'Heureux-Dube, n. 4 above. 24 C L'Heureux-Dube `Lecture: Conversations on Equality' (1999) 26 Manitoba Law Journal, 
p. 276. 
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necessary for full and equal participation in society. Since human dignity and equal 
participation encompass both individual and collective aspects of the human 
experience, the human rights approach requires balancing the rights of individuals, 
the recognition that historically disadvantaged or minority groups may need special 
protection, and the collective social interest. 25 Thus, in essence, the human rights 
approach requires that society be free from inequality. According to L'Heureux- 
Dube, this reliance on the human rights approach while drafting the Charter set the 
stage for a relatively inclusive and purposive approach that is unique to Canadian 
equality jurisprudence. 26 
Keeping in mind the dismal history of Bill of Rights equality decisions, feminist 
scholars and activists in Canada put great effort into the wording of the equality 
provisions under the Charter to get better protection of rights and to foreclose the 
possibility of restrictive interpretation. So when an initiative was taken in the late 
1970s to adopt the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the following demands 
were put forward by them27: first, the language of the equality guarantee had to be 
broader than that of the Bill of Rights; second, distinctions based on sex had to be 
subject to a stringent review by the Courts; and third, the Charter had to include a 
general statement of equality between men and women. 28 The result of their effort is 
clearly reflected in the wording of the equality guarantee of the Charter. 
Section 15(1) of the Charter provides: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on 




race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
Significantly, section 15(1) provides for every individual not only a guarantee of 
equality before and under the law, but also the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination. Section 15, thus sets out four different equal 
protection guarantees: 1. equality before the law, 2. equality under the law, 3. equal 
protection of the law, and 4. equal benefit of the law. It has been suggested that these 
provisions should be seen as related to each other rather than as freestanding 
guarantees. "The four equality clauses make it abundantly evident that the drafters 
intended to cover every conceivable operation of the law and that, in its operation, 
`every individual' be treated `without discrimination', particularly with respect to a 
number of specifically recognised categories. "29As the cases discussed below will 
demonstrate, the equality provision under the Charter has been interpreted in 
subsequent cases as embracing the concept of substantive equality. 
This substantive guarantee of equality was further reinforced by a clear 
endorsement/affin-nation of ameliorative measures in section 15(2) which provides- 
sub-section (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability. 
An additional provision section 28 which is directed exclusively at sex equality was 
also included in the Charter. Section 28 states that "[n]otwithstanding anything in 
this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male 
and female persons". 
29 W Tarnopolsky `The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Commentary' in W Tarnopolsky and Gerald Beaudoin (eds. ) The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms: A Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), quoted in K Davis `Equal Protection 
for Women in India and Canada : An Examination and Comparison of Sex Equality Provisions in 
the Indian and Canadian Constitution' (1996) 13 Ariz. J. Int 'I & Comp. Law, p. 31 quoting. 
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In addition to above, Section 1 provides, "the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. " 
Before proceeding to discuss how the equality provisions of the Charter have been 
interpreted in subsequent case law it may be interesting at this point to compare the 
equality guarantee in Canadian Charter with the equality guarantee under the 
Constitution of Bangladesh. 
Firstly, as noted earlier, Section 15 of the Canadian Charter provides four different 
equal protection guarantees, namely, "equality under the law", "equality before the 
law", "equal benefit of law" and "equal protection of law", whereas the Constitution 
of Bangladesh, in its Article 27, provides only "equality before law" and "equal 
protection of law". 30 The text of Section 15 indicates specifically enumerated 
grounds, including sex, in relation to which discrimination is prohibited. Thus unlike 
Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, the Canadian Charter does not have a 
separate "general" equal protection guarantee. The general language of equal 
protection does not stand alone but is part of a larger provision which enumerates 
30 See Chapter I. The equality provisions under the Constitution of Bangladesh consist of Article 
27 and Article 28. Article 27 of the Constitution provides "All citizens are equal before law and 
are entitled to equal protection of law. " Article 28 of the Constitution states: 
"(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race caste, 
sex or place of birth. 
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and of public life. 
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be subjected to 
any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to any place of public 
entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational institution. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special provision in favour of 
women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens. " 
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specific grounds entitled to equal protection. 31 Further the equality guarantee in the 
Charter is limited by Section 1 of the Charter. The Constitution of Bangladesh does 
not contain such a limitation. And lastly, although both Section 15 of the Charter and 
Article 28 of the Constitution of Bangladesh prohibit discrimination on similar 
grounds including race, sex and religion, Section 15 has subsequently been 
interpreted (in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews (1989)32, which is 
discussed below) to extend to analogous grounds or grounds similar to the 
enumerated grounds. Thus, although the concept of equality in the Charter is broader 
than the Bangladeshi equality guarantee (in the sense that the former contains four 
equality protections, not two), it is formally tied to the specification of enumerated 
grounds in a way the Bangladesh Constitution is not. On the other hand, subsequent 
interpretation of the Canadian Constitution has extended the scope of the Canadian 
Constitution to embrace "analogous grounds", stretching the reach of the Canadian 
Constitution particularly in an intersectionality context. 
a) Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews 
The most significant case for the development of equality jurisprudence in Canada is 
perhaps the Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews (1989)33. This is because 
the case marked a clear turn away from the formal model of equality and a 
significant move towards the concept of substantive equality. As Hughes points out 
the "taking account of difference" which lies at the heart of substantive equality had 
been well. established as a principle (in case law under Canadian human rights 
31 K Davis `Equal Protection for Women in India and Canada : An Examination and Comparison 
of Sex Equality Provisions in the Indian and Canadian Constitution' (1996, Spring) 13 Ariz. J. 
Int'l & Comp. Law, p. 42. 
32 1 S. C. R. 143. 
33 Ibid. 
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legislation) even before the time section 15 of the Charter came into effect in 1985. 
This and other similar developments were incorporated into the interpretation of 
section 15 in Andrews. 34 
In Andrews, Mark Andrews and Elizabeth Kinersly challenged the requirement of 
the British Columbia Bar that those applying for admission to the Bar should be 
Canadian citizens. Andrews, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, and 
Kinersly, an American citizen who was at the time a permanent resident of Canada 
articling in the Province of British Columbia, both met all the requirements for 
admission to the practice of law except that of Canadian citizenship. The 
constitutional questions before the Court were: (1) whether the Canadian citizenship 
requirement for admission to the British Columbia Bar infringed or denied the 
equality rights guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter and; (2) if so, whether that 
infringement was justified by Section 1 of the Charter. It was held that the 
requirement of Canadian citizenship for admission to the Bar of British Columbia 
contravened the equality guarantee of section 15 of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Andrews is significant for the equality 
jurisprudence in Canada from many perspectives. Firstly, Andrews confirmed that 
the grounds of discrimination enumerated in Section 15(1) are not exhaustive. 
Grounds analogous to those enumerated are also included within the scope of the 
guarantee. In Andrews Section 15 was interpreted to allow a ground of 
discrimination not expressly listed in Section 15 to be included because it is similar 
to the grounds listed. Accordingly, although citizenship is not expressly included in 
Section 15 as a prohibited ground of discrimination, the Court in Andrews held that it 
34 P Hughes `Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle' 
(1999) 7 Dalhousie Lmv, p. 5. 
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is included as a ground analogous to the express grounds. Non-citizens permanently 
resident in Canada such as Andrews and Kinersly were found to fall within the group 
of "discrete and insular minority" that Section 15 was designed to protect. In this 
regard Justice Wilson observed-- 
It is important to note that the range of discrete and insular minorities has 
changed and will continue to change with changing political and social 
circumstances.. . It can 
be anticipated that the discrete and insular 
minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognised as such today. 
It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that it be interpreted 
with sufficient flexibility to ensure `unremitting protection' of equality 
rights in the years to come. 35 
The recognition of the concept of "analogous grounds" in the judgment is critically 
important for equality jurisprudence in Canada as it opened the door for inclusion of 
other important grounds within the scope of the equality guarantee in the Charter. 
Secondly, in Andrews, Justice McIntyre rejected the concept of formal equality and 
the subsisting "similarly situated test" to equality. As Justice McIntyre observed, that 
test was seriously deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the nature of the 
law. According to McIntyre if the test were to be applied literally, it could be used to 
justify the Nuremberg laws of Adolf Hitler in the sense that similar treatment was 
contemplated for all Jews. He observed: 
[The] mere equality of application to similarly situated groups or 
individuals does not afford a realistic test for violation of equality rights. 
For, as has been said, a bad law will not be saved merely because it 
operates equally upon those to whom it has application. Nor will a law 
necessarily be bad because it makes distinctions. 3 
He observed therefore, that "similarly situated test" to equality cannot be accepted as 
a fixed rule or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the 
35 n nn I_ .1 11 zn, ee- n. sz. aoove, at p. i Dz . ]G 
"' n. 32 at p. 171. 
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Charter. He also added that "consideration must be given to the content of the law, 
to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those 
whom it excludes from its application. " 
This indicates the potential for Section 15 to move beyond the model of formal 
equality. Also, in line with the substantive approach to equality, Andrews recognised 
that the focus of equality analysis should be on the effect of the distinction or 
classification on the complainant. It confirms that not all forms of distinction 
constitute discrimination. Section 15 forbids only those distinctions or classifications 
that involve prejudice or disadvantage. 
The words "without discrimination" require more than a mere finding of 
distinction between the treatment of groups or individuals. These words are a 
form of qualifier built into s. 15 itself and limit those distinctions which are 
forbidden by the section to those which involve prejudice or disadvantage. 
The effect of the impugned distinction or classification on the complainant 
must be considered. Given that not all distinctions and differentiations 
created by law are discriminatory, a complainant under s. 15(1) must show 
not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and under the 
law or that the law has a differential impact on him or her in the protection or 
benefit of the law but must show in addition that the law is discriminatory. 37 
In other words, Andrews established that a determination of inequality under Section 
15 requires a contextual analysis which seeks to link differential treatment with 
concrete disadvantage. 
37 See- Andrews, n. 32 above, at p. 143, Per Dickson C. J. and McIntyre Lamer, Wilson and 
L'Heureux-Dube JJ. As to what constitutes discrimination Justice McIntire observes: "I would 
say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but 
based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not 
imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and 
advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics 
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the 
charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be 
so classed. " 
167 
As observed above, Andrews provided an encouraging start to the equality 
jurisprudence under Section 15 in Canada. After Andrews, the next case, Rv Turpin 
(1989)38, strengthened the equality analysis of Andrews. Together, these decisions 
form the structure of the Section 15(1) analysis that dominates Canadian equality 
jurisprudence to this day. 39 
In R v. Turpin, two accused, charged with murder in Ontario, argued that Sections. 
427 and 429 of the Criminal Code (1985)40 violated their equality rights because an 
accused charged with murder in Alberta could elect to be tried by a judge alone. 
They claimed that the law by giving accused persons in Albarta, but not in any other 
province, an election to be tried before judge alone violates their equality rights 
under Section 15 of the Charter and cannot be justified under Section 1.4 'Justice 
Wilson held that the Criminal Code provisions did not infringe Section 15(1) of the 
Charter. 42 
From Andrews and Turpin there emerged a two-step analysis used to find violations 
of the equality rights under Section 15(l) 43 As York summarises, the first step is to 
determine whether the impugned law draws a distinction, intentional or not, based on 
the personal characteristics of the individual or group and resulting in the denial of 
one of the four basic equality rights. However, not every distinction would deny an 
38 1 SCR 1296. 
39 York, n. 13 above, p. 334. 
C. t-. i4) avauabie at: nttQ: iiwww. caniil. orgicaista/c-140/ kLast accesses iu. iu. u4J. 
" Except in Alberta, an accused charged with murder must, under Sections 427,429 and 430 of 
the Criminal Code (1985), be tried by a judge and jury. 
42 In Wilson J. 's view, the provisions did not discriminate against the complainant, in part 
because the appellants could not be characterized as a "discrete and insular minority" and 
therefore, residents outside Alberta and charged with a s. 427 criminal offences outside Albarta 
do not constitute a disadvantaged group in Canadian society within the contemplation of Section 
15. 
43 York (n. 13 above) extrapolated the test from Mclntyres J's judgment in Andrews and Wilson 
J's judgment in Tiepin. 
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individual's equality rights. The second step therefore, is to demonstrate that this 
distinction results in discrimination. To prove discrimination, the claimant must 
show that the distinction was based on a ground enumerated in Section 15(l) or 
analogous to one. Such a distinction must also be shown to have the effect of 
imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on, or withholding benefits and 
opportunities from, an individual or group not imposed on or withheld from others44 
But unfortunately, after Turpin, in the notorious trilogy of Miron v Trudel (1995)45, 
Egan v Canada (1995) 46 and Thibaudeau v Canada (1995)47 the meaning and 
direction of the equality guarantee under the Charter became increasingly uncertain 
and fragmented. 48 
In Miron v Trudel (1995)49 an insurance plan that awarded accident benefits to 
married spouses but denied it to common law spouses was challenged. 5° A majority 
of the Supreme Court judges decided that denying spousal benefits to non-married 
cohabitants violated Section 15(l) of the Charter. Egan v Canada (1995)51 was 
concerned with section 2 of the Old Age Security Act (1985)52 which provided early 
old age pension entitlement to heterosexual cohabitees but denied it to Mr. Nesbit on 
the ground that his relationship with Mr Egan as a same sex couple did not satisfy 
44 York, n. 13 above, p. 334. 4s 2 SCR 418. 
46 29 CRR (2d) 79. also at (1995) 2 SCR 513. 47 2 SCR 627. 
48 For details see E Grabham `Law v Canada: New Directions for Equality Under the 
Canadian Charter? ' (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 pp. 646-647. 49 n. 45 above. 
so The appellants were not married but lived together with their children and their family 
functioned as an economic unit. One of the appellants was injured in an accident and after the 
accident, he made a claim for accident benefits for loss of income and damages against his 
partner's insurance policy, which extended accident benefits to the "spouse" of the policy holder. 
The respondent insurer denied his claim on the ground that they were not legally married and 
hence do not fall within the definition of "spouse". The appellants argued that the policy terms 
prescribed by the Insurance Act, R. S. O. (1980) (c. 218) violated Section 15(1) of the Charter. 
n. 46 above. 
52 R. S. 1985, c. O-9. Available at: http: //laws. justice. gc. cafen/O-9/ (Last accessed 09.10.04). 
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the section 2 definition of "spouse" under the Act. The legislation was found to be 
discriminatory but was nevertheless upheld under section 1 of the Charter. In 
Thibaudeau v Canada (1995)53, the procedure of the "inclusion-deduction" 
54 system 
for post-separation child support under the Income Tax Act (1970) was challenged 55 
The challenge was unsuccessful. 
As Grabham points out, in these three cases the Supreme Court judges were seen to 
be splitting in three ways over the correct interpretation of Section 15. Some of them 
(a conservative quarter of judges led by Justice Gonthier) wanted to modify the 
framework set out in Andrews; others (Sopinka, Cory, Mclachlin and Iacobucci JJ) 
wanted to retain it; and one Judge (Justice L'Heureux-Dube) wanted to expand it. 56 
As York Summarises57, the conservative quarter of judges led by Gonthier J 
introduced a third step to the Andrews test. The third step assessed whether the 
distinction is based on an irrelevant personal characteristic which is either 
enumerated in Section 15(1) or one analogous thereto. 58 According to Gonthier J., 
the third step comprises two aspects: determining the personal characteristic shared 
by a group and then assessing its relevancy, having regard to the functional values 
underlying the legislation59. The group consisting of Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin and 
lacobucci JJ, adhered to the two-step framework of Andrews. Finally, Justice 
53 2 SCR 627. 
54 Section 56(1) (b) of the Act requires the recipient of child support to include such payments as 
taxable income, whereas the payer or the non-custodial parent can claim a deduction for these 
payments under section 60 (b) and (c). 
5 The claimant Suzanne Thibaudeau pointed out that majority of recipients of child support are 
women and argued that the Income Tax Act (1970) (1970 c. I10, S. C. 70-71-72) imposes a 
burden on women and therefore violates section 15 of the Charter. 
56 Grabham, n. 48 above, pp. 646-647. 
57 York, n. 13 above. 58 Miron, n. 45 above, p. 702. 
59 Ibid at 703. 
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L'Heureux-Dube sought to reassess the direction of Section 15(l) jurisprudence 
GO 
Instead of defining discrimination with reference to the enumerated or analogous 
grounds, she preferred to take a functional and contextual approach to Section 15(l) 
that would focus on the impact of the distinctions on particular groups. Justice 
L'Heureux-Dube's approach concentrated on the "fundamental purpose" of the 
provision, which is, "to guarantee to all individuals a certain kind of equality, i. e., 
equality without discriminationiG1. She observed that the "pivotal question" is how 
to define "discrimination "62. The core elements of a definition of "discrimination", in 
her opinion, would focus the constitutional analysis upon the impact, or 
discriminatory effect of the legislation, rather than on its constituent elements, or the 
grounds of the distinction, and would evaluate the discriminatory effect from the 
perspective of the victim, rather than the perpetrator. 63 
b) Law v Canada 
Due to the confusion created by the notorious 1995 trilogy, a concerted effort was 
made in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and immigration) (1999)64 ("Law v 
Canada") to mitigate their unsettling affects by providing a set of guidelines for 
courts while analysing equality claims under the Charter. In Law v Canada, a 30- 
60 Grabham, n. 48 above. 
61 Egan, n. 46 above, p. 542. 
6' Ibid. 
63 As York summarises, the judge preferred a three-step approach to Section 15(1) in which the 
rights claimant must demonstrate the following: (1) that there is a legislative distinction; (2) that 
this distinction results in a denial of one of the four equality rights on the basis of the rights 
claimant's membership in an identifiable group; and (3) that this distinction is "discriminatory" 
within the meaning of s. 15. Under this approach, a distinction is discriminatory where it is 
capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual adversely affected by 
this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a 
member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration. For 
details, see--Egan, n. 46 above York, n. 13 above. 
64 1 SCR 497. 
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year-old widow without dependent children or disability, was denied survivor's 
benefits under the Canadian Pension Plan (1985)65. She claimed that Sections 
44(1)(d) and 58 of the Plan infringed Section 15(l) of the Charter on the ground that 
they discriminated on the basis of age against widows and widowers under the age of 
45. The constitutional questions before the court therefore were whether Sections 
44(1)(d) and 58 of the Canadian Pension Plan (1985) infringe Section 15(1) of the 
Charter on the ground that they discriminate on the basis of age against widows and 
widowers under the age of 45, and if so, whether this infringement was demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society under Section 1. The Court decided that the 
first constitutional question should be answered in the negative and the second 
constitutional question need not be answered. 
In her judgment, lacobucci J. affirmed that a purposive and contextual approach is to 
be followed while interpreting Section 15 (1). As was observed: 
It is inappropriate to attempt to confine analysis under Section 15(1) of the 
Charter to a fixed and limited formula. A purposive and contextual 
approach to discrimination analysis is to be preferred, in order to permit the 
realization of the strong remedial purpose of the equality guarantee, and to 
avoid the pitfalls of a formalistic or mechanical approach. 
She also added a clarifying third step to the Andrews framework. 
A court that is called upon to determine a discrimination claim under 
s. 15(l) should make the following three broad inquiries: 
A. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or 
(b) fail to take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position 
65 The age limits on survivor benefits under The Canadian Pension Plan (1985) precludes 
surviving able-bodied spouses without dependants who were under the age of 35 at the time of 
the death of the contributor from receiving the pension until they reach the age of 65. According 
to the plan, the survivor's pension is gradually reduced for surviving spouses who are between 
the ages of 35 and 45 by 1/120th of the full rate for each month so that the threshold age to 
receive benefits is age 35. For details on the Plan, see-- (R. S. 1985 c. C. 18), available at 
http: //laws. iustice. gc. ca/en/C-8/ (Last accessed 13.09.04). 
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within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment 
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics? 
B. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds? And, 
C. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon 
or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or 
which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that 
the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human 
being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, 
respect, and consideration? 66 
The first step of the test requires examination of both the purpose and effect of the 
legislation whereas, the third step seemingly promotes an effects-based analysis with 
a focus on the denial of benefits and an underlying concern with disadvantage. 67 In 
addition to that, it also opens the door for contextual assessment of discrimination 
through the consideration of four further factors: pre-existing disadvantage, 
relationship between grounds and the claimant's characteristics or circumstances, the 
ameliorative purposes or effects of the impugned law, and the nature of the interest 
affected by the impugned law. 68 The test therefore, expressly takes into consideration 
historical social disadvantage and affirms that ameliorative measures should be 
viewed primarily as non-discriminatory. 69 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the Courts by their decisions in Andrews 
and in Law v Canada have now moved towards a more substantive understanding of 
equality that focuses on the actual effects of legislation on a group, rather than on 
66 Law v Canada, n. 64 above, pp. 334-341. 67 ,.,. urabnam, n. 4u above. 
°° See, Law v Canada, n. 64 above, pp. 534-41. According to Iacobucci J, the mentioned four 
factors are examples of factors which may be referred to by a Section 15 claimant in order to 
demonstrate that legislation has the effect of demeaning his or her dignity. 
69 Grabham, n. 48 above. 
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distinctions made by the legislation itself. The approach of focusing on the 
"disadvantage" instead of sameness or difference taken by the Courts in these cases 
is similar to the approach taken by scholars such as Catherine MacKinnon who 
rejects the dichotomy between "sameness and difference" in the context of gender 
discrimination 70. She argues that "the difference approach" continues to adopt a 
point of view of male supremacy because according to this approach "man" remains 
the standard against which all others are measured. As she points out, under the 
sameness standard, women are measured according to their correspondence with 
man. Under the "difference" approach, women are measured according to their lack 
of correspondence with the men. She concludes, "gender neutrality is thus simply the 
male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but do 
not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both. "71 
4. Substantive equality and equality at the intersection 
Inequality and disadvantage can be embedded in many societies, on many levels, and 
in many different forms. Women from different socio-economic-cultural background 
therefore may experience these inequalities and disadvantage differently. Often these 
inequalities are rooted in multiple sites of oppression based on sex, religion, race, 
class, sexual identity, disability, and age etc72. For example-in Bangladesh, Hindu 
women arguably suffer double oppression because of their gender and also because 
they belong to a religious minority community; in western societies, lesbian, 
disabled and racial minority women may also suffer multiple oppressions. 
70 C MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Lire and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987) pp. 32-46. 71 Ibid., p. 34. 
72 Majury, n. 2 above. 
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As noted earlier, the grounds of discrimination can in fact be wide in number and 
scope. As Hannett73 summarises from the writings of Shoben74 and Eaton75, this kind 
of multiple discrimination can occur in at least two ways, namely, where the grounds 
of discrimination are additive in nature; and/or where the discrimination is based on 
an invisible combination of two or more social characteristics. The former, additive 
discrimination, describes a situation where an individual belongs to two different 
groups, both of which are affected by discriminatory practices76. The latter, 
commonly referred to as intersectional discrimination, arises out of the combination 
of various oppressions which, together, produce something unique and distinct from 
any one form of discrimination standing alone. 77 Examples of these two types of 
discrimination are given by Crenshaw7s from the experience of black women. 
Crenshaw points out that black woman often experience double or additive 
discrimination as a cumulative effect of practices which discriminate on the basis of 
race as well as on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience intersectional 
discrimination as Black women, i. e., not as the sum of race and sex discrimination, 
but simply as Black women. 79 
The issue of intersectional discrimination was almost completely absent in early 
feminist writings on the Canadian Charter. 80 Since those days, intersectional 
discrimination as a critical component of any equality analysis has been powerfully 
73 S Hannett `Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle 
Multiple Discrimination' (2003) 23 O. ford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 65-86. 
74 E Shoben `Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment 
Discrimination' (1980) 55 NYULawRev, p. 793. 
75 M Eaton `Patently Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v Mossop' (1994) 1 Rev Cons 
Stud 203. 
76 See Shoben, n. 74 above, p. 794. 
77 Eaton, n. 75 above, p. 229. 
78 K Crenshaw `Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics' in DK Weisberg (ed) 
Feminist Legal Thheory: Foundations (Philadelphia: Temple, 1993) p. 383. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Hanett, n. 73 above. 
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brought to the foreground through the writings and advocacy of women of colour81. 
The result of their analysis has been an enriched understanding of what substantive 
equality should entail. Hughes92 points out - 
as our understanding of equality has evolved, its role in the ordering of 
liberal societies has become more prevalent. It is no longer sufficient to 
assess inequality at a surface (overt or obvious) level: rather, more subtle 
forms of inequality (disproportionate impact or based on an intersection of 
grounds) are now being addressed ... A 
fully realized substantive equality 
concept requires an appreciation of the flexibility and overlapping nature of 
identity and of the distinction between an externally imposed and an 
internally derived identity. 
According to Majury 83 anti-discrimination law must be capable of responding 
effectively to the complex and intersectional discrimination that many people 
experience; to the extent that it fails to do so, the law itself is discriminatory. As 
Grabham points out, "the dilemma in Canadian equality jurisprudence is therefore 
how to accurately portray, and remedy the multi-dimensional, interlocking and 
highly specific nature of social inequalities" . 
84 She observes, in contrast to formal 
and categorized equality that provides an "either-or" choice of grounds, substantive 
equality "should work like a spotlight on social relations to clarify the complexity 
and inter-relatedness of discriminatory dynamics". 85 
Since the advent of the Charter, one of the concerns of feminists in Canada has been 
that whether Section 15 with its enumerated grounds is capable of addressing 
situations of intersectional discrimination. The concern is premised on the notion 
that a grounds-based approach to discrimination may not be able to encompass 
intersectional discrimination. As the discussion below will show, it is the 
81 
Ibid. 
82 Hughes, n. 34 above, p. 43. 
83 See- Majury, n. 2 above. 
84 Grabham, n. 48 above. 
85 Ibid., p. 644. 
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"contextual" approach to interpretation in the test set out in Law v Canada that has 
ultimately facilitated the introduction of concepts such as intersectionality into the 
equality jurisprudence in Canada. This eventually led to opening up the 
multidimensional possibilities of section 15 by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in the case 
Corbiere v Canada (1999). 86 
In Corbiere v Canada (1999), section 77(1) of the Indian Act (1985)' was 
challenged. This section required that in order to vote in the band elections, the band 
members had to be "ordinary resident" on the reserve. 88 Following Law v Canada's 
contextual analysis, the majority of the judges found that band members who were 
not "ordinary residents" were an analogous group and hence deserved protection 
under Section 15 of the Charter. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube, citing Justice lacobucci's dicta in Law v Canada and 
Justice Wilson's dicta in Andrews, observed that the analogous grounds inquiry 
"must be undertaken in purposive and contextual manner" 89 She identified a number 
of contextual factors that indicate that certain characteristics or combinations of 
characteristics have discriminatory potential. These factors include the fundamental 
nature of the characteristic, the importance of the characteristic to the claimant's 
sense of identity, personhood, or belonging, and the lack of political power, 
86 
2 SCR 203. 
97 
n. 17 above. 
88 The respondents, on their own behalf and on behalf of all non-resident members of the 
Batchewana Indian Band, sought a declaration that s. 77(1) of the Indian Act (1985), which 
required that in order to vote in band elections, band members have to be "ordinarily resident" on 
the reserve, violates Section 15(1) of the Charter. As less than one third of the registered 
members of the band lived on the reserve, the provision therefore, in effect prevented a large 
number of band members from exercising their voting rights. 89 Corbiere v Canada (1999) 2 SCR 203 at 251. 
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disadvantage or vulnerability of those possessing the characteristic. 9" She concluded 
that: 
The second stage must therefore be flexible enough to adopt to stereotyping, 
prejudice, or denials of human dignity and worth that might occur in specific 
ways for specific groups of people, to recognise that personal characteristics 
may overlap or intersect (such as race, band membership, and place of 
residence in this case), and to reflect chanýing social phenomena or new or 
different forms of stereotyping or prejudice. 9 
It is clear from the above statement that Justice L'Heureux-Dube's approach to 
equality analysis recognises the need to take into account possibility of specific 
grounds of intersectional discrimination through the "contextual determination of 
analogousness"92 under Section 15. In allowing the intersection of enumerated and 
analogous grounds to result in new grounds, she thus created the possibility for 
recognising that women of colour, for example, are disadvantaged in a unique way 
on the basis of race, gender and economic class. In doing so, she subverted the focus 
from the rigid application of enumerated and analogous grounds and affirmed the 
need for conscious consideration of inequality within the context of persons whose 
identities may involve the intersection of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, 
physical disadvantage or other characteristics which often serve as the basis for 
unfair discrimination. The test set out in Law v Canada as applied in Corbiere by 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube thus clearly progresses toward developing "multi- 
dimensional" 93 understanding of equality. This indicates that the Canadian courts are 
on their way to a fuller and more sensitive treatment of intersectional discrimination, 
which is contextually based. 
90 Ibid at 252. 




The Canadian experience shows that while the drafting of an effective and multi- 
dimensional equality guarantee can be difficult, it can be even more difficult and 
complex to interpret it so as to embrace a more substantive, nuanced understanding 
of equality. As the above discussion demonstrates, in recent years, escaping from 
previous formal understanding of equality, the Charter is proceeding, with its 
enumerated and analogous grounds, towards a more nuanced and substantive 
understanding of equality. 
Since its advent, the equality provision of the Charter has brought about a major and 
ongoing transformation in many areas of Canadian law such as, criminal, family, 
employment and tort law. As Susan Boyd94 argues, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982) 95 has affected family law in Canada in three different ways: 
firstly, through governmental review of legislation so as to ensure that statutory 
provision comply with the Charter96; secondly, through direct constitutional 
challenges in the Courts to statutory provisions on the basis that they violate Charter 
guarantees; and thirdly, through indirectly invoking the Charter to argue that, even in 
the absence of the required element of government or state action, judges must 
nevertheless in this situation take into account the fundamental values such as 
equality that are enshrined in the Charter. Also, as Boyd observes the emphasis of 
successive Supreme Court judges like Wilson and L'Heureux-Dube upon the 
94 S Boyd `The Impact of Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian Family Law' (2000) 17 
Canadian Journal of Family Law p. 293. 
95 n. 1 above. 
96 The equality section of the Charter was suspended for three years to permit the federal and 
provincial governments to review their legislation to see whether statutes were in conformity 
with the Charter. 
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importance of a contextual mode of interpretation, together with the work of 
academics, feminist scholars and women's groups has introduced into Canadian 
equality jurisprudence a more subtle interpretation of substantive equality that 
illuminates the complexities and contradictions of de facto inequalities97. 
Despite these developments, debates related to the Charter and the scepticism about 
its ability to facilitate transition from a formal to a meaningful guarantee of 
substantive equality still continues among the feminist scholars. As Herman 
observes, while a majority of feminist lawyers clearly view the Charter's advent as a 
good thing for women, some academics, notably those writing within a Marxist 
tradition, remain critical in this area. Most others are `cautiously optimistic'98. These 
critiques and debates raise some very fundamental questions such as whether, 
because of its comparative nature, equality can ultimately only mean formal equality, 
albeit in forms more sophisticated than treating men and women identically99. 
Majury argues that the way in which equality analysis has been set out by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in its decisions (including Law v Canada) requires that the 
discrimination has to be related back to grounds and distinct comparator groups have 
to be determined with respect to each ground. This comparative approach arguably, 
remains a limiting feature of the analysis and impedes the courts' ability to address 
situations of intersectional discrimination in their complex wholeness10°. According 
97 Grabham, n. 48 above. 99 D Herman Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality (London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 73. 99 Majury, n. 2 above, p. 334. 
100 Majury, Ibid. York observes in this regard that as the comparative analysis remains embedded 
in Section 15 jurisprudence, litigants must choose a comparator group that accurately reflects the 
discrimination experienced. This is particularly relevant for claims arguing that a legislative 
provision is under-inclusive, since a result oriented court may choose to focus on the differences 
between the group claiming the benefit and those receiving the benefit. See- York, n. 13 above, 
p. 27. 
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to some, the problems inherent in equality as an analytical tool and as a goal render it 
of extremely limited utility for women and other subordinated groups. As Radha 
Jhappan observes ". .. the 
discourse of legal equality as an overarching goal and 
strategy is an idea whose time may have passed. "101 Criticising the inherently 
comparative nature of equality, she questions whether an equality analysis can ever 
lead to anything more than variations on the formal equality. 
This Chapter has highlighted the comparison between the equality guarantee 
enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh and the equality in the Charter. It has 
been observed in Chapter IV that there is scope to embrace the concept of 
substantive equality in equality jurisprudence in Bangladesh by progressive 
interpretation of Article 28(4). In this regard Chapter IV also discussed a recent case 
where "substantive equality" analysis was argued by the Petitioners while 
interpreting the Constitutional guarantee of equality. While it yet remains to be seen 
if the judiciary will endorse the substantive equality analysis and if it does, how it 
will be translated on the ground, in the context of Bangladesh the advantage of 
pursuing a such a substantive analysis of equality is considerable mainly because it 
can help to avoid some of the difficulties associated with the issue of reforms of 
religious law- particularly Islamic law that is perceived as sacred and therefore not 
amenable to changes. As has been mentioned earlier, in Bangladesh gender equality 
is often perceived as a Western value inconsistent with the underlying values of 
Islam. It has been pointed out in Chapter IV that while Islam insists on similarities 
between men and women in relation to their spiritual role and arguably, in relation to 
their worth as human beings, it also insists on difference between sexes by 
101 R Jhappan `The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice' (1998) Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 10, p. 63. 
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prescribing different social roles and duties for men and women. In this regard it has 
been noted that substantive equality analysis focuses on the "disadvantages" that 
flow from differential treatment rather than "difference" between the sexes per se. 
Seen in this light, the substantive approach to equality becomes much less 
contradictory to Islam which prescribes as its overarching aim to ensure, arguably, 
overall justice between the sexes and hence eradicate disadvantage. This argument 
will be further elaborated in the Concluding Chapter. Also it has been pointed out in 
this Chapter that the intersectional approach to equality if embraced in Bangladesh 
context can be beneficial for women belonging to the minority religious 
communities such as Hindu and Christian women who suffer inequality on multiple 
grounds. The next Chapter will look at how equality has developed in another 
jurisdiction i. e. South Africa and if the analysis developed therein useful for 
addressing the issue of reform to the religious laws in Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GENDER EQUALITY: SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter looks at the equality jurisprudence developed in South Africa with focus 
on its effort to shift towards a model of substantive equality as opposed to the previous 
formal understanding of rights developed under the apartheid regime. The Chapter 
begins with an examination of the gender equality framework provided by the 
Constitution. It then moves on to analyse case law with a view to assessing the 
Constitutional Court's efforts towards achieving substantive equality. The previous 
Chapter has traced the development of substantive equality in Canada. This Chapter 
aims to trace the development of the substantive equality in South Africa with a view 
to exploring the possibilities it offers together with the equality analysis developed in 
Canada in addressing some of the issues and concerns pertinent to the basic theme of 
the thesis i. e. the reform of the religious personal laws in Bangladesh. 
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a) The Constitutional Framework 
i) The Interim Constitution of 1994 
Before the enactment of the "final"' Constitution in 1996 which came into force in 
1997, South Africa was governed by an "interim"'` Constitution. This constitution was 
the result of negotiations by strategically placed groups that did not have a democratic 
mandate and hence was interim. 3 However, it is important to note that this interim 
constitution laid down the basic structures for a future or final constitution. As such, 
policy, legislation, and case law promoting gender equality started to emerge before 
the enactment of the Final Constitution in 1996.4 
In view of the wide-scale violations of human rights under the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, the framers of the Interim Constitution attempted to ensure that human 
rights, including the right to equality, are given prominence and protection. Chapter 3 
(Sections 7 to 35) of the Interim Constitution entitled "Fundamental Rights" therefore 
included a range of rights relevant to gender equality such as the right to equality 
before the law and to equal protection of the law under section 8 (1), the right not to be 
discriminated against directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the 
generality of the equality provision, on grounds of race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
' Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) [Act No. ] 08 of 1996], hereinafter referred to 
in this Chapter as the "Final Constitution" or as "the Constitution". 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1994) (Interim Constitution) [Act 
No. 200 of 1993], hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the "Interim Constitution". sS Jagwanth and C Murray `Ten years of transformation: How Has Gender Equality in South 
Africa Fared? '(2002) 14 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2. 
4 All of the decisions made by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in its first twenty-nine 
months of existence were based on the provisions of the 1994 Interim Constitution. Of the forty- 
eight decisions in question twenty-six required a decision regarding whether an existing law 
violated the human rights provisions of Chapter 3 therein. For details, see -B Dickson `Protecting 
Human Rights Through a Constitutional Court: the Case of South Africa' (1997) 66 Fordham Law 
Review, p. 531. 
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origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture 
or language under section 8 (2). Right to respect for and protection of human dignity 
under section 10 and freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion 
under section 14. 
In some important respects, the interim Constitution went further than the standard 
guarantee of rights protected in most liberal constitutions. As Dickson5 notes, the 
drafters of the interim constitution searched the world for models from which to 
borrow. While keeping in mind the particular needs of the South African situation, 
they were especially influenced by the German Constitution (1949)6 and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (hereinafter referred to as the "Canadian 
Charter" or as "Charter"). Chapter 3 therefore also protected among other things, the 
right to respect for one's dignity. 
However, it is important to note here that the Constitution did not confer the rights in 
absolute terms but provided in section 33 Chapter 3, that these rights are limited by 
law. For this, the Constitution in Chapter 3 laid down a general limitation clause 
stating that the rights could be limited provided such limitation was-- (a) (i) 
reasonable, (a)(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, and (b)shall not negate the essential content of the right in question. 8 In 
addition to the above, there were also other provisions which were aimed at building a 
5 Dickson, n. 4 above. 
6 Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949. Also known as the "Basic Law". 
Last amended on 31 August 1990. 
7 (1882,79). Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act (1982) (U. K., 1982, c. 11), which came into 
force on April 17 1982. Available at: http: //laws. justice. ge. ca/en/cliarter/index litml (Last accessed 
10.09.04). 
8 n. 2 above. 
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legal system based on the values of human rights and equality. For instance, the 
Constitution specifically directed all courts when interpreting Chapter 3 to "promote 
the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality. " 9 The courts were also required to have regard to relevant international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights'entrenched in the Constitution, and may have 
regard to comparable foreign case law.. 10 Dickson observes that South African courts 
dealing with constitutional cases have already referred on many occasions to similar 
cases decided in Canada, the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. ' 1 
ii) The Final Constitution of 1996 and the South African Bill of Rights 
As has been mentioned above, it was the interim Constitution that laid the foundation 
for the final Constitution of South Africa. Hence, it is argued that the final 
Constitution did not depart in its purpose and spirit in any fundamental way from the 
interim Constitution but built on the structure provided therein. 12 Equality and human 
rights are given clear prominence in the Constitution. They feature in the in the first of 
the Founding Provisions of the Republic of South Africa: "Human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. " They 
are then spelt out in detail in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 of the final Constitution, entitled "Bill of Rights" (hereinafter referred to as 
the Bill of Rights), includes an extensive equality provision in section 9 which states, 
9 Ibid, Chapter VII, 35(1) 
10 Ibid. 
11 Dickson, n. 4 above. 
12 Ibid. 
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"Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. " (9(1)). It further provides, 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 13 
This section also protects affirmative action programmes, by providing that "to 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect 
or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken. " 14 It is interesting to note here that, like the Canadian Charter, the 
equality provision of the South African Constitution strives for equal benefit of the law 
which seeks "equality in result" as opposed to the formal/liberal understanding of 
equality which is confined to the narrow interpretation of equality before law and equal 
protection of the law. The Final Constitution also includes a few more sections than 
Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution. 15 One of these is section 7, which asserts in 
subsection (1)- 
13 Constitution, n. I above, Chapter II, 9(3). 
14 Section 9 of the Bill of Rights provides: 
I. "Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. 
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination. 
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair. " 
15 Constitution, n. 1 above, Chapter II, 7-39. 
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This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. [It] 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 16 
Sub-section (2) further states that state must not only respect, protect and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, but also promote them. The Constitution under section 12 
provides that everyone have a right to freedom from "all forms of violence from either 
public or private sources. " Furthermore, subsection 2 of section 12, on freedom and 
security of the person, expressly includes the right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction. 17 It is also interesting to note here that the Constitution provides 
protections against the misuse or gender-biased application of some of the rights 
which have been a matter of concern for feminists all over the world including 
Bangladesh as they are often used to preserve and perpetuate discriminatory customs 
and practices. For example, right to freedom of religion under Bangladesh 
Constitution may be mentioned which, as Chapter I of the thesis points out, has often 
been used to justify and perpetuate discriminatory practices in the sphere of religious 
personal laws in Bangladesh. The South African Constitution under section 15 in 
subsection I also provides the usual protection of freedom of "conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion" and also expressly recognizes in subsection 3(a) the 
"system of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons 
professing a particular religion". This immediately raises the concern that this 
provision may serve to legitimise some of the discriminatory practices evident in some 
customary laws and religious laws governing family relations. Interestingly, section 15 
in subsection 3 (b) removes this concern by requiring that the "recognition of any 
system of marriage or family law must be consistent with this section and the other 
16 Ibid. Chapter II, 7(1). 
17 Ibid. Chapter II, 12. 
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provisions of the Constitution" including the Bill of Rights. Similarly, section 31 in 
subsection 1 provides that persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community may not be denied the right, to enjoy their culture, practise their religion 
and use their language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society. However, the same section in its 
following subsection 31 (2) provides that these rights may not be exercised in a 
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
With regard to limitations on the scope of the Bill of Rights, section 36 requires that 
such limitations has to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Moreover, section 8 (3)(a) expressly 
requires that a Court, when applying the Bill of Rights, apply, or if necessary, develop, 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to the right. 
According to section 8 (3) (b) a Court may also, conversely, develop rules of the 
common law to limit the right, provided the limitation is in accordance with section 
36(1). According to section 39 (2), every Court when interpreting any legislation, and 
when developing the common law or customary law, "must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights". Jagwanth and Murray18 argue that the application of 
the Bill of Rights to the common law (which governs private relations) is obviously 
important for gender equality in South Africa since gender inequalities and violence 
against women in the private sphere has traditionally been considered outside the 
scope of constitutional scrutiny in order to preserve the public-private divide. 19 
!8n. 3 above. 
19 Ibid. 
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b) Other Legislative measures to ensure gender equality 
The Equality Act 
Pursuant to the constitutional requirement that national equality legislation be enacted 
within three years of the adoption of the Constitution, in February 2000 the Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act20 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Equality Act) was passed to promote equality and to prevent and prohibit unfair 
discrimination, harassment, and hate speech. 
The Equality Act contains a number of provisions for the prevention and prohibition of 
unfair discrimination. According to the definition in the Act, discrimination "means 
any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation 
which (a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantages on; or (b) withholds benefits, 
opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more of the prohibited 
grounds. " Z' The prohibited grounds under the Act include race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture language and birth. In addition, any 
20 Act No. 4 of 2000. 
21 Ibid. Section 1. 
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other ground that might disadvantage a person or that "undermines human dignity" or 
22 
adversely affects his rights and freedoms, is also included. 
By specifically affirming in the preamble that promotion of equality requires the 
"advancement, by special legal and other measures, of historically disadvantaged 
individuals, communities and social groups who were dispossessed of their land and 
resources, deprived of their human dignity and who continue to endure the 
consequences", the Equality Act recognises that addressing past patterns of 
disadvantage suffered by some groups is an essential part of the equality guarantee. 
This approach is particularly important for women and other racial or religious 
minorities who often suffer from long-established discrimination and systemic forms 
of disadvantage. 
Another important characteristic of the Act is that it specifically defines the content of 
certain prohibited grounds of discrimination. 23 For example, section 1 of the Equality 
Act defines marital status as "the status or condition of being single, married, divorced, 
widowed or in a relationship, whether with a person of the same or opposite sex, 
involving a commitment to reciprocal support in a relationship". The Act thus 
provides a way for women to seek redress in areas that previously have not been 
expressly recognised and protected by laws. 24 According to the Act, gender 
discrimination includes violence against women, practices that unfairly limit women's 
rights to property, or other resources including access to social benefits. The Act also 
22 Ibid. Section 1(xxii). 
'3 Jagwanth and Murrary, n. 3 above, p. 269. 
24 Ibid. p. 270. 
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prohibits traditional, customary or religious practices that undermine the dignity of 
women or gender equality. 25 
In addition to the Equality Act, there have been a number of other legislative 
developments that are relevant to gender equality in South Africa. As Jagwanth and 
Murray points out26, these include, the Employment Equity Act2' requiring employers 
to implement affirmative action programmes to redress disadvantage suffered by 
people who are members of designated groups such as women, black persons and 
persons with disabilities; the Prevention of Family Violence Act28 criminalising the 
rape of a woman by her husband; the Termination of Pregnancy Act29 allowing 
women to terminate their pregnancies during the first twelve weeks and on certain 
prescribed conditions thereafter, and the Maintenance Act30 which aims to provide for 
a simple and effective procedures for dependants to claim and recover maintenance 
from their ex-partners. 
2. Emerging Equality Jurisprudence 
a) Liberal Constitutionalism v Transformative Constitutionalism 
The uniqueness of South African Constitution has generated a body of academic 
commentary on the appropriate jurisprudential stance for courts to adopt. In this 
25 n. 20 above, Section 8(d). 26 n. 23 above, see for details on the legislative development regarding equality. 27 Act 55 of 1998. 
28 Act 133 of 1993. 
29 Act 92 of 1996. 
30 Act 99 of 1998. 
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context, scholars such as Karl Klare and Pierre de Vos31 argue that the Constitution of 
South Africa can be understood to embrace the concept of transformative 
constitutionalism32 rather than the concept of liberal constitutionalism. Liberal 
constitutionalism traditionally pays little attention to the fact that the social, economic, 
cultural and political context in which the Constitution came into force can change in 
the future. 33 By adhering to the fiction that "the political community is founded at a 
single magic moment of `social contract', it thereby runs the risk of ratifying the pre- 
existing hierarchy and distribution of social and economic power. "34 Transformative 
constitutionalism on the other hand sees the Constitution as an instrument committed 
to social transformation and reconstruction. According to this transformative 
approach, while determining the scope and meaning of the rights and obligations 
enshrined in the Constitution, one should not only engage with the past socio-political 
and cultural context that produced it but also the future that it will gradually shape. 35 
Also embodied in this approach is the idea that the power of the community must be 
deployed to create a society that will nurture and encourage the full potentials of 
human beings. In other words "the Constitution embraces a vision of collective self- 
determination parallel to its vision of individual self-determination. "36 Under liberal 
constitutionalism, the chief purpose of a constitutional document such as Bill ofRights 
31 See K Klare `Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism' (1998) 14 SAJHR 146, p. 155 
and P de Vos `Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
Contextual Fairness' (2001) 17 SAJHR, p. 258. 32 Klare (n. 31 above) views "Transformative Constitutionalism" as an enterprise that induces large 
scale social change through non-violent political processes grounded in law. By the word 
"transformation" he actually denotes "reform" which is short of or different from "revolution" in 
any traditional sense of the word. In the background of which is the idea of a highly egalitarian, 
caring, multicultural community, governed through participatory, democratic processes in both the 
polity and large portions of "private sphere". Unlike classical liberal constitutions, a transformative 
constitution is social, redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly horizontal, participatory, 
multicultural, and self-conscious about its historical setting and transformative role and mission. 33 De Vos, n. 31 above, p. 260. 34 Klare, n. 31 above, p. 155. 3C De Vos, n. 31 above, p. 260. 
Klare, n. 31 above, p. 153. 
193 
is to secure individual liberty and property from intrusion by the state, whereas the 
transformative approach does more than place negative restraints on governmental 
interference with liberty. It imposes positive or affirmative duties on the State to assist 
people in exercising and enjoying their constitutional rights, and to facilitate and 
support individual self-realisation37. This means the Constitution is not merely a 
document that preserves and protects rights but also aims to facilitate the extension of 
the enjoyment of rights to all. Viewed thus, the Constitution becomes a long term 
project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed to 
transforming "political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction". 38 
According to Klare and De Vos, the Constitution of South Africa explicitly rejects the 
traditional approach of liberal constitutionalism by setting as one of its primary aims 
the transformation of society into a more just and equitable place where people can 
realise their full potential as human beings and live their lives in dignity. Klare and De 
Vos offer as evidence of the transformative vision of the South African Constitution 
the following features of the new South African Constitutionalism39: 
I. Social rights and substantive conception of equality: The Constitution of South 
Africa views political freedom and socio-economic justice as inextricably intertwined 
and draws a close connection between political and socio-economic rights. 40 The 
preamble of the South African Constitution affirms that the purpose of democratic 
transformation is to establish a society based on social as well as political justice and 
37 De Vos, n. 31 above, p. 261 
38 Klare, n. 31 above, p. 150. 
39 The six points discussed here have been extrapolated and summarised from the authors Klare 
and De Vos. See n. 31 above. 
40 Klare, n. 31 above, p. 153. 
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Section 1 clearly states that the Republic of South Africa is founded on the value of 
achieving equality. The Constitution envisages equality not just within the legal 
process but in the broader social context. 
2. Affirmative State duties: As has been mentioned earlier, one important 
characteristic of the transformative approach is that it imposes on the state both 
positive and negative obligations. For example, the equality guarantee in section 9 of 
the Constitution of South Africa places a negative obligation on the state that prohibits 
it from unfairly discriminating against an individual. At the same time, this guarantee 
also places a positive duty on the state to take steps to create an environment in which 
individuals will be able to reach their full potential as human beings and live their 
lives in dignity. 
3. Horizontality: The terminology "horizontal" refers to the scope of application of the 
fundamental rights provisions of the constitution. Unlike the traditional "vertical 
application" which denotes that fundamental rights only bind governmental actors and 
only apply within the relationship of government to citizens, "horizontal" application 
refers to an application of fundamental rights that binds private as well as 
governmental actors and applies in relationships between private citizens as well as in 
relationships between government and citizens. 41 The Constitution of South Africa 
envisages extending democratic norms and values into the private sphere, particularly 
the market, the workplace and the family. The Bill of Rights binds private parties. 42 
Private parties are expressly barred from engaging in invidious discrimination 43 and 
the government is obliged to enact 
legislation enforcing this. ' 
41 See Klare and De Vos, n. 31 above. 
42 Constitution, n. I, section 8(2). 
43 Ibid, section 9(4), 
44 Ibid, n. 1, section 9(4) read with schedule 
6, item 23(1). 
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4. Participatory governance: The Constitution envisages inclusive, accountable, 
participatory, decentralised and transparent institutions of governance45 and 
contemplates that government will actively promote a culture of democracy. 46 
5. Multiculturalism: The Constitution celebrates multiculturalism and diversity and 
expressly promotes gender justice, rights for vulnerable and victimised groups and 
identities by including protection for gay people and the disabled. It protects language 
diversity and respect for cultural traditions. 47 
6. Historical self-consciousness: An important feature of the Constitution is its 
historical self consciousness. According to the Preamble of the Interim Constitution 
the document is "a historic bridge between the past of. ... injustice, and a [democratic] 
future. "4s The Constitution also acknowledges that the Constitution is not self- 
executing but is an evolving text that must be interpreted and applied. The 
Constitutional Court has also affirmed that while interpreting the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights, the historical, social and economic context must also be taken into 
account. 9 
The 2001 decision in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
(2001)50 ("Grootboom ") confirms that the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
implicitly embraced this transformative vision by its acceptance of a contextual 
45 Klare concludes this by referring to sections 40(2), 41(1), 32 and 33 of the Constitution. See 
Klare, n. 31 above, p. 155. 
46 Klare concludes this by referring to section 234 of the Constitution. Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Interim Constitution, n. 2, Preamble. 
49 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (2001) (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
50 Ibid. 
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approach. 51 In Gr-ootboom, almost one thousand people were evicted and made 
homeless from a land in Western Cape where they were residing. 52 They claimed that 
the state's policies53 constituted an infringement of their right of access to housing 
guaranteed in section 26 of the Constitution. The Court unanimously agreed that the 
existing housing policies did not meet the obligations set out in section 26 of the Bill 
of Rights, but stated that this did not entitle the applicants to demand housing or 
shelter immediately. 54 
The reasoning deployed by the Court in this case is of the utmost importance as it 
places the transformative project of the Constitution at the centre of the Court's 
interpretation of rights such as the right of access to housing. The judgment confirms 
that the transformative vision of the Constitution is only realised when the rights 
therein are interpreted with reference to the specific social and economic context 
prevalent in the country as a whole, and the social and economic context within which 
the applicant group find itself in particular. 55 According to Yacoob J., the Constitution 
sets out the goal of achieving social justice and the improvement of quality of life for 
everyone. The aim of the Constitution is to create a legal framework that facilitate the 
Si n__ ,. a. ... . Jee ue vos, n. sl above. 
To control the influx of Africans to the region the Western Cape apartheid regime implemented 
influx control policies which resulted in an acute shortage of housing and homelessness especially 
for Africans. See- Grootboom, n. 49 above, para 6. 
53 The state's extensive housing programme provided for the progressive realisation of access to 
formal housing, to be assessed via a waiting list after a waiting period of up to seven years or 
more. Ibid., para 8. 
54 The Court came to the conclusion that neither section 26 nor section 28 of the Constitution 
entitled Respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand. However, section 26 
did oblige the State to devise and implement a coherent, co-ordinated programme designed to meet 
its section 26 obligations. The programme that had been adopted and was in force at the time that 
the application was instituted, fell short of the obligations imposed upon the State by section 26(2) 
in that it failed to provide for any form of relief to those desperately in need of access to housing. 
Accordingly, the Court made a declaratory order requiring the State to act to meet the obligation 
imposed upon it by section 26(2). This included the obligation to devise, fund, implement and 
supervise measures to provide relief to those in desperate need. Ibid. 
Ss De Vos, n. 31 above. 
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realisation of one over-arching goal, namely, the achievement of a society that based 
on the principles of equality, human dignity and freedom56. 
In line with the transformative vision, the Court also stressed that the Constitution 
placed a duty on the state to act positively to ameliorate the living conditions of its 
citizens. In the judgement it was stated that-- 
The obligation is to provide access to housing, health-care, sufficient food 
and water, and social security to those unable to support themselves and 
their dependants. The state must also foster conditions to enable citizens to 
gain access to land on an equitable basis. Those in need have a 
corresponding right to demand that this be done. 57 
As explained earlier, one of the important characteristics of the transformative 
approach is the understanding that the rights in a constitution are interrelated and 
interdependent. This implies that the right to equality and other social and economic 
rights set out in the Bill of Rights have been included to ensure the achievement of the 
same goal of creating a society where people can achieve their full potentials without 
being disadvantaged on the ground of race, sex, disability, sexual orientation or class. 
In line with this, the Court in Grootboom confirmed that to advance such 
transformative goals, all the rights under the Bill of Rights must be viewed as inter- 
related and mutually supporting: 
there can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the 
foundational values of our society, are denied to those who have no 
food, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people 
therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2. 
The realisation of these rights is also key to the achievement of race 
and gender equality and the evolution of a society in which men and 
women are equally able to achieve their full potential58. 
56 See-- n. 49 above, para 1. 
57 Ibid., paras 88 and 89. 58 
Ibid., para 23. 
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As De Vos points out, the Court is apparently suggesting that the failure by the state 
housing plan in the Western Cape to provide for the eradication of homelessness was 
unreasonable, and hence an infringement of section 26, could have a strong bearing on 
whether the inaction of the State would also constitute an infringement of section 
9(3)59 of the Constitution. This according to De Vos, indicates that where the Court 
finds the state to act in a way that unreasonably fails to fulfil the social or economic 
needs of the vulnerable section of the society, it will be a strong indication that such 
action or inaction also constitutes unfair discrimination. Reading the various sections 
of the Constitution together in this manner reinforces the transformative nature of the 
Constitution in general and equality analysis in particular as it confirms the 
inextricable link between the aspirations of the equality guarantee in section 9 and the 
aspirations articulated by various social and economic rights. 6'0 
3. Towards a substantive equality 
Equality as a foundational value and as a right is central to the transformative project 
of the Constitution. 6' The challenge of achieving equality within the transformative 
project involves the eradication of systemic forms of disadvantage as well as 
development of opportunities which allow people to realise their full potential as 
human beings. 62 
59 Section 9(3) states: "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth. 
fi0 See De Vos, n. 31 above. 
°' C Albertyn and B Goldblat `Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality' (1998) 14 SAJHR p. 249-presents a 
distinction between the two. Equality as a value gives substance to the vision of the Constitution. 
As a right, it provides the mechanism for achieving substantive equality. 62 Ibid. 
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Critical feminist scholars have challenged some of the fundamental tenets of 
liberalism that focus on the rights of the individuals devoid of contextual reality. As 
Albertyn and Goldblat summarise, having engaged with the law to expose its gender 
bias, critical feminists argue that the law must see human beings as rooted in their 
social context and should recognise the structural inequality and disadvantage which 
affect a person's ability to realise her full potential as a human being. One of the 
fundamental objectives of critical legal feminism is, therefore, to locate its 
understanding of law and legal concepts in the lived experience of women and men. 
63 
Feminist scholars have insisted on a substantive understanding of equality that 
recognises that women and other disadvantaged groups are subject to various 
inequalities which are deeply structural, embedded in the socio-economic and cultural 
norms and values of the society. This approach of substantive equality rejects the 
formal model of equality that merely requires the state to guarantee equal treatment of 
the individuals and thus disregards the structural inequality in the society and 
perpetuates prevailing patterns of social and economic disadvantage. Feminist scholars 
have, therefore engaged extensively with the notions of difference and disadvantage 
and argued that differences are only problematic when they perpetuate disadvantage. 
The focus is not, therefore, on difference as such but on the disadvantage resulting 
from this differentiation. 
The judgements delivered by the Constitutional Court of South Africa so far recognise 
that equality must be understood substantively rather than formally to give effect to 
the transformative vision of the Constitution. As the cases below will show, in line 
with the transformative vision of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has 
63 Ibid. 
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interpreted the right to equality broadly to embrace a more positive approach that 
places a duty on the state to take steps towards achieving a society in which every 
individual member of the society can reach their full potential and human dignity. 
Acknowledging the fact that a person cannot fulfil his full potential as a human being 
where structural inequality prevails, the Court has developed a contextual approach to 
equality that requires examination of the actual impact of an alleged violation on the 
individual within and outside different socially relevant groups in relation to 
prevailing social, economic and political circumstances. 
a) Equality and disadvantage 
i) Brink v Kitshoff 
In Brink v Kitshoff (1996)64, the issue before the Court was to decide the 
constitutionality of section 4465 of the Insolvency Act (1936)66. In her judgment in this 
case O'Regan J placed the idea of systemic discrimination and group-based 
disadvantage at the heart of the equality analysis. She observed that the equality 
provision (in the Interim Constitution) was adopted "in the recognition that 
discrimination against people who are members of disfavoured groups can lead to 
pattern of group disadvantage and harm. Such discrimination is unfair: it builds and 
entrenches inequality amongst different groups in our society. The drafters realised 
that it was necessary both to proscribe such forms of discrimination and to permit 
64 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). 
65 This section in certain circumstances operated to deprive married women of some or all of the 
benefits of life insurance policies ceded to them by their husband before they became insolvent. 
There were no similar provisions limiting the benefits of a life insurance policy ceded by a woman 
in favor of her husband. The Court struck the provision down as unconstitutional and held that the 
distinction between married men and women in this regard could not be justified tinder the Interim 
Constitution. Ibid. 
66 Act 24 of 1936. 
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positive steps to redress the effects of such discrimination"67 She further observes that 
by treating married women and married men differently the impugned sections of the 
Act disadvantages married women and not married men. The discrimination in these 
sections is therefore based on two grounds: sex and marital status. Although section 
8(2) of the Interim Constitution does not require that the discrimination be based on 
one ground only; it specifically states that it may be based on "one or more" grounds. 
The list provided in this section is thus not exhaustive. She therefore, concludes that 
"the subsection states expressly that the list provided should not be used to derogate 
from the generality of the prohibition on discrimination. It is not necessary to consider 
whether the other ground of discrimination, marital status, would be a ground which 
would constitute unfair discrimination for the purposes of section 8. It is sufficient that 
the disadvantageous treatment is substantially based on one of the listed prohibited 
grounds, namely, sex. "6s 
The case was important because of its emphasis on the need to understand the right in 
light of South-Africa's history of systemic racial and gender discrimination. It also 
affirms that the list of grounds provided in the equality guarantee is not exhaustive but 
may overlap and the equality analysis should take that factor into account. This in 
turn, points towards the possibility of adopting an intersectional approach to equality. 
It thus set the stage for developing a more nuanced, context based and substantive 
understanding of equality by the Courts to follow in the subsequent years. 
67 n. 64 above, para 42. 
68 Ibid. para 43. 
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ii) National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister for Justice 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister for Justice and Others 
(1998)69 it was recognised that the right to equality must be understood in the context 
of South Africa's history. The court in this case observed: "Gay men are a permanent 
minority in society and have suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage. The 
impact is severe, affecting the dignity, personhood and identity of gay men at a deep 
level. It occurs at many levels and in many ways and is often difficult to eradicate. , 70 
The Court thus came to the conclusion that the discrimination in question was unfair 
and therefore in breach of section 9 of the 1996 Constitution. 
As to the nature of substantive equality under the Constitution, the Court commented 
that in a country such as South Africa where persons belonging to certain categories 
have suffered considerable unfair discrimination in the past, and observed: 
It is insufficient for our Constitution to merely ensure, through its Bill 
of Rights, that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair 
discrimination in the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination has 
ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of which is not halted 
immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, and unless 
remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely. 71 
According to this approach, the primary purpose of an equality provision is to 
eradicate past patterns of disadvantage and to interpret discrimination within the 
context of past and existing social, political, and economic disparities. 72 This 
('9 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC). In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v 
Minister of Justice and Others (1998), the Applicant, a voluntary association challenged the 
constitutionality of the common law proscription of sodomy and certain statutory provisions which 
criminalised sexual acts engaged in between male persons such as, section 20A of the Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957, Schedule I to the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the Security 
Officers Act 92 of 1987. The Court unanimously declared them to be inconsistent with the Final 
Constitution and invalid. 
70 Ibid. para 26. 
71 Ibid. para 60 
72 Jagwanth and Murray, n. 3 above. 
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highlights the fact that the systematic social marginalisation of groups such as gays 
and lesbians, blacks, women and black women, require a remedial approach to 
equality which takes into account their membership in groups with a history of 
discrimination. 73 The Court concluded that the need for such remedial or restitutionary 
measures has been recognised in sections 8(2) and 9(3) of the interim and 1996 
Constitutions respectively. 74 
This approach is in line with the contextual approach prescribed by a substantive 
notion of equality that insists that equality analysis should not focus on the sameness 
or difference of the claimant and her group, but on the social relationships and 
institutions which utilise differences to justify and enforce disadvantage and the ways 
in which such practices can be changed. 
b) Equality and dignity 
i) President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo (1997)75 ("Hugo "), a single 
father, Mr Hugo, challenged the constitutionality of the President Act (1994)76 which 
granted special remission of sentence to, "all mothers in prison on 10 May 1994, with 
73 n. 69 above 
74 Ibid. According to the Court, section 9 of the 1996 Constitution, like its predecessor the interim 
Constitution, clearly contemplates both substantive and remedial equality. Substantive equality is 
envisaged by section 9(2) which unequivocally asserts that equality includes "the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. " In addition to this, the State is further obliged "to promote 
the achievement of such equality" by "legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, " which 
envisages remedial equality. 
75 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
76 Act 17 of 1994, initiated by newly elected President Nelson Mandela in 1994. 
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minor children under the age of twelve years". Hugo claimed that the President Act 
(1994), by granting remission to prisoners who were mothers and not fathers, 
discriminated against him unfairly on the grounds of sex. The majority accepted that 
the President Act (1994) discriminated against fathers in denying them a benefit 
accorded to mothers, but in light of historical patterns of disadvantage perpetuated 
against women as primary care-givers, such discrimination was not unfair. 
The reasoning deployed by the Court in this case is significant for equality analysis for 
a number of reasons which are: 
Firstly, in developing its equality analysis, in Hugo77, The Constitutional Court shifted 
its emphasis from disadvantage and placed dignity at the centre of the equality 
analysis. Referring to J. L'Heureux-Dube's analysis in Egan v Canada (1995)78 the 
Court observed: 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies recognition that 
the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded 
equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular 
groups. The achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply 
inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that is a goal of the Constitution that 
79 should not be forgotten or overlooked. 
This shift away from disadvantage to dignity has received some criticism from 
feminist scholars engaged in the equality analysis. Authors such as Albertyn and 
Goldblat£{0 argue that the replacement of disadvantage with dignity returns us to a 
liberal and individualised conception of right. The problem with this is that it centres 
the right on individual feelings of affront rather than locating the complainant within 
77 n. 75 above. 
78 29 CRR (2d) 79, pp. 104-5. The case has been discussed in details in Chapter V. 
79 n. 75 above, para 41. 
s0 Albertyn and Goldblatt, n. 61 above. 
205 
the context of a disadvantaged group. According to these authors, this shifts the 
emphasis away from the transformative use of the right. 
Secondly, in Hugo, the Court found itself faced with the question that whether a 
limited and short-term benefit of the remission of imprisoned mothers outweighed the 
detriment of perpetuating a gender stereotype-that women are "care-givers" and bear 
more responsibility for child-rearing than the fathers. The majority of the Court agreed 
that the Presidential decree was justified on the basis that it was aimed at benefiting a 
vulnerable group which has suffered longstanding discrimination and disadvantage in 
the past. Justice O'Regan, supporting the majority observed, "Even where 
discrimination in a particular case arises from reliance upon a stereotype or 
generalisation, the focus of the [unfair discrimination inquiry] must remain whether 
the impact of the discrimination was unfair. ,8 'According to her, the approach 
advocated by Kriegler J. (discussed below) does not take sufficient account of present 
social realities and could indeed deter rather than facilitate achieving the constitutional 
goal of equality. 82 
Hugo provides a good example of some of the difficulties that may arise while 
addressing the complex nature of discrimination in the equality analysis. Although in 
this case the Court accepted that the President Act (1994) reinforced underlying 
societal constructions of difference that maintain women's subordination through a 
stereotypical assumption regarding women's child-bearing and rearing capabilities as 
primary care-givers, a contextual evaluation of women's disadvantaged position in 
South African society ultimately led the Court to conclude that the impugned Act is 
si n. 75 above, para 111. 
82 Ibid, para 113. 
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justified as it aimed at benefiting a vulnerable group which has suffered longstanding 
discrimination and disadvantage in the past. 83 The court held: 
we need ... to 
develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognises that although a society which affords each human being equal 
treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot 
achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all 
circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will 
require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine 
whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of 
equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context may not 
necessarily be unfair in a different context. 84 
This observation by the court arguably accords with the substantive notion of equality. 
The ultimate goal of substantive equality is to ensure equality of outcomes. In order to 
achieve this goal a contextual inquiry into individual and group disadvantage has to be 
made. This sometimes require treating those who are different the same and in other 
circumstances it means treating them differently. As Martha Minow points out: 
[E]quality requires same or different treatment, depending on the 
circumstances and the position of the individual in relation to his or her ss group-based systemic disadvantage. 
The decision in Hugo was however much criticised on the ground that it made a 
stereotype that perpetuated women's disadvantage, constitutionally permissible". 
According to some, the limited benefit conferred upon a small group of women who 
suffered historical disadvantage was far outweighed by the long-term detrimental 
effects of perpetuating a gender stereotype against all South African women. 87 As Van 
Marie observes, "the court's approach of substantive equality, which aims to represent 
83 C Barclay `Toward Substantive Equality: A feminist Critique of the Notion of Difference in the 
Canadian and South African Equality Tests' (2002) 5 International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law 2/3. 
84 n. 75 above, para 42. 
85 M Minow `Feminist Reason: Getting it and Losing it' (1988) J. Leg. Edu 47. 86 Barclay, n. 83 above. 
97 A total of 440 women prisoners were released under the President Act (1994). 
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a way of regarding difference, by taking a `universal'/general or stereotyped view of 
reality as its starting point, harmed the dignity of and respect for women and men. "" 
As Kriegler J. in his dissenting judgment in Hugo observed: 
The limited benefit in this case cannot justify the reinforcement of a view 
that is a root cause of women's inequality in our society. In truth, there is 
no advantage to women qua women in the President's conduct, merely a 
favour to perceived child minders. On the other hand, there are decided 
disadvantages to womankind in general in perpetuating perceptions 
foundational to paternalistic attitudes that limit the access of women to the 
work place and other sources of opportunity... I cannot agree that because 
a few hundred women had the advantage of being released from prison 
early, the Constitution permits continuation of these major social 
disadvantages. 89 
Albartyn and Goldblatt observes in this regard that the Court by assuming only 
mothers as being historically disadvantaged with regard to child care responsibilities, 
failed to recognise the complexities of issues where fathers are primary care-givers. 
The Court failed to see Hugo as both part of an advantaged group of fathers, and as 
distinct from that group, because of his location within the sub-group of primary care- 
giver parents. The Court, thus, while relating the complainant to a particular group, 
lost the sight of the overlapping nature of the social groups. 90 
ii) Harksen v Lane 
88 K Van Marie "`The Capabilities Approach", "The Imaginary Domain" and "Asymmetrical 
Reciprocity": Feminine Perspectives on Equality and Justice' (2003) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 3, 
p. 268. According to Van Marie the court's decision affirmed unfair discrimination against Hugo 
and other single fathers with children under the age of 12 as well as against children under 12 who 
were in the precarious position of having only father as a single parent. She further observes that 
the court's decision also negatively affected the dignity and respect of women by affirming the 
harmful stereotype and generalisation that only women are to be considered the primary caregivers 
of children. 
89 n. 75 above, para 83. 
90 Albartin and Goldblatt n. 61 above. 
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Following Hugo, the Constitutional court finally set out in Harksen v Lane (1997)91 
the full test for equality, and the circumstances under which different treatment may 
constitute unfair discrimination. Van Marle summarises the test as follows: While 
judging a claim of unequal treatment or unfair discrimination under the equality 
section, the first question is whether the provision of the challenged legislation indeed 
differentiates between people, or categories of people. If the Court finds such 
differentiation then it will examine whether there is a rational connection between the 
differentiation and a legitimate governmental purpose. If such a rational connection 
cannot be found then the legislation will be held to have violated the equality 
guarantee. The Court will then look at the limitation clause, to see if the violation may 
nevertheless be justified . 
92 Even where a rational connection is found, the Court will 
turn to the prohibition of unfair discrimination to determine whether, despite the 
rational connection, the differentiation none the less amounts to unfair 
discrimination. 93 To determine whether differentiation amounts to unfair 
discrimination a two stage analysis is followed. First, it must be determined whether 
the differentiation amounts to "discrimination" and, if it does, whether it amounts to 
"unfair discrimination". 94 The Constitution provides two categories of discrimination. 
The first is differentiation based on one of the sixteen specified grounds in section 9(3) 
of the Constitution. The second is differentiation oa ground not specified but 
"analogous"95 to such grounds. The Court decided that discrimination on an 
unspecified but analogous ground is one that is objectively based on attributes or 
characteristics that has the "potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of 
persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious 
91 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 




manner". 96 If the discrimination is on a specified ground, unfairness will be presumed, 
but if it is on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant. 97 It was also held that in order to determine whether discriminatory 
treatment is unfair, various factors must be considered including the position of the 
complainants in society and whether they have suffered from discrimination in the 
past; the nature of the discriminating provision or power, and the purpose sought to be 
achieved by it, as well as any other relevant factors, including the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of the complainant and whether it has 
led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity. 98 If the discrimination is 
held to be unfair, the Court will proceed to the final leg of inquiry as to whether the 
measure can be justified in terms of general limitation clause. 99 
4. Equality at the intersection 
According to Romany100, black women in South Africa cannot neatly 
compartmentalise their identities. This is because black women in South Africa have 
suffered multiple oppressions and have been marginalised because of their colour, 
religion, class and sex. Recognising the fact that some women can suffer compound 
inequalities, the Constitution of South Africa provides for an equality framework 
which is informed by an intersectional approach to equality. It has been observed 
earlier that under the Constitution, a litigant can allege discrimination "on one or more 
96 n. 88 above at para 49. 
97 Van Marie n. 88 above. 
98 Ibid. According to Jagwanth and Murray, it is this part of the test that is intended to be 
contextual and that gives effect to substantive equality, because it is in this way that factors, such 
as whether past patterns of disadvantage are being exacerbated, are to be considered. See n. 3 
above. 
99 n. 88 above. 
100 C Romany `Black Women and the Gender Equality in a New South Africa: Human Rights Law 
and the Intersection of Race and Gender' (1996) 21 Brooklyn J. Intl L, p. 857. 
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grounds" listed in section 9 of the Constitution. The Constitution thus provides the 
scope for a woman to allege discrimination suffered at the intersection of race and 
gender. In Brink v Kitshoff (1996), Justice O'Regan observed that patterns of race and 
sex discrimination have resulted in "particularly acute" disadvantage in the case of 
black women, as race and gender discrimination overlap. 101 In National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister for Justice (1998)102, Justice Albie Sachs in 
concurring judgment recognised the intersectional aspect of equality by holding that 
"one consequence of an approach based on context and impact would be the 
acknowledgement that grounds of unfair discrimination can intersect, so that the 
evaluation of discriminatory impact is done not according to one ground of 
discrimination or another, but on a combination of both, that is, globally and 
contextually, not separately and abstractly" According to the judge, an example of 
people suffering from such multiple discriminations would be African widows, who 
historically have suffered discrimination as blacks, as Africans, as women, as African 
women, as widows and usually, as older people, intensified by the fact that they are 
frequently amongst the lowest paid workers". 
Above discussions demonstrate that the equality jurisprudence in South Africa as in 
Canada is now moving towards embracing an intersectional approach to equality. As 
has been observed in Chapter V, the concept of intersectional approach to equality 
does have some significance for the rights of women belonging to various religious 
minority communities in Bangladesh who suffers discrimination on multiple grounds. 
101 Justice 0' Regan concludes this by observing that although in South African society, 
"discrimination on grounds of sex has not been as visible, nor as widely condemned, as 
discrimination on grounds of race, it has nevertheless resulted in deep patterns of disadvantage. 
These patterns of disadvantage are particularly acute in the case of black women, as race and 
gender discrimination overlap. That all such discrimination needs to be eradicated from our society 
is a key message of the Constitution. " See, n. 64 above. 102 n. 69 above. 
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It has been discussed in Chapter I and III that in Bangladesh the personal law general 
law divide has left the different religious communities to be governed by their own 
religious laws. It has also been pointed out that since its independence, while the state 
has made attempts to improve the legal status of women of the Muslim communities, 
it has left the discriminatory religious personal laws of the minority communities 
virtually untouched. This in turn has created inequality not only between men and 
women but also between women of different religious communities. In Bangladesh, 
Hindu women and Christian women therefore, suffer double oppression because of 
their gender and also because they belong to a religious minority community. It has 
been observed in the earlier Chapters that equality guarantee as enshrined in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh does offer the scope to interpret it in a substantive way. In 
this context, it has also been pointed out that the argument of substantive equality has 
already started to appear in equality litigation in Bangladesh. 103 If the judiciary 
endorses this argument, then the next logical step may be to pursue the argument of 
intersectionality in the equality litigation in Bangladesh. In this regard the thesis 
observes that although the concept of intersectionality has so far been completely 
absent in the equality litigation in Bangladesh as well as in the academic writings, this 
concept if incorporated into the equality analysis will go a long way in strengthening 
the argument for replacing the obviously discriminatory and disadvantageous personal 
laws with a unified personal law regime based on substantive equality. 
103 For example, Shamima Sultana Seema and Others v Bangladesh and others (2003) WP No. 
3304/2003. See Chapter IV for detailed discussion on the case. 
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a) Equality and Customary/Religious Law 
Many writers'04 distinguish between "living" customary law, which is the practices 
and customs actually observed by the people in their day-to-day lives and "official" 
customary law, which is the result of an embodiment of customary law in a set of rules 
compiled by early colonial rulers. 105 It can be argued that application of the "official" 
version of customary law violates the Constitution and the right to gender equality. 
In this regard it needs to be noted that the nature of the relationship between the 
potentially conflicting rights of cultural/religious freedom and the right to gender 
equality has always been a problematic and complex one. The problem becomes even 
more complex in societies where right to participate in one's culture and right to 
practise religion are guaranteed alongside the right to gender equality under the 
constitution and the nature of the relationship between these two rights are left to be 
worked out through adjudication. As seen in Bangladesh, most often the customary or 
religious practices are seen as a private matter and not a legitimate sphere for state's 
intervention. As Nussbaum notes, in these situations, discriminatory religious 
practices are often "cheerfully put up with, as part of legitimate differences". 106 
10 See- T Nhlapo `The African Family and Women's Right: Friends or Foes? ' (1991) Acta 
Juridica 135; J Bekker and P Maithufi `The Dichotomy Between "Official Customary Law" and 
"Non-Official Customary Law"'(1991) Journal of Judicial Science 47; and TW Bennett A 
Sourcebook of African Custommy Law for Southern Arica (Capetown/Johannesburg: Juta and 
Co., 1991). 
105 As summarised by Bennett: "The system of African customary law includes the relegation of 
wives of customary marriages to the status of minors tinder the legal guardianship of their 
husbands. Women may not own property or hold office in public forums; they may not negotiate 
or terminate their own marriages or claim custody of their children; and customary marriages 
require husbands to pay bride-wealth and allow them to enter into polygamous unions". See- in T 
W Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution 
(Capetown: Juta and Co., 1995). 
106 M Nussbaum Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 85-86. 
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The concept of "living" customary law which is receptive to change can therefore, 
play a significant role in societies such as in Africa and South Asia107 where 
discriminatory religious and customary practices that causes significant disadvantage 
to women comes into direct conflict with the equality provision and egalitarian vision 
of the constitution. The advantage of living customary law is that it is receptive to 
changing conditions and capable of evolution. 108 In other words, it can be seen as a 
fluid and flexible concept which can incorporate new developments. Viewed thus, the 
concept of leaving customary law becomes significant for the project of personal law 
reform in Bangladesh as it opens up the door to develop the customary and religious 
laws in line with the values of the Constitution without a wholesale abandonment of 
the cultural practices of the minority communities. 
The concept of "living" customary law, however, is not an easy one to define or 
develop. As Jagwanth and Murray109 point out, the concept of living customary law 
give rise to a range of complex questions such as: who would attest to the living law? 
In a matter of dispute over the meaning, whose words should be taken as conclusive- 
that of the chiefs or Mullas (who most often seen to be holding the orthodox 
predominantly patriarchal view) or that of the members of the community? How do 
courts (which are restrained by formal rules of procedures), determine the appropriate 
way to develop customary law? 
As the case law will demonstrate, the South African courts have started to recognise 
the concept of "living" customary law. How this will be developed in future is yet to 
be seen. 
107 Most notably in Bangladesh and India. 
lox Jagwanth and Murray, n. 3 above. 
109 Ibid. 
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b) Customary law and the Constitution 
As has been discussed earlier, the Constitution of South Africa recognises the right to 
culture and the right to practice religion as well as the right to equality. However, the 
Constitution also provides that the right to culture may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. ' 10 Viewed thus, it appears if 
there is a conflict between the right to culture and rights such as equality -the latter 
will prevail. It needs to be noted here that the South African position in this regard is 
different from Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, as has been discussed in Chapter I and IV, 
the Constitution guarantees right to freedom of religion alongside the right to equality 
and there is no express affirmation about the superiority of one over the other. The 
right to religion is however made subject to "law, public order and morality". As has 
been mentioned in Chapter 1, the judiciary of Bangladesh has already recommended 
that guidelines should be set up to define "law, public order and morality". "' 
As has been mentioned before, section 39(2) of the South African Constitution 
requires the courts to promote the spirit, purport, and object of the Bill of Rights when 
interpreting any legislation, the common law or customary law. This section thus 
provides a scope to preserve the key features and values of traditional customary 
practices and at the same time develop or discard the others that may be in conflict 
with the overall spirit of the Constitution. It thus provides the scope for the 
incremental development of customary law, ensuring that the values of the 
IIOn__ 
__j lt _r. L_ n: » _rn: _t. _ Jee sections .u anu J1 01 Inc Diii of R1gn1s. 
"' See-Editor The daily Banglabazar Patrika and two others v District Magistrate and 
Commissioner, Naogaon (2000) (Writ Petition No. 5897 of 2000). In this case, the Court observed 
that "the State must define and enforce public morality. It must educate society. " For detailed 
discussion on the case see Chapter I. 
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Constitution are infused into cultural practices, which may come into conflict with 
gender equality. 112 Despite these progressive provisions, the issue of gender equality 
and customary/religious laws has been and still remains a highly controversial and 
problematic issue in South African equality jurisprudence. 
The difficulties associated with the issue of balancing these competing rights were 
summarised in a South African Law Commission paper as follows: 
The contested positions involve, on the one side, the need to honour the 
Bill of Rights by removing laws that discriminate against women ..., and, 
on the other, the recognition of customary law in the same Constitution as 
part of the law of the land. The difficult task of trying to reconcile these 
provisions is complicated in any case by the need to be alive to practical 
realities and to intervene in ways which do not worsen the situation of 
people in their daily lives. " 
The following case shows us that South African courts have already taken notice of 
the concept of "living customary law". Mabena v Letsoalo (1998)114, involved the 
issue of validity of a customary marriage. The appellant (who was the father of the 
deceased groom) contended that the marriage was void for two reasons: Firstly, he, 
as the father of the deceased groom, had not consented to the marriage. Secondly, 
the amount bride price (lobolo) to be paid was negotiated by the mother of the bride, 
instead of the father. It was argued that there was no valid customary union because 
the respondent's mother could not play the role of a guardian and negotiate the terms 
of a marriage according to the customary law. The High Court rejected this claim 
and concluded that for mothers to negotiate the terms of lobolo and to act as her 
daughter's guardian and consent to her marriage is not contrary to the customary 
law of marriage. The Court observed that although under traditional law it is 
112 .-. ýI --- -- ^ ragwanm ana Murray, n.. ý aoove. 
"' Law Commission Customary Law (discussion paper no. 93) (Johannesburg: Project 90, August 
2000). 
114 (1999) 116 SALJ 742. 
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impossible for the mother of the bride to be her daughter's guardian, in practice a 
mother may act as guardian despite being contrary to customary law. As such, it was 
in accordance with the customary law as actually practised and must be recognised 
by the Court as a development pursuant to the "spirit, purport and objects" of the 
Constitution. ' 15 The approach taken by the Court thus recognises the concept of 
"living customary law" which is "actually practised" by African communities as 
oppose to the official version as documented by writers. 
5. Conclusion 
The above discussions traced the development of equality jurisprudence in South 
Africa and examined some of the decisions of the Constitutional Court interpreting the 
equality right by taking into account the history of apartheid in South Africa and the 
needs of its society. It has been seen that the Constitutional Court has affirmed that the 
goal of the Constitution is substantive equality and has rejected the formalistic reading 
of the guarantee. It has also been seen that the Court has embarked on recognising 
equality as a central dimension of the transformative project of the Constitution and is 
progressing towards providing a framework within which equality can address 
systematic disadvantage and provide equal opportunity for every member of society to 
fulfil his or her human potential. The discussions in this Chapter also highlighted some 
of the key features of the equality jurisprudence in South Africa such as its trends 
towards embracing the intersectional approach and the concept of "living customary 
law". The possibilities these developments and features may offer in the context of 
its Ibid. 
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Bangladesh in relation to equality jurisprudence as a whole as well as in relation to 
reform religious laws has also been discussed in Chapter. Before proceeding towards 
the conclusion, the next Chapter will look at the reforms to personal status laws in two 
Muslim countries i. e., Tunisia and Morocco and examine the possibilities they offer 
for reform of religious personal laws in Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PERSONAL STATUS LAWS IN MOROCCO AND TUNISIA 
1. Introduction 
On January 25,2004, the government of Morocco adopted a new landmark family law 
granting women new rights, among others, in the area of marriage, divorce and custody 
of children. The new legislation replaced the family law included in the Moudawana, 
Morocco's Personal Civil Status Code (hereinafter referred to as "Moudawana" or as 
"Moroccan Code" or as "The Code" where appropriate), encompassing family law 
governing women's status. The reform came as a direct result of longstanding demand 
and advocacy efforts by women's rights activists both inside Morocco and across the 
Muslim societies in the world. 
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The recent reforms succeed in bringing the Moroccan law closer to the level of the 
Tunisian Code of Personal Status' (hereinafter referred to as "Tunisian Code" or as "The 
Code" where appropriate) as far as women's legal status is concerned. In this respect, 
the recent reform of Moroccan family law is not only significant in the context of 
women's rights in North Africa but also in relation to the women's movement in 
general. One important outcome of this reform is that the personal status law of 
Morocco, along with Tunisia, can serve as models for other Muslim countries which are 
concerned with equality-seeking legal reforms grounded within the culturally 
appropriate values of the society. To initiate the reform of personal laws in any Muslim 
society, it is arguably politically imperative that these reforms are in accord with the 
socio-cultural values of that society. It is therefore important to compare approaches and 
policies that have proved effective in other similar contexts. In particular, this 
comparative approach may be useful in informing strategies to initiate reforms of 
religious-based personal laws in Bangladesh where current personal laws as 
demonstrated in Chapters I and 11, undermine the right to gender equality guaranteed by 
the state's constitution. 
The object of this Chapter is to challenge the view that religious-based personal laws are 
not amenable to equality-seeking reforms and changes. It begins by providing a brief 
background to the personal status laws in Tunisia and Morocco and proceeds to trace the 
reforms initiated therein with a view to exploring their prospects in contributing towards 
an equality-based reform approach in Bangladesh. Since the areas covered by personal 
Code du Statut Personnel. Online version available at: 
htt,: //www. iurisitetunisie. com/tunisie/codes/csl2/Menu. html (Last accessed 09.09.2004); see also-- 
httn: //www. jurisitetunisie. com/tunisie/codes/csp/Menu. htm] (Last accessed 14.11.04). 
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status laws are too vast to permit exhaustive citation and examination in the course of 
present study, the focus of the discussion is confined to areas such as marriage, the duty 
of obedience, polygamy, divorce and custody of children under the present personal 
status laws of these two jurisdictions. 
2. Background to the Personal Status Laws in Tunisia and Morocco 
Morocco and Tunisia share a common legacy of Islamic jurisprudence of the Maliki 
School2 and French legal culture. As Mayer observes, after achieving independence 
from France3 these countries had to choose between the French model of codified law 
enacted by the state and the system of decentralised jurists' law that characterised the 
pre-colonial period. Both states selected the French model, a choice that maximised the 
possibility of centralised state control over the legal system instead of a system under 
which control over the formulation of laws would have reverted to religious scholars. a 
Therefore, in both of these Maghrebs countries in general while other areas of law have 
undergone a transformation brought about by colonial rule and influence, the family 
structure was left to be regulated by traditional Islamic law. After independence and 
since, these countries have been adhering to a common legislative model of family 
informed by Islamic values. In this context, Tunisia opted for progressive innovations 
2 See - House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Human Rights Annual Report 2003: Fourth 
Report of Session 2003-2004 (London: The Stationary Office Ltd of HOC, 6 May 2004). 
3 Tunisia became a French Protectorate in 1881 and attained full independence in March 1956. 
Morocco gained independence from France in 1956. 
4A Mayer Reforºn of Personal Status Laws in North Africa: A problem of Islamic or Mediterranean 
laws? (Occasional Paper No. 8) (London: WLUML, July 1996) p. 4. 
5 The term "Maghreb" mainly refers countries such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 
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and reforms in the area of personal status law, while Morocco chose to reinstate many 
principles taken from the Maliki jurists. 6 
The principle of equality is expressly stipulated in the Tunisian Constitution. Article 6 
of the Constitution provides that "all citizens have the same rights and duties and are 
equal before the law" and Article 32 provides that principles of international treaties 
once ratified supersede provisions in Tunisian law8. In line with the equality guarantee 
in its Constitution, Tunisia crafted Tunisian Code of Personal Status9 with a series of 
provisions that put women in a equal position with men in relation to family matters, 
such as equal duties and responsibilities in running of the family, equal rights to divorce, 
the abolition of polygamy and the duty of obedience of the wife to the husband etc. The 
Code thus reflects a more modernist approach by the legislature as it integrates certain 
fundamental principles which are more accommodating of equal rights of women such 
as monogamy, judicial divorce, women's emancipation, the welfare of the child 
6 n. 2 above. 
Adopted in June 1959 and amended in1988 and 1991. Article I declares Islam the state religion, 
and Article 38 provides that the President of the Republic must be a Muslim. The principle of 
equality of men and women with respect to citizenship and before the law is expressly affirmed in 
the Constitution. In this regard Article 6 states: "All citizens have the same rights and the same 
duties. They are equal before the law"; articles 20 and 21 recognize that women have the right to 
vote and to stand for public office. 
8 See -C Benninger-Budel and J Bourke-Martignoni Violence Against Women in Tunisia (report) 
(Geneva: OMCT--World Organisation Against Torture, November 2002). The report was prepared 
for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Available at: 
htta: //www. omct. org/pdf/vaw/tunisiaeng2002. pdf (Last accessed 13.10.04). 
Sec n. 1 above. The Code was promulgated on 13 August 1956. 
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(adoption). 10 Tunisia's specific commitment to "gender equality" is also reflected in its 
Post-Beijing Plan of Action (1997-2001)11 where it was stated that 
To reaffirm within Tunisian law the principles... of gender equality, respect of 
women's rights, and equally shared responsibility in the conduct of family and 
children's affairs, President Ben Ali promulgated... an extensive series of 
social measures in favour of women and the family. (emphasis added). 
It was further observed that- 
to anchor the principle of gender equality in the minds of coming generations, 
school curricula and manuals have been recast to improve the image of women 
and emphsize the necessity that family relations be based on mutual respect 
and shared responsibilities, and to stress the importance of the women's 
presence as a responsible, active partner in public life and society. ` (emphasis 
added). 
In its combined report (i. e., initial and second report combined) submitted before the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women it was affirmed that 
the Tunisian Personal Status Code laid the foundations for a new organisation of family, 
based on legal equality of men and women. 13 The above statements clearly indicate that 
Tunisia's future policy is to ensure "gender equality" in both its public and private 
sphere. This approach of the Tunisian policy makers has also been reflected in several 
successive reforms to the personal status code which reinforced women's equal rights 
within the family. Since 1956, the legislature has been seen to intervene and uphold 
10 Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalitd One Hundred Steps, One Hundred Provisions: For an egalitarian 
codification of Family and Personal Status Laws in the Maghreb (Discussion Paper) (London: 
Women Living Under Muslim Law, November 2003). 
11 For details, see Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, Tunisia Post-Be Ping Plan of Action 
(1997-2001) (report). Available at littp: //www. un orQ/esa/eoplier- 
data/conf/fwcw/natrep/NatActPlans/tunisia. txt (Last accessed on 02.12.04). 
12 Ibid. 
13 See-- Government of Tunisia Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties to 
the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women U. N. Doc. No. 
CEDAW/C/TUN/I-2. 
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women's rights in matters relating to custody and guardianship of children, divorce, and 
abolition of the wife's duty of obedience to her husband. 14 
Although the Tunisian Code as it stands today, does not contain any explicit references 
to Islam, Islamic values and principles influenced its drafting. 15 It is sometimes argued 
that the Tunisian law-makers have sought to develop a new phase of ijtihad or "Islamic 
thinking" distinct from the Islamic law in other Muslim countries which has resulted in a 
series of reforms to create gender equality in the areas of marriage, divorce and custody 
of children. To some therefore, these reforms are not a wholesale abandonment of 
Islamic values, but rather an evolution in tune with the needs of modern time. 16 As 
Mayer" observes, viewed from the standpoint of comparative legal history, Tunisia's is 
by far the most modern of the Maghribi codes and unique in the Arab world. 
However, it also needs to be noted that while the Tunisian Code of Personal Status 
refrains from making any explicit reference to Islam, it nevertheless remains silent on a 
number of questions such as intercommunity marriage, obstacles to inheritance between 
Muslims and non-Muslims and is conservative on other questions such as triple divorce, 
14 In this regard the Report points out that based on the measures announced on National Women's 
Day, August 13,1992, broad legal amendments were made in the Code of Personal Status, the 
Labour Code, the Nationality Code, the Penal Code, and the establishment of Institutional 
mechanisms to promote women's equal rights in the family and society. For details, sec Post-Beijing 
Plan of Action (1997-2001) (n. 1 I above) submitted by Tunisia. is Mayer (see n. 4 above) in this regard observes that although the Tunisian Code does not 
specifically state that laws are to be interpreted by reference to Islamic jurisprudence, it is construed 
in the light of Islamic principles. As an example, she cites article 5 of the Tunisian code and the 
interpretation of the term "empechement legal" or "legal prevention" to marriage therein. Although 
the wording in the text makes no mention of religion, it has been interpreted as incorporating the 
Islamic legal ban on marriages of Muslim women to non-Muslim men. 
16 For details, see Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), UNDP `Tunisia: 
Women in Public Life' available at hqp: //www. r)ogar. org/countries/ttinisia/tiendcr. htnil (Last 
accessed 02.12.04). 
17 For details, see Mayer, n. 4 above. 
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dowry, breast-feeding as an impediment to marriage and upholds traditional 
interpretations concerning inheritance. 
18 Reference to Islam is also expressed in the 
official discourse which accompanies and justifies the Code. 19 It is argued that the 
Tunisian law-makers have always taken great care to present reforms in the framework 
of a re-reading of the Shar'ia which sometimes has the effect of allowing the 
jurisprudence to revert to a patriarchal and conservative view of the family. 
20 
Article 5 of the Moroccan Constitution2' provides that all citizens are equal before the 
law and affirms in the preamble its commitment to abide by universally recognised 
human rights. Despite these specific assertions of equality, women in Morocco were 
subjected to various forms of legal and cultural discrimination until the reform of 
personal status law in 2004. The new law although appearing substantially to improve 
the legal position of women - for example, by putting stringent restrictions on 
polygamy, abolishing the duty of obedience previously owed by the wife to the husband, 
18 Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalite, n. 10 above. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Adopted on September 13,1996. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco (as revised by 
Decree (Dahir) no. 1-96-157 of October 7,1996), contains the following articles relevant to the issue 
of gender equality, women and employment issues: Article 5 states: "All Moroccan citizens shall be 
equal before the law". Article 8 provides that "Men and women shall enjoy equal political rights. 
Any citizen of age enjoying his or her civil and political rights shall be eligible to vote". Article 9(c) 
provides that "the Constitution shall guarantee all citizens ... 
freedom of association and the freedom 
to belong to any union or political group of their choice". Article 12 provides that "opportunities for 
employment in public offices and positions shall be uniformly open to all citizens". Article 13 
provides that "All citizens shall have equal rights in seeking education and employment". Operative 
paragraph 3 of the Constitution Preamble acknowledges Morocco's commitment to international 
standards and international human rights guaranteed by international conventions it is a party to: 
"Aware of the need of incorporating its work within the frame of the international organisations of 
which it has become an active and dynamic member, the Kingdom of Morocco fully adheres to the 
principles, rights and obligations arising from the Charters of such organisations, as it reaffirms its 
determination to abide by the universally recognised human rights". The relevant Articles have been 
translated and summarised at- 
http: //www ilo orp-/public/cnglish/cmyloyment/gems/eeo/law/maroc/cons. htm (Last accessed on 
02.11.2004). 
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and giving women better protection against unilateral divorce by the husband by making 
divorce subject to prior authorisation of the court - does not however grant women full 
equal standing with men in all areas of the family sphere. This is evident from King 
Mohamed VI's speech at the Parliament before introducing the reformed law where he 
states that one of the objectives of the reform is "to ensure that women enjoy a better 
and more equitable status"". The aim here is clearly not an equal status but a "better 
and equitable" status within the framework of Islam. It is also important to note that 
unlike their Tunisian counterparts who refrained from making any overt reference to 
Islamic jurisprudence in the Tunisian Code, the Moroccan law-makers relied heavily on 
progressive interpretations of Islamic law and its egalitarian principles in their reforms 
of personal status laws23. This approach was highlighted in King Muhammad's speech 
before the Parliament on the new law where he stated: 
It is necessary to be mindful of the tolerant aims of Islam, which advocates 
human dignity, equality and harmonious relations, and also to rely on the 
cohesiveness of the Malikite rite and on Utihad, thanks to which Islam is a 
suitable religion for all times and places. The aim is to draw up a modern 
Family Law which is consistent with the spirit of our glorious religion. 
3. Personal Status Code: Tunisia 
Like some Arab countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, and some South Asian countries 
such as India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, Tunisia also experienced a period of foreign 
22 See - King Mohammad VI of Morrocco, speech delivered in the fall session of the Moroccan 
Parliament on 10 October 2003. Full text of the speech is available at- 
httn: //www. rnincom. gLov. ma/english/gencralities/speech/2003/ParlianmentFallSession 101003 htm 
(Last accessed 10.11.2004). 
23 For example, various Qur'anic verses and hadith were cited in the King's speech (n. 14 above) as 
justifying the restrictions on polygamy and for making divorce subject to judicial supervision under 
the reformed law. 
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administration. As Kelly24 observes, although the French occupation was administrative, 
France's policy clearly indicated its economic as well as cultural imperialism and in the 
process Tunisians and Tunisian society were demonised to justify French rule. in 
Tunisia, under French administration and as a semi-autonomous Ottoman province prior 
to that, 25 personal status was regulated by religious courts, not the state. '` The personal 
status Code presently in force regulates the areas which were traditionally regulated by 
the religious authorities and brings them into the domain of the state where they now 
apply to all citizens Muslims as well as the non- Muslims. 
In Tunisia, the debates related to the issue of women's rights became intense and 
vociferous in 1920s and, as Kelly observes, these debates were intricately linked to the 
nationalist struggle at that time. As is common in many nationalist movements, among 
those concerned with the issue of reform, there were two distinct and opposite 
approaches identifiable. Kelly summarises these two approaches or trends of thought as 
follows. On the one hand, some argued that for Tunisia to be a strong independent 
nation able to resist European domination it would have to gather the strength of all its 
citizens including women. On the other hand, some argued that as the Tunisian way of 
life had been nearly obliterated by colonization, what remained - including the 
traditional gender roles (which included veiling) - had to be preserved. To them, any 
attempts to adapt social practices or laws were suspect and viewed as concessions to the 
24 P Kelly `Finding Common Ground: Islamic Values and Gender Equity in Tunisia's Reformed 
Personal Status Law' in Special Dossier No. ] (London: WLUML, fall 1996). 
25 Tunisia was an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire since 1574. 
26 Shari 'a courts were abolished in 1956. There are now four levels of courts in the judiciary. 
Cantonal courts have limited criminal jurisdiction. Courts of first instance have civil, commercial, 
correctional, social and personal status chambers. Three Courts of Appeal (i. e., Tunis, Sousse and 
Sfax) have civil, correctional, criminal and accusation chambers, the final one being similar to a 
grand jury. The Court of Cassation in Tunis is the highest court of appeal, with three civil and 
commercial chambers and a criminal chamber. For details, see - Mayer, n. 4 above. 
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colonizers, or the West. 27 The nationalists in Tunisia who belonged to the first group 
were strongly influenced by nineteenth century Arab liberal philosophy. Prominent 
among them is Habib Bourguiba who was hugely influenced by the teachings of liberal 
thinkers who believed that Islamic law is by nature evolutionary and that the relative 
economic, political and social backwardness of Muslim societies was due to their failure 
to continue to evolve naturally and not to any flaw inherent within Islam. 28 
Challenging the imposition of a dogmatic assimilation between Islam and Muslim 
jurisprudence, consecutive generations of liberal reformers including Bourguiba 
extended the debate of modernity to all aspects of legislation on family matters in 
Tunisia. 29 The interesting point to note here is that, they did so "without questioning 
Islam as a religion, as a cultural heritage, or as a civilization. With the aim of better 
understanding and overcoming the problems raised by the application of such a law in a 
27 Kelly, n. 24 above. 28 Following three decades of dictatorship under President Bourgiba, Zina al-Abidine Ben All 
became President of Tunisia in 1987. As Kelly observes, while the Bourguiba regime was widely 
applauded for its respect of human rights and had wide popular support, it was not an open political 
system. Kelly observes, Bourguiba was hugely influenced by the teachings of liberals such as Jamal 
al-Dil al-Afgani, Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amin, and Khayr al-Din Pasha al-Tunisi. 
See, ibid. 
29 The improvement of women's status through the reform of personal laws and social practices was 
a significant issue for Muslim liberals because of the importance accorded to women and their role in 
shaping the family and society at that time. As an example, Kelly refers to the work of Afgani who 
argued that Muslim women should be educated so that they could fulfil their duties as mothers. As 
Kelly argues, although the views of the liberals on women and gender roles were often patronizing 
toward women and displayed a limited concept of women's potential, they represented a great 
improvement over attitudes held at that time. One important outcome of their work was that by 
presenting the status of women as a valid concern of state and society, they opened the door for 
constructive debate among and between both sexes on the status of women. Following liberals like 
Afgani and others, Bourguiba also used culturally accepted symbols and principles to express his 
ideas. Thus, while Bourguiba's outlook was secular, he often delivered his ideas in language and 
terms that were Islamic. From the point of view of reform to religious laws and women's rights, one 
important consequence of this is that it gave his ideas legitimacy of tradition despite their departure 
from conventional interpretations and customs. See, ibid. 
228 
secular state, their arguments were grounded in a sound knowledge of the content and 
meaning of Muslim jurisprudence. "30 
After independence in 1956 the first major document developed and adopted by the 
newly independent Tunisia3' was the Tunisian Code of Personal Status. The Code 
introduced various progressive provisions granting rights to women in the area of family 
law and reflecting the policy of the Tunisian Government and legislature to use personal 
laws as an instrument of modernisation and amelioration of the poor status of women in 
Tunisia. 32 
4. Personal Status Code: Morocco 
As has been discussed earlier, when Morocco achieved independence from France in 
1956, the newly independent Morocco adopted French civil law, but retained, in contrast 
to Tunisia, a code of Islamic religious laws without breaking away from the traditional 
Islamic law that governs behaviour within families. 
Following independence in 1956, a Law Refonn Commission was established in order 
to draft a code of personal status in Morocco. As a result of the Commission's work, the 
30 
Ibid. 
31 The Code, inspired by unofficial draft codes of Maliki and Hanafi family law, was passed soon 
after independence in 1956. It was extended to apply to all Tunisian citizens in 1957. 
32 Various statistics and indicators that women's position have improved in Tunisia during the last 
few decades. For example one study by the Women's International Network shows significant 
improvement in the age of marriage from 20.8 (in 1986) to 26.7 (in 1994). The Post-Beijing Plan of 
Action (1997-2001) submitted by the Government of Tunisia shows that the proportion of women in 
the working population has risen from 5.5% in 1966 to 23% in 1994. The women occupy 7% of seats 
in parliament, 17% of the scats in municipal councils, 12% of positions in the public office and the 
magistracy. During 1995-96, the school enrollment rate among girls between the age of 6 and 12 was 
89.4%. For details, see- n. II above. 
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religious laws were codified into a formal document, the Moudawana, or Personal Civil 
Status Code, which came into force in 1958, two years after Morocco's independence. 
The philosophy the Moroccan Code embodied was diametrically opposite to that of the 
Tunisian Code as it reaffirmed many of the rules taken from the treatises of Maliki 
jurists of the past centuries and reinforced the traditional patriarchal order. 33 For 
example, under the Moudawana, men were free to conduct polygamy and exercise the 
power of unilateral divorces. Women on the other hand, had unequal rights to divorce 
and limited property and inheritance rights. It also required them to obtain permission 
from their fathers or their husbands for various purposes such as opening a business and 
obtaining a passport. Since independence, various women is rights activists and 
organizations have been demanding reforms to the Code and protested against the 
disadvantage and discrimination they suffer in the area of family law. In the 1990s, the 
Union for Feminine Action (UAF), a women's rights group, organised a campaign for 
reforming the Moroccan Personal Civil Status Code (or Moudawana). The campaign 
received good response as the organisation was able collect nearly about one million 
signatures on a petition urging reform of the existing Moroccan Code. 
35 Acknowledging 
the success of the campaign, King Hassan II referred the matter to a council of religious 
leaders which led to limited reforms in 1993. In this regard, it however needs to be 
33 The Moudawana is a codification of thefiqh and in the event of legal lacunae, the text expressly 
referred back to the dominant opinion or to the unchanged jurisprudence of the Maliki school. For 
details, see Mayer, n. 4 above, p. 6. See also-- House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Hunan 
Rights Annual Report 2003: Fourth Report of Session 2003-2004 (London: The Stationary Office 
Ltd of HOC, 6 May 2004), p. 42. 
34 While the Constitution of Morocco affirms the principle of equality between citizens, there is little 
doubt that Moroccan women remained subjected to a legally inferior status in the family. The main 
reasons for this have been identified as follows: the father's right to decide his daughter's marriage; 
the authority of the husband to whom she owes submission and obedience; the women having only 
custody of young children without the authority of guardianship; the unequal distribution of property 
in relation to succession and inheritance. For details, see n. 10 above. 
35 See story synopsis at: ht! p: //www. pbs. orgfhopcs/morocco/story. htmi (Last accessed 17.11.04). 
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mentioned that despite these changes in the personal law relating to marriage, custody, 
polygamy, and divorce which brought a certain degree of improvement to the status of 
women, they failed to bring the Moroccan law to the level of the Tunisian Code. 
In April 2001, a Royal Consultative Commission of religious authorities and legal 
experts was established to study the possibility of revising the Moudawana in 
accordance with religious principles. The continued advocacy and awareness-raising 
efforts of women's rights activists and strong backing by the government contributed to 
the Commission's decision in favour of a reformed Moroccan family law. 36 After thirty 
months of contentious deliberation, the Commission presented its recommendations to 
the Palace. In October 2003, almost two and a half years after the establishment of the 
Commission, HM King Mohammed VI publicly announced the new reforms based on 
the recommendations to create in his words, a "modern Family Law which is consistent 
with the spirit of Islam and yet eradicates the inequity imposed on women" and 
submitted to Parliament in October 2003. Parliament debated the reforms extensively, 
making some 110 amendments before unanimously approving the final text in January. 
37 
Finally, on January 25,2004, the government of Morocco adopted a new law that 
replaced the laws included in the Moudawana. 
36 For example, various women's rights organisations, organised within the Printernps de I'F_galilc 
network, analysed the details of the draft legislation's text and organised workshops, round tables, 
and discussion groups to prepare for lobbying efforts in Parliament and to educate the public about 
the reforms. Also, as pointed out by Bordat and Kouzzi, "the reforms' smooth passage was mainly a 
product of the changed political environment following the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, 
in which Islamic extremists were implicated. In the aftermath of the attacks some Islamist groups 
were repressed and others were put on the defensive, which had the effect of muting religious 
opposition to the revision". For details, see S Bordat and S Kouzzi `The Challenge of Implementing 
Morocco's New Personal Status Law' (September 2004) 2 Arab Reform Bulletin 8 (published by 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
37 In contrast, both the original 1957 Mudawwana and minor revisions in 1993 were simply enacted 
by Royal Decrees. 
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5. Notable Features of Personal Status Laws in Tunisia38 
a) Minimum age for marriage 
Both males and females in Tunisia are protected from child marriage. The minimum age 
of marriage is 20 for males and 17 for females. According to article 5 of the Code, 
marriage below these ages requires special permission from the courts, which may be 
given only if there are "pressing reasons" and on the basis of a "clear interest" or benefit 
to be realised by both spouses of to the marriage. Marriage below the age of legal 
majority requires the consent of the guardian and, since 1993, of the mother. 
39 In the 
event of their refusal, recourse may be had to the judge under Article 6. The age of legal 
majority is 20 for both males and females, but according to Article 153 marriage gives 
rise to legal majority for matters of personal status, civil and commercial transactions 
provided the party concerned is over the age of 17. Marriage can be proven only by an 
official document as prescribed by law. 
440 
b) Consent to marriage 
Neither the father nor any other guardian can force a woman either minor or major to 
marry without her consent. Prior to the introduction of the Personal Status Code (and 
still in some countries like Algeria), although women's consent was required, they could 
38 The information used to discuss the notable features of the Tunisian Personal Status Code have 
been gathered from Kelly (n. 24 above) and from the Law and Religion Program of Emory University 
Study of Islamic Family Law (IFL), available at 
http: //www. law. emoly. edu/ifl/lesal/morocco. htm#text (Last accessed 10.10.2004), Kelly (n. 16 
above). For full version of the Tunisian Code, see- n. I above. 
39 See the text of the Tunisian Code, n. l above. 
40 Ibid. 
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not formally represent themselves in the marriage contract and were instead represented 
by their fathers and or other male delegates. Women are now legally capable of 
representing themselves in a marriage contract, although they may appoint a delegate if 
they choose under Articles 9 and 10 of the Code. 41 
c) Duty of obedience 
Another notable feature of Tunisian Code is that the "duty of obedience" by the wife, 
which is common in many Muslim societies, no longer exists in the Code. 
42 As has been 
discussed elaborately in Chapter 4, the verse or ayah which is often cited as proof that 
Islam allows male dominance over women and imposes upon a wife a duty of obedience 
or ta'a to her husband is verse 4: 34 of surat al-Nisa of the Qur'an. " As has been 
discussed, on the basis of the patriarchal interpretation of this verse, traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence provides that a wife owes a duty of obedience to her husband, failure to 
comply with which makes her nashiz. The concept of ta'a is also associated with the 
concept of tamkin, or availability which provides that a Muslim wife must submit to sex 
with her husband as and when he chooses. Moreover, this verse has also been 
interpreted to give power to the husband to beat or strike his wife if she is not obedient. 
41 n. 38 generally. 
42 Kelly, n. 224 above. She notes that the Dar Ejwad, or "house of Obedience" (elsewhere called Bad'! 
Al-Ta'a), no longer exists in Tunisia. Until the 1950s, women who disobeyed their husbands could 
be confined to a designated room or house, where they would stay until they recanted. 
43 The first part of the verse is as follows: "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, 
because God has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from 
their means. " The second part of verse 4: 34 reads as follows: "So good women are the obedient, 
guarding in secret that which God hath guarded. As for those of whom ye fear rebellion, admonish 
them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them beat them. Then if they obey you, seek not a 
way against them. Lo! God is ever High, Exalted, Great. " See English translation of the Holy Qur'an 
by Abdullah Yusuf Ali at httn: //web. umr. edu/msaumr/Ouran . 
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It has been noted that there is a considerable amount of controversy among academics 
regarding the interpretation of the verse and the rights and obligations derived from it. In 
particular, some Islamic feminist writers such as al-Hibri44, Eissa45 and Riffat Hassan46 
have provided an interesting challenge to the traditional meaning attributed to this 
verse. 47 
An amendment to the Tunisian Code in 1993 replaced the clause which prescribed that 
"a woman must obey her husband and respect his prerogatives". Article 23 of the 
amended Code in Tunisia lays the obligation upon both spouses of treating each other 
with mutual respect and assisting each other in managing the household and children's 
affairs. As "head of the family" the husband is responsible for the maintenance of his 
wife and children, while the wife is to contribute to family maintenance if she has the 
means to do so. 48 
44 A al-Hibri `Deconstructing Patriarchal Jurisprudence in Islamic Law: A Faithful Approach', in A 
Wing (cd) Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) pp. 221-233. 
45 D Eissa Constructing the Notion of Male Superiority over Women in Islam: The Influence of Sex 
and Gender Stereotyping in the Interpretation of the Quran and the Implications for a Modernist 
Exegesis of Rights (Occasional Paper No 11) (London: WLUML, 1999). 
46 R Hassan `Equal before Allah? Woman-Man Equality in the Islamic Tradition' (Jan-May, 1987) 
WVII Harvard Divinity Bulletin 2. 
47 According to al-Hibri's (n. 44 above) analysis of the first part of the verse can alternatively read as 
follows: "Men are [advisors/providers of guidance] to women [because/in circumstances where/in 
that which] God made some of them different from some others and [because/in circumstances 
where/in that which] they spend their own money". Eissa (sec n. 45 above) points out that if seen 
from a different perspective the second part of this controversial verse can simply mean that good 
women are God fearing and that when a man fears that his wife's conduct is disobedient to God, he 
should admonish her for such conduct, take separate sleeping quarters, and possibly "strike out" of 
the marriage. The alternative interpretations by them have been discussed in details in Chapter IV. 
48 See generally- n. 38 above. 
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d) Marriage with a non-Muslim 
The Code does not mention religion as an impediment to marriage. Tunisia has ratified 
without reservation the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriage (1962)49, which confirms the equality of men and 
women in respect to their choice of marriage partner, without discrimination as to race, 
sex, or religion. Although the wording in the Code makes no mention of religion, it has 
been interpreted as incorporating the Islamic legal ban on marriages of Muslim women 
to non-Muslim men. 50 Tunisia's position in this regard is quite similar to Pakistan and 
Bangladesh where a Muslim man may contract a valid marriage with a woman of either 
Christian or Jewish faith (kilabia). As explained in Chapter 11 a man also can marry a 
Hindu or Buddhist woman and the marriage would not be void but irregular with the 
effect that in such cases the children born out of such marriage would be legitimate but 
the parties would not inherit from each other. A Muslim woman on the other hand, may 
not contract a valid marriage with anyone else but a Muslim man. A marriage with a 
kitabia would be irregular while a marriage with Hindu etc. would be invalid and any 
children born out of the wedlock shall be illegitimate. 
51 
49 G. A. Res. No. 1763A (XVII) of 7 November 1963, entered into. force on 9 December 1964. Full 
text of the convention is available at: http: //www. unhchr. cli/html/menu3/b/63. htm (Last accessed 
18.10.04). 
so As Kelly points out the interpretation of the relevant Article in the Code was confirmed by a 
directive in 3 November 1973 from the Minister of Justice which in the past used to prohibit Civil 
Status Officers from registering marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. For 
details, see Kelly, n. 24 above. 
51 For details, see Sobhan Legal Status of Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of law 
and International Affairs-BILIA, 1978). 
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e) Polygamy 
One of the most notable features of the Tunisian Code is that polygamy is prohibited 
and offenders are liable to a prison sentence of one year and/or a fine under Article 18 of 
the Code. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, one of the main obstacles to abolishing 
polygamy is the argument put forward by some that polygamy is explicitly permitted by 
the Qur'an. In support of their argument they cite verse 4: 3 which is traditionally 
interpreted as giving permission to Muslim men to marry up to four times and keep four 
wives simultaneously. 52 But as has been discussed in Chapter IV, some feminist writers 
and reformists do not accept this interpretation and argues that permission to engage in 
polygamy is subject to the condition that the man can do full justice to all of the wives 
which require equality in love, affection and esteem. 53 The Islamic position on 
polygamy is therefore not of encouragement but prohibition as it is arguably impossible 
for any man to give equal love, affection and esteem to all his wives. 
Following the progressive interpretations of the Qur'anic verses and arguments against 
polygamy, Tunisian lawmakers have prohibited polygamy altogether. In this regard, 
Kelly points out that MT al-Snoussi, who was the minister of justice in Tunisia when 
the Code was adopted, agreed that the prohibition of polygamy is based on several 
centuries of proof that a husband cannot treat his wives equally. A basic principle of 
Islamic law is that actions which are permitted but not obligatory or recommended can 
52 Verse 4: 3 of the Qur'an states: "If ye fear that yc shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, 
marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal 
justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hand possesses. That will be more 
suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice. " See - al-Hibri n. 44 above. 53A Serajuddin Shari 'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Subcontinent (Dhaka: 
Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991) p. 118. 
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be justly restricted if necessary for the public interest. Thus, since polygamy is 
permitted-as opposed to obligatory or recommended - it can be regulated or even 
abolished by the state. 54 
f) Divorce 
Along with the elimination of polygamy, a reformed divorce law with increased 
women's access to divorce and abolished oral repudiation, is one of the best known 
features of Tunisia's Personal Status Code. Under the Code, divorce is a judicial matter 
and extra judicial divorce or talaq (which is a common practice in some Muslim 
societies including Bangladesh) has no validity. No divorce may be decreed until a 
judge appointed by the Court has tried and failed to reconcile the couple. 55 Where 
divorce is not by mutual agreement the Court may award compensation for the injury. 
Both men and women can initiate divorce. The individual seeking the divorce petitions 
to the lower court, after paying a fee. According to Article 3 1, the court may grant 
divorce based on- 1) mutual consent or agreement of the spouses; 2) a petition from one 
spouse by reason of injury caused by the other; or 3) a petition from the husband or the 
wife56: 
i) Divorce by mutual consent: Divorce in this process can be initiated when both 
spouses agree to the divorce and to the arrangements for custody and maintenance. The 
54n__ .. n ... I---- - on Nee &euy, n. z4 aoove, p. ay. 
" For general details, see n. 38 above. 
$6 Ibid. 
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court in these cases does not determine which party as at fault in the divorce, and neither 
party is eligible to receive compensation. 
ii) Divorce by a petition from one spouse by reason of injury caused by the other: 
Either spouse may request a divorce based on failure of the other to respect the rights 
and obligations outlined in the Personal Status Code. 
iii) Divorce by a petition from the husband or the wife: This clause allows either 
spouse to obtain a divorce without the obligation of proving fault. Compensatory 
payments have been introduced to limit the abuse of this kind of divorce. 
g) Custody of Children 
Under the prevailing law in Tunisia if the marriage ends by death of one of the spouses, 
custody goes to the surviving spouse. If it ends by divorce, the judge is required to take 
the best interest of the child into account in assigning custody either to one of the 
parents or to a third party. The court retains the power to decide whether custody will be 
granted to the mother who remarries (article 58). In all cases, the interests of the child 
take precedence. 57 
h) Division of property 
Property acquired during the marriage belongs to the spouses individually and each may 
independently manage their own property. Article 11 of the Code allows for limited 
community of property as an optional property regime. In this case, what is acquired by 
57 Ibid. 
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the couple during the marriage is held in common, while the property each brought to 
the marriages held separately. Limited community of property protects the wife's 
personal goods from being appropriated by the husband, while allowing for the fair 
distribution of goods acquired jointly. 58 
6. Notable Features of the Moroccan Personal Status Code S9 
a) The minimum age for marriage 
The minimum age of marriage is 18 for both men and women. Marriage of a minor 
below the age of majority (rushd) requires the guardian's consent, and if the guardian 
refuses, the parties may take matter to Court. A guardian cannot contract the marriage of 
his ward unless she authorises it 60 The guardian's right of coercion (ijbur) under certain 
circumstances was revoked under the 1993 amendments to the Moroccan Personal Civil 
Status Code. The ward may take the matter to court if her guardian refuses consent for 
her marriage, and if a ward of the age of majority has no father, she may choose either to 
appoint a wall (guardian) of her choice or contract her own marriage. 6' Husband and 
wife share joint responsibility for the family and most notably the wife is no longer 
59 Ibid. 
59 As English versions of the old or the amended Code were not available, the information used in 
the discussion below on the notable features of the present personal status law in Morocco and its 
difference with the previous law have been gathered from secondary sources which are as follows: 
l'Association Dcmocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) `Comparison of former Moroccan 
Family Law with the new provisions', accessible at 
http: //www. leamingpartnershiiD. ory/events/ncwsalerts/moroccofamiaw. pdf (Last accessed 15.11.04); 
Law and Religion Program of Emory University Study of Islamic Family Law (1FL), available at 
http: //www. law. emo! y. edu/ifl/legal/Tunisia2. htm#text (last accessed 17.10.04); and F Scbti Rights of 
the Muslin Women in Morocco, internet version available at httT): //www. techno. net. nii/feiiiiiics/e- 
guide. htrn (Last accessed on 10.11.04). 
60 See- ADFM, n. 59 above. 
61 Ibid. 
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legally obliged to obey her husband. Before the amendment in 2004, the family was the 
responsibility of the husband only and the wife was required to obey his reasonable 
orders. 
b) Polygamy 
Although the new law in Morocco does not prohibit polygamy altogether, it subjects 
polygamy to the judge's authorisation and to stringent legal conditions that make it 
difficult to practice. ' According to the new law, the judge must make sure that there is 
no presumption of inequity before authorising a second marriage. 63 The judge must also 
be convinced that the husband has the ability to treat the second wife and her children on 
an equal footing with the first, and also ensure that they enjoy similar living conditions. 
In addition, a woman has the right to impose a condition in the marriage contract 
requiring that her husband refrain from taking other wives. If there is no pre-established 
condition, the first wife must be informed of her husband's intent to remarry, the second 
wife must be informed that the man is already married, and moreover, the first wife may 
ask for a divorce due to harms suffered. " 
c) Divorce 
In Morocco, according to the newly reformed law, the right to divorce is a prerogative 






divorce was left to the discretion of the husband only and was often exercised in an 
arbitrary way. The new law has also established divorce by mutual consent. To protect 
the wife against possible misuse of the exclusive and unrestricted right to divorce by the 
husband, the new law has made divorce conditional upon the court's prior authorisation 
and enhanced the scope for reconciliation both through the family and the judge. 66 The 
new law also requires that all monies owed to the wife and the children should be paid 
in full by the husband before divorce can be registered. Verbal repudiation is no longer 
valid as divorce is now subject to a court ruling. 
67 
d) Custody of children 
In Morocco, the custody of the children is to be granted to the mother, then the father, 
then the grandmother on the mother's side. If this proves to be impossible, the judge will 
entrust custody to the best qualified relative in the child's family, keeping in mind the 
best interest of the child. According to the new law, a mother can retain custody of her 
child under certain conditions, even upon remarrying or moving out of the area where 
the husband lives. She may also regain custody if the reasons which caused her to lose 
this right cease to exist. Under the old law, a woman irrevocably lost custody in the 
above conditions. In addition, the new law has also made provision to provide the boys 
with an option to choose their custodian at the age of fifteen similar to the girls. This 
alters the previous position under which the boys could choose their custodian at the age 





e) An examination of the reforms in Moudawana 
As seen above, the new reformed law in Morocco has brought some important changes 
in the area of personal status law which may contribute to improving the possibility of 
legal status of the Moroccan women. Notable among them are the raising of the 
minimum age of marriage for women, establishing the right to divorce by mutual 
consent, subjecting polygamy and divorce under strict judicial control, abolishing the 
wife's duty of obedience to her husband and making the family the joint responsibility of 
both spouses and abolishing the requirement of a marital tutor (wall) for women to 
marry. 
However, whether these reforms will be able to bring any substantive change in the 
status of women in Morocco still remains to be seen. Although various women's groups 
and activists have supported the reform, they have also raised some concerns and 
identified some factors which in their opinion may serve to limit or obstruct the 
realization of some of these rights by Moroccan women in practice. Bordat and Kouzzi 
identifies and summarises some of these impediments and concerns as follows: 69 
i) One of the impediments which can obstruct women's newly granted rights is in the 
authors' opinion, the Moroccan judiciary's lack of familiarity with the reforms and the 
lack of institutions to monitor the judiciary's performance. According to the revised text, 
judges are still allowed to use religious principles to decide matters not covered in the 
text which leaves ample room for them to apply the most conservative religious 
interpretations. Although the Ministry of Justice in Morocco has begun training 
69 See Bordat and Kouzzi, n. 36 above. 
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programmes for some of the judges specialising in family issues, as the authors point 
out, such training may not suffice given that the commitment of the judiciary to the 
spirit behind the reforms is uncertain. In this regard the authors also highlight the 
concerns of various women's groups who hold that the Moroccan judges had failed in 
the past to adhere even to the more modest reforms enacted in 1993. It is therefore, not 
certain whether the judges will be able to break away from the traditional approach of 
interpretation while applying the law. The new law also assigns judges the role of 
overseeing mandatory reconciliation in divorce cases, which has also raised concern 
among women's organizations that judges may prioritise reconciliation even at the cost 
of women's right to divorce in the interest of "family harmony". 
ii) The second impediment identified by the authors is the structure of the judiciary. The 
new law calls for the creation of family courts, separate from the ordinary courts of first 
instance that previously had jurisdiction over family law matters. The government's 
present plan to establish seventy family courts or one per province is, as the authors 
observe, inadequate to serve the 50 percent of the population residing in remote rural 
areas. In addition, they also point out that removing family law cases from the general 
courts may result in a lower standard of justice for these cases. 
iii) Under the old laws, adouls (who are similar to notary publics but have a religious 
character) alone had the authority to officiate marriages and to draw up marriage 
contracts. The new law transfers this role to the new family courts and relegates adouls 
to mere "court clerks" with a symbolic religious function. This prompted adouls to stage 
a protest at the Ministry of Justice. According to the authors the opposition of adouls 
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may pose some problems in implementing the newly granted rights. Also, even after the 
passing of the new law, the conservative adouls (who often have orthodox views about 
women's rights because of their religious role) may still retain their huge influence over 
marriage anyway because of the fact that many Moroccans consider the adouls and not 
the judges to be the community legal experts, and also because, unlike the new family 
courts, adouls are present throughout the country. 
iv) The final challenge for the proper implementation of the law lies in ensuring that the 
public knows about and accepts the reforms. In this regard, the high illiteracy rates 
among women in Morocco and the propaganda of various extremist religious groups 
against the law at the grass root level can serve as major obstacles in the realization of 
the rights given under the new law. According to official estimates, 42 % of urban 
women and 82 % of rural women in Morocco are illiterate. According to another survey, 
female adult illiteracy is 66%, compared to 40% for males. In rural areas, female 
illiteracy may be as high as 90% 
70 
The above discussion demonstrates that while the recent reforms in Morocco have 
succeeded in improving women's formal position with respect to their legal rights, it 
still remains to be seen how far this will actually benefit women and how far the rights 
granted therein will be achieved in reality. 
70 See- n. 16 above. 
244 
7. Possibilities for reform in Bangladesh 
Foregoing discussions have highlighted that it is possible to improve the legal status of 
women in a Muslim society within the framework of Islam. This Chapter therefore 
concludes that reforms introduced in Tunisia and especially in Morocco which explicitly 
took a reform approach consistent with the values and spirit of Islam in various areas 
such as divorce, polygamy and custody of children can serve as examples to be followed 
to reform the relevant provisions of the personal status law for the Muslim community 
in Bangladesh. For example, it has been observed in Chapter 11 that the divorce 
procedure followed in Bangladesh is discriminatory towards women as it in practice 
leaves the husband's arbitrary right to divorce intact. 7' In this regard, drawing on the 
provisions in Tunisia and Morocco, this Chapter argues that the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance (1961)72 that regulates the divorce procedure in Bangladesh should be 
amended to make all divorce subject to judicial process instead of leaving it to the non- 
judicial Arbitration Council. It is argued that the difficulty and expense of going 
through a judicial process may serve to reduce the number of arbitrary divorces by men. 
With regard to polygamy, it has been pointed out in Chapter II that Bangladesh has not 
prohibited polygamy altogether but has imposed some procedural restrictions on it 
through the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961)". In this regard Chapter II has also 
drawn attention to a decision of the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court in which the Court examined the issue of whether Islam truly approves of 
71 The procedure for divorce under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) [(VIII 1961) 14 PC 
67] and some of the problems that arise while complying with it have been discussed in details in 
Chapter II. 
72 (Vlll 1961) 14 PC 67. 
73 Ibid. 
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polygamy. As has been pointed out, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh in Jesmin Sultana v. Mohammad Elias (1997)74, by accepting the arguments 
put forward by some modem commentators that the pennission to take a second wife 
amounts virtually to a prohibition under Islamic law, held that section 6 of the 
Ordinance is against the principle of Islamic Law as it does not prohibit polygamy 
altogether. The Court also noted that the Tunisian Code of Personal Status has given 
legislative effect to this interpretation by abolishing polygamy and recommending this 
section be deleted and substituted with a section prohibiting polygamy altogether. 75 This 
Chapter therefore argues that the example of Tunisia can be followed in Bangladesh to 
abolish polygamy outright. Alternatively, if abolishing polygamy outright proves to be 
difficult due to the fear of political backlash from religious fundamentalist groups, 
Bangladesh can at least follow the example of Morocco by making polygamy subject to 
the prior authorisation of the court. If, following Morocco, the requirement of doing 
justice between co-wives and equal treatment of them is made a condition precedent to 
polygamous marriage, the abuse of polygamy can be effectively curtailed if not stamped 
out altogether. In the cases of guardianship and custody of children, the prime 
consideration should be the welfare of the child and both the guardianship and custody 
should be placed in one person. The prevailing law, the Guardians and Wards Act 
(1890)76, in this area clearly affirms the importance of considering the child's welfare in 
deciding these cases. There is no reason therefore to deprive the mother of the 
74 17 BLD 4. 
75 The Court referred the judgment to the Ministry of Law for amending the law accordingly but no 
action is known to have been taken on it. 76 (VIII of 1890) 3 BC 292,3 PC 300. 
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guardianship or custody where she is financially capable of taking care of the child's 
educational and other expenses. 
8. Conclusion 
The Tunisian and Moroccan experiences of law reform show us that it is possible to 
improve the status of women within the framework of Islamic law by invoking 
egalitarian principles of Islam. For reforms to personal laws in Bangladesh the 
experience of Morocco becomes valuable as it shows that the legal position of women 
can be substantially improved within the framework of Islam although, as has been 
pointed out in the foregoing discussion, how far this will advance women's rights in 
reality remains to be seen. While it is accepted that the ultimate success of the newly 
reformed law in Morocco will depend to a large extent on how the problems and 
concerns discussed above are addressed and resolved, it is nevertheless evident that the 
reforms mark a step forward for women's rights. The progressive reforms in Tunisia and 
Morocco can thus, serve as examples for Bangladesh for similar reforms and achieving a 




1. Summary of arguments in favour of extending the equality principle in the 
sphere of religious personal laws 
This Chapter summarises the findings of the previous Chapters and points out 
possibilities for reform of the religious personal laws in Bangladesh drawing on the 
discussions and arguments put forward in earlier Chapters. Chapter I of the thesis has 
discussed the framework of the legal system of Bangladesh within which the religious 
personal laws operate and examined the scope of the equality provision of the 
Constitution with regard to reform of the personal laws on the basis of gender equality. 
The Chapter has concluded that there is scope to interpret the equality guarantee under 
the Constitution so as to extend its applicability to the personal sphere, thus making it 
obligatory upon the state to reform the personal laws so as to bring them in line with the 
guarantee of gender equality enumerated under the provision. Chapter II in this regard 
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has highlighted the discriminatory aspects of the religious laws, in particular aspects of 
the Islamic law operative in Bangladesh, that are clearly contradictory with the 
guarantee of gender equality under the Constitution, which is also the supreme law of 
the land. The chapter has also highlighted disadvantages to women flowing from some 
of the provisions of Islamic family law drawing on a range of statistics and other data. 
Chapter III has examined the public-private dichotomy operating in the legal system of 
Bangladesh and located the issue of reform of religious laws within public/private 
discourse. The Chapter has concluded, in light of the critique and arguments put forward 
by feminist scholars regarding the dichotomy that to ensure equality in one sphere i. e., 
the public (which is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution), it is imperative to ensure 
equality in the private sphere as well. Chapter IV has taken a closer look at the equality 
provision of the Constitution, its nature, scope and possibilities. The Chapter argued that 
although the meaning, scope and application of equality under the equality provision of 
the Constitution has been mostly informed by the formal understanding of equality, 
there is scope to interpret the provision to embrace a more substantive approach to 
equality and that certain aspects of Islamic law are reconcilable with gender equality. 
Chapter V, VI and VII have located the development and application of equality as a 
norm and strategic goal in four different jurisdictions. The first two of the four are 
western and non-Muslim contexts namely, Canada and South Africa. The second two 
are Muslim contexts namely Tunisia and 
Morocco. These Chapters have traced the 
development of equality and examined what 
kind of equality is emerging in these two 
different sets of contexts. 
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The key findings and arguments in the preceding Chapters are summarised as follows: 
a) The scope of the equality guarantee under the Constitution can and should be 
interpreted to extend to the private life including the religious personal laws 
It has been observed in the earlier discussions in Chapters 1,11,111 and IV that the issue 
of reform to the personal laws or indeed the very validity of those laws under the 
supreme law of the country the Constitution of Bangladesh depends to a great extent on 
how the scope of the equality guarantee of the Constitution is interpreted. If its 
application is interpreted to be limited to public sphere only, then religious personal 
laws operating in the family sphere falls outside its scope. On the other hand, if its 
application is interpreted to embrace the personal sphere as well, then it gives the state 
the legitimacy and the authority under the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, to 
intervene in the religious personal laws and reform them accordingly (either by 
replacing them with a secular family law regime or in the form of piecemeal reform to 
the personal laws) so as to bring them in line with the concept of gender equality. 
As has been explained in Chapter 1, it can be argued on the one hand that the equality 
provision (Article 28) of the Constitution can be interpreted to confine the application of 
equality guarantee (as the touchstone for judging the validity of any law in the country) 
to the public sphere only as the wording of the subsection 2 of Article 28 affirms the 
responsibility of the state to ensure gender equality in the "public life" of the citizens 
and is silent about personal life which includes family life where the religious personal 
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laws operate. ' As has been elaborated in the earlier Chapters (I and 111) with regard to 
this issue, this thesis takes the position that there is scope to interpret Article 28 to 
include the personal sphere and the religious personal laws operating therein within the 
ambit of the equality guarantee for two specific reasons: 
First, Although subsection 2 specifically refers to "state and public life", it does not 
explicitly exclude the personal sphere if it is read together with the first part (subsection 
1) of Article 28 which lays down a general equality guarantee which is not confined to 
any specific sphere. 2 In this regard the study argues in Chapter I that subsection 2 which 
refers to "state and public life" only affirms a strong commitment by the state to ensure 
gender equality in the public sphere and the fact that this subsection is silent about 
private life does not amount to wholesale exclusion if these two subsections are read 
together. Subsection 2 therefore should not be read and interpreted in isolation of the 
whole Constitution but should be read together with other provisions such as the 
preamble to the Constitution which affirms the state's commitment to ensuring gender 
equality, and Article 27 which provides "all citizens are equal before law and are 
entitled to equal protection of law". 
This approach of reading and interpreting a specific provision in the light of the overall 
spirit of the Constitution laid down in the preamble, the fundamental policy of the state 
and other relevant provisions is supported by various established rules of interpretations 
such as harmonious construction, purposive interpretation etc. As seen below, this 
I Article 28 (2) of the Constitution states: "Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of 
the State and of public life". 
2 Article 28 (1) states "the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race caste, sex or place of birth". 
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argument has been strengthened further by the discussions and arguments put forward in 
Chapter III relating to the public-private dichotomy, and in Chapter IV relating to 
equality and Islam. 
Second, in light of the discussion on the public-private dichotomy in Chapter III and the 
arguments put forward therein, it can also be argued that even where the responsibility 
of the state to ensure gender equality is confined only to the public sphere, in order to 
actually achieve that in reality, the state must ensure gender equality in the personal 
sphere as well because of the interdependent and overlapping nature of the public- 
private divide. It is therefore argued in this study that to ensure meaningful and equal 
participation in "state and public life", the state needs to create the opportunity and 
environment in the private sphere which will allow women meaningfully to participate 
in public life. This needs among other things, the removal of restrictions and obstacles 
that the religious personal laws often impose on women either directly or indirectly so as 
to restrain them from participating in the public sphere. 
3 
b) The right to religion is not an obstacle in reforming the personal laws 
The thesis has argued that the opposition of freedom of religion and gender equality is a 
false dichotomy. There is no necessary reason why religious freedom cannot be enjoyed 
simultaneously with the equality of women in the personal sphere. Firstly, as seen in 
Chapter 111, many aspects of Islamic personal law may be reconcilable with particular 
3 See Chapter II for detailed discussion on how some of the values underlying religious personal laws 
and some specific rules of the religious text promotes the idea of subordination of women and 
operate to obstruct women's participation in the public life as self-sufficient individuals. 
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notions of gender equality. Secondly, the idea of 
freedom of religion does not 
necessarily entail the right to enact laws which govern those whose religious or personal 
moral convictions may be different and thirdly, as has been 
discussed in details in 
Chapter I and III, the right to freedom of religion under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh 
is a qualified right subject to law, public order and morality. 
It has been pointed out in Chapter I that the traditionalists use the right to 
freedom of 
religion and preservation of the cultural identity of religious communities to 
deploy 
arguments in favour of restraining the state from reforming the personal 
laws and bring 
them in line with the gender equality guarantee. This view is sometime evident in 
various decisions, reports and activities of the policy-making bodies of the State which 
demonstrate the tendency of privileging the right to religion over the right to equality for 
women. 4 It has been observed in Chapters I and III that freedom of religion is a qualified 
right as it is subject to law, public order and morality. As has been observed in the 
Fatwa cases, there is a need to interpret and set clear guidelines as to what constitutes 
"public order and morality". It is argued in this thesis that "public order and morality" 
should be interpreted to uphold gender equality in situations of conflict between 
religious rights and gender equality where upholding religious rights means causing 
significant disadvantages to women. In this regard it also needs to be pointed out that 
by focusing exclusively on group rights to practice religion and in considering the 
fundamentalist religious leaders as the sole representatives of the religious communities, 
the state may disregard difference of interest within groups which can result in the 
marginalisation of women's interests. Among other things, it can bind Muslim and 
a See Chapters I and Il. 
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Hindu women to an essentialist notion of identity that denies the possibility of internal 
challenge to Muslim and Hindu laws. 6 It is, therefore, submitted that there is a pressing 
need to problematise the notions of "culture" and "group identity" in this regard. While 
acknowledging the importance of protecting group rights and the cultural identities of 
religious communities, the thesis argues that the recognition of group identity must be 
informed by an understanding of both the situation of women within the collectivity and 
of the systematic disadvantage of women as a group. 
7 It is submitted that the state while 
protecting cultural identity, should make sure that this is not used as a device to 
disadvantage women within a community. In this context, it is argued that the best 
possible approach to legal reform in Bangladesh is to pursue a uniform family law 
applicable to all citizens irrespective of their gender and religion. It is also argued that 
religions in this regard should take an inspiring role only. In other words, religious 
values should be respected as a personal spiritual choice but should not be the basis of 
the personal laws. The feasibility of this option in the present socio- political context of 
Bangladesh is discussed further below. 
c) Certain aspects of Islamic law are reconcilable with gender equality 
It has been observed in Chapter IV that there are certain aspects of Islamic law that are 
reconcilable with a notion of gender equality. It has been pointed out that ]slain 
acknowledges equality between the sexes in terns of spirituality and equal worth as 
5 The case has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
6 See-- V Narain Gender and Community: Muslim Women's Rights in India (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001). 
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human beings but ascribes different social roles to men and women. In Chapter IV, 
some of the provisions of Islamic law such as maintenance, divorce, the duty of 
obedience causing inequality and significant disadvantages to women have been 
challenged as the product of biased interpretation and it has been argued that there is 
scope to reform some of these provisions to eradicate gender-based disadvantage and 
bring them closer to the notion of gender equality. Discussions in Chapter VII have 
examined how the issue of reform to religious personal law has been approached in two 
Muslim societies, Tunisia and Morocco. Although the reform approach undertaken in 
these two countries and the concept of equality emerging as a result is different from 
South Africa and Canada, this examination has nevertheless been useful as it 
demonstrated that (a) it is possible to have a unified personal status law and (b) it is 
possible to initiate equality-enhancing reforms in a Muslim society. It is however, 
accepted that change in the legal status of women through legal reform does not 
automatically guarantee the improvement of social or economic status or the overall 
status of women in a society. Particularly in case of Morocco it still remains to be seen 
whether the recent reforms initiated there will improve the overall status of women in 
any substantial way. In Tunisia as well, it is difficult to confirm how far the reforms to 
personal laws have changed the overall position of women in the society as not enough 
data is available conclusively to prove a position. This thesis nevertheless argues that the 
reform approach pursued in Tunisia and Morocco may serve as a stepping stone towards 
developing a substantive understanding of equality in Bangladesh, as witnessed in South 
Africa and Canada. It is clearly necessary to improve the legal status of women 
7 Narain makes a similar proposition in the context of reforming Muslim Law in India. For details 
see ibid. 
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considering the close link between religious laws and women's rights and the fact that 
some of the rules and values underlying religious laws (as has been discussed in Chapter 
III), obstruct women's participation in public life as fully autonomous individuals and 
hence impede their economic empowerment, leaving them subservient to men in the 
society. 
d) Lessons from Canadian and South African equality jurisprudence: The equality 
guarantee should be interpreted to embrace the concept of substantive equality. 
South Africa and Canada demonstrate the possibilities that equality offers for improving 
the status of women through adopting a substantive version of equality. While it is 
accepted that these two countries have little in common with the socio-cultural 
background and condition of women in Bangladesh, the lessons learned from the South 
African and Canadian equality jurisprudence can nevertheless be valuable for 
understanding as well as developing the problems and prospects of equality 
jurisprudence in Bangladesh. In this regard Chapter IV has already discussed the Case 
Shamima Sultana Seema and Others v Bangladesh and otherss where the Petitioners 
have argued that the Constitutional guarantee of equality embraces the concept of 
"substantive equality". It yet remains to be seen if the Court endorses this argument or 
not but if it does then this will further strengthen the argument of this thesis that there is 
scope and need for embracing the concept of substantive equality in the equality 
jurisprudence in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter V and VI have pointed out that while it is difficult to adopt a substantive 
version of equality analysis, it can sometimes be even more difficult and complex to 
actually apply and develop it in practice. We have to bear in mind that while developing 
and implementing substantive equality analysis new problems are emerging in South 
Africa and Canada. 9 In Bangladesh it is not possible to foresee how substantive equality 
analysis, if adopted will be translated on the ground and what sort of problems will 
emerge. But it is nevertheless useful as these two jurisdictions helps us to identify the 
possibilities equality may offer as a concept and a strategic goal and the problems that 
may occur in implementing and achieving equality and how some these countries have 
sought to overcome such problems. While it still remains to be seen if the Bangladeshi 
courts and the government take on the challenge to accept and interpret equality in a 
substantive way or to provide the institutional framework for implementing it, the 
lessons learned from the Canadian and South African experience can be helpful in 
helping us think about how to achieve a more meaningful guarantee that can 
substantially improve the position of women in Bangladesh in the future. 
In both South Africa and Canada the form of equality that is emerging is substantive 
equality requiring a contextual analysis that focuses on disadvantage instead of formal 
attributions of similarity or difference. As has been observed in Chapter V and V1, the 
substantive approach to equality may be useful in developing equality jurisprudence and 
pushing reform of personal laws in Bangladesh as it may be less prone to accusations of 
"Westernization" because of its focus on disadvantage rather than difference between 
the sexes. As it has been observed in Chapter IV, Islam propagates equal worth of 





human beings but different provisions of Islamic law consider women as inherently 
different from men and ascribe different social roles for men and women. Gender 
equality understood as formal equality in some instances, prescribes equal treatment 
between men and women insisting on their similarity. As has been observed in Chapter 
IV for a large part of the nineteenth century, women's struggle in the West under the 
formal equality paradigm was a fight for inclusion by insisting that women are similar to 
and just as "good" as men and therefore should qualify for equal treatment. This 
succeeded in securing some important rights for women such as the right to vote, equal 
treatment in the workplace and so forth. However, the formal approach to equality may 
be considered as contradictory to the values and lifestyle prescribed by Islamic law 
which insists on difference. On the other hand, the kind of equality approach emerging 
in the South African and Canadian equality jurisprudence adopts a contextual analysis 
that focuses on the "disadvantages" that flow from differential treatment rather than 
"difference" between the sexes per se. Under this approach therefore, different treatment 
is invalid/suspect only when it causes systematic disadvantage to a class or group. 
Viewed thus, the substantive approach to equality becomes much less contradictory to 
Islam which prescribes as its overarching aim to ensure, arguably, overall justice 
between the sexes and hence eradicate disadvantage, which as Islamic law prescribes, 
sometimes require treating women differently. (For example, women as a general rule 
get half the share of men in inheritance because they have no formal obligation to 
contribute towards household expenses; the actual guardianship of children lies with the 
father as he has the ultimate responsibility to provide for the child's needs). While the 
thesis accepts that these underlying notions of religious laws are problematic as they 
9 See Chapters V and VI for details. 
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reinforce stereotypical assumptions about women and contribute to their subordination, 
the acknowledgement of difference nevertheless creates the possibility of dialogue, 
compromise and flexibility in these kinds of contexts. The point is that substantive 
equality creates the possibility for discursive movement in an equality context which a 
formal equality approach precludes. Also, because substantive equality adopts a 
contextual analysis that involves taking into account while judging disadvantage the 
relevant socio-legal and economic context, it can be argued to be less susceptible to 
accusations of imposing an "alien" culture or of fostering Westernisation and the 
cultural imperialism of the West. 
2. The Possibilities for Reform of the Personal Laws in Bangladesh 
The above discussion has highlighted the possibilities and arguments in favour of 
extending the equality guarantee in the sphere of the religious personal laws in 
Bangladesh with a view to reforming them accordingly. It has been noted that in 
Bangladesh any reform approach to personal laws needs to be consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution and should be assessed in the light of the overall socio- 
political context of Bangladesh. This part of the discussion will examine which type of 
reform approach is suitable and feasible considering the present socio-cultural and 
political situation of Bangladesh. It needs to be noted that those involved in debates 
relating to reforms of personal laws and women's rights in Bangladesh consist of two 
opposing groups. On the one side are the traditionalists who are hostile to any changes 
in the religious-based laws. This group advocates strict adherence to norms and laws as 
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prescribed by the religious sources and their interpretations by the classical jurists. They 
tend to view any reform attempts with extreme suspicion. In the opposite camp are 
secular and modernist women's rights activists who vociferously demand replacement 
of religious-based personal laws with a uniform and secular legal regime based on 
equality. This group mostly includes people educated in the West and NGO (foreign aid- 
based Non Government Organisations) activists. They base their claim on the relevant 
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing formal gender equality10 and argue that a 
uniform personal status code should be introduced which will be based on gender 
equality and will be applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religion or sex. In 
between these two views, one can find a middle position which although sceptical about 
gender equality as a strategic goal in a Muslim society, is nonetheless unsupportive of 
the arguments of the conservatives that Islam requires women to be kept subordinated, 
disadvantaged and secluded. The proponents of this approach argue that there is no 
alternative to finding a solution within the framework of religious personal laws. They 
argue that the crux of the problem is that women are in fact deprived of rights 
guaranteed by religious laws. The proponents of this view thus insist on the proper 
implementation of rights and duties guaranteed to women under Islamic law instead of 
bringing any substantive change to it on the basis of gender equality. For example, 
Monsoor argues that the concept of equality dominating current legal scholarship is not 
compatible with the socio-cultural realities of Bangladesh. As such, she opts for "gender 
10 Article 28 of the Constitution states: "(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race caste, sex or place of birth. (2) Women shall have equal rights with 
men in all spheres of the State and of public life. (3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, 
race, caste, sex or place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with 
regard to access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational 
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equity" instead of "gender equality". Believing that "gender equity" can be ensured by 
better enforcement of existing rights guaranteed under the Islamic law, she suggests that 
Bangladeshi women should insist that men fulfil their respective obligations of 
maintaining and protecting them. " The main argument against this approach is that the 
concept of "equity" is not expressly recognised by the Constitution. It has been noted in 
earlier discussions in Chapter IV that the Constitution of Bangladesh is vested with the 
authority for determining the validity of all existing laws. It specifically guarantees 
gender "equality" to all citizens and does not acknowledge the concept of gender 
"equity", either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, there exists a strong argument in 
feminist scholarship against the idea of women as a class in need of protection and man 
as the sole provider. It is argued that the representation of women as a "protected 
species" 12 operates against their dignified existence, reinforces subordination and 
dependence and tends to conceal the reality of discrimination and violence suffered by 
them in the home. 13 
Traditionalists versus Seculars 
One of the arguments usually put forward against the idea of secular and uniform family 
laws is that it undermines key factors of the social reality of societies such as 
institution. (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special provision in favour 
of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens". 
T Monsoor From Patriarchy to Gender Equity: Family Law and its Impact on Women in 
Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 1999) p. 57. 
12 The analogy of "protection-endangered species" was drawn by S Sobhan Legal Status of Women 
in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of law and International Affairs-BILIA, 1978). 
13 Some of these feminist arguments have been highlighted in Chapters 111, IV. Chapter 11 has 
highlighted how some of the provisions of the Shar'ia operate to reinforce dependence and 
subordination and 





Bangladesh where religion and religious beliefs form a critical point of reference for 
both individual conduct and institutional development. 14 It is argued that if the concept 
of secularity is incorporated into the sphere of family laws, it will disturb the 
equilibrium of the social fabric that has been developed over centuries j5. It is also 
argued that in the complex social and political context of Bangladesh, any attempt at 
secularisation or unification of family laws will be met with political backlash and with 
accusations of "westernisation". An example of this is the Eva Sunanda case'6 where the 
Court recommended adopting a unified marriage and divorce law for all religious 
communities. After the judgment, various fundamentalist Islamic organisations 
organised violent protest and even declared a price on the head of the presiding judge. 
As has been explained in Chapter 1, after independence, to give effect to the ideals and 
aspirations that led the nation to the liberation movement, the first Constitution of 
Bangladesh in 1972 affirmed the equal rights of women and incorporated "secularism" 
and "social justice" as two of its fundamental pillars. Unfortunately, in later years, 
between 1975 and 1990 during most of which the country was under pro-Pakistan and 
pro-Islamic military dictatorship, the Constitution underwent some major surgery and 
the principles of secularism and social justice were scrapped and replaced with 
diametrically opposed principles such as "absolute trust and faith and trust in almighty 
Allah" and adoption of Islam as state religion. '? The impact of this shift away from 
14 TM Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1996). 
15 Monsoor, n 11 above 
16 Eva Sunanda Chowdhurxv Subir Sardar (2000) 5 BLC 660-661. 
17 The process of moving away from the basic ideals of the independence war, including secularism, 
started after the brutal killing of Bangabondhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of 
Bangladesh, together with his family on 15 August 1975. After his killing the country was under 
military dictatorship for several decades. An amendment to the Constitution in 1977 removed the 
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secularism has been disastrous as it has not only tampered with the basic structure of the 
Constitution but has also strengthened the hands of Islamic fundamentalist forces who 
are opposed to any reform of traditional Islamic law. Among other things, this has also 
taken away from the religious minorities their sense of belonging and security and made 
any reform attempts by the State of the religious personal laws of the minority 
communities a truly difficult task. 
Since Islam has been declared the State religion, it has often been argued by the 
traditionalists that the idea of a secular and uniform personal status law applicable to all 
citizens is against the values and ideology of an Islamic State. To examine the validity 
of such an argument, one should take notice of two things. First, as Anisuzzaman'8 
points out, there was never any public demand to do away with secularism or to declare 
Islam as a state religion. On the contrary, it created grave concern and sparked protests 
from various citizens' groups. For example, after declaring Islam as a State religion 
through the Eighth Amendment, some women's groups challenged this amendment in 
the highest court on the ground that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution 
and with various United Nations Conventions (W. P. No. 1330 of 1988). They also argued 
that this amendment will strengthen the authority of the religious fundamentalist forces 
to police women's participation in public life and expose them to more discriminatory 
principle of secularism and replaced it with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah" by Arts 8(1), 
(]A) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Finally, in 1988, the Eighth Amendment, (The Constitution 
(Eighth Amendment) Act (1988) (Act XXX of 1988) section 2 inserted Article 2A, affirming, "[t]he 
state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in 
the republic. " 
is Anisuzzaman `Religion, Politics and the State' in Mohiuddin Ahmed (ed. ) Bangladesh Towards 
21" Century (Dhaka: CDL, 1991) pp. 5-7. 
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laws. 19 Second, it also needs to be pointed out that compared to other Muslim countries 
such as Iran and Pakistan, the official attempts to "Islamise" the legal system in 
Bangladesh have been more muted and cautious. For example, there has been no attempt 
to bring criminal laws, which are applied to all citizens irrespective of their religion and 
sex, in line with Islamic penal law by introducing traditional Islamic modes of trial and 
punishment. 20 Also, as Kabeer points out, there has been an absence of any sustained 
attack on women's rights, for example, with regard to deportment of dress. Despite 
pressure from fundamentalists, the more drastic step of declaring Bangladesh "an 
Islamic Republic", in place of its present denomination as "a People's Republic", has 
not yet been taken . 
71 Anisuzzaman222 points out that although the process of Islamisation 
has undoubtedly led to some increase in religious activities in Bangladesh at the private 
level, at the public level the process has been muted and cautious. In this regard, it 
19 The Eighth Amendment incorporated two fundamental changes in the Constitution: 1) It made 
Islam the state religion of Bangladesh and 2) It created six more permanent benches to the 1-ligh 
Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in different parts of the country in place of the 
existing on High Court Division with its permanent seat in the capital city of Dhaka. Several writ 
petitions were made challenging the validity of the amendment. Three writ petitions (C. P. No 207 of 1988, C. P. No 208 of 1988 and C. P. S. L. No 3 of 1989) were filed in the High Court Division 
challenging the validity of the amendment so far as it related to the creation of six extra benches of 
the High Court Division of Bangladesh Supreme Court, while three more writ petitions, one by Nari 
Pokkha (an women rights organisation in Bangladesh) (W. P. No. 1330 of 1988), one by Citizens' 
committee for Resisting Communalism and Autocracy and another by Mr. Shakii Das Goswami 
(W. P. No. 1177 of 1988) were filed challenging the state religion part of the impugned amendment. 
Writ petitions relating to the creation of six extra benches to the High Court Division were 
summarily rejected by the High Court Division. On appeals, the Appellate Division in its judgment 
delivered on 2 September 1989 found the relevant part of the amendment ultra i'ires of the 
Constitution and declared it invalid. For a detailed critique of the Eighth Amendment, see S Alam 
`State-Religion in Bangladesh: A Critique of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution' (1991) 4 
South Asia Journal 3, pp. 313-334. 
20 Anisuzzaman, n. 18 above. 
21 N Kabeer The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the State in Bangladesh (Discussion 
Paper No. 268) (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, October 1989). 22 
Anisuzzaman, n 17 above. 
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should also be noted that, despite all efforts, there was never any public demand to do 
away with secularism or to have a state religion. 23 
It can, therefore, be argued that in the light of the spirit of the Constitution set out in its 
preamble, 24 the fundamental principles of state policy and guarantee of gender equality 
set out in article 28, the best possible approach to legal reform in Bangladesh is to 
follow the instance of Tunisia and pursue a uniform personal status law applicable to all 
citizens irrespective of their gender and religion. The next obvious question therefore, is 
whether such a uniform personal status law is achievable given the present socio- 
political situation of Bangladesh. As has been mentioned above, viewing some of the 
provisions of Shari'a law and Hindu law as oppressive and incompatible with basic 
western values like human rights and equality, the proponents of the secularist approach 
concludes that for the sake of women's rights, personal laws must be substituted by a 
secular legal regime. They base their claim on the relevant Constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing formal gender equality and argue that a uniform family code should be 
introduced which will be based on absolute gender equality and should be applicable to 
all citizens irrespective of their religion or sex. In Bangladesh, the first draft of a 
"Unified Family Code" was proposed by Mahila Parishad, which is one of the leading 
23 According to Kabeer, this apparent lack of confidence by the State in implementing its Islamic 
goals stems from a central ambivalence in relation to prevailing notions of national identity, an 
ambivalence which relates to the significance attached by different political constituencies to the 
place of "Islamic" versus "Bengali" values in determining national identity. She further points out 
that while Islamic religion and Bengali culture are the very essence of the community's separate 
identity, its historical experience has prevented the two from being successfully moulded into a 
coherent community. For details, see Kabeer, n 20 above. 
24 The Preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh sets out clearly the philosophy, aims and 
objectives of the Constitution and describes the qualitative aspects of the state the Constitution is 
designed to achieve. The Preamble refers to the historic war of national independence and declares 
the fundamental aim of the State to be the establishment of a society in which the rule of law, 
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women's rights organisation in Bangladesh. Since then, the project of unification and 
secularisation of personal laws has been taken up with increasing enthusiasm by various 
other NGO-based activists and, as a result, a couple of other drafts of the Code were 
presented by several other organisations, such as ASK (Ain 0 Shalish Kendra) and 
BNWLA (Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association) etc. All of these drafts, 
although they have some difference in their approach to addressing the issue of 
unification and reform, nevertheless share some common feature such as banning 
polygamy and child marriages, allowing inter-faith marriages, providing equal rights in 
the area of marriage, divorce, guardianship, and inheritance etc. 
The proposals of unification and reform of personal laws however were not net with 
much enthusiasm by the government or the judiciary. The scepticism of the judiciary in 
this regard is evident from the judgments of the Supreme Court in recent years. As has 
been mentioned earlier, in Eva Sunanda Chowdhury v Subir Sardar (2000)25 which was 
a divorce case filed by a Christian woman, the High Court Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh recommended that Parliament should enact a "unified Marriage 
and Divorce Act for all the citizens to keep in pace with the modern time". `6 The court 
also ordered a copy of the judgment to be sent to the Ministry of Law. Unfortunately, 
later, acting on the petition filed by an organisation called Islamic Law Research and 
Legal Aid Bangladesh, the recommendation of High Court Division's Justice Golam 
Rabbani was expunged by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 27 
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice are ensured. For details see M Islam 
Constitutional Laws of Bangladesh (Dhaka: BILIA, 1995) p. 45. 
25 5 BLC 660-661. 
1-6 Ibid. p. 661. 
27 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court pointed out that the judgment of the High Court 
Division regarding the Uniform Civil Code was a mere recommendatory observation of Justice 
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The way forward 
The above discussion has highlighted some of the problems associated with the practical 
application of the different approaches (traditional, secular and the approach in between) 
to legal reform existing in the legal scholarship in Bangladesh. In light of the above 
discussion, it seems doubtful that a unified and secular personal law regime applicable 
to all religious communities as in Tunisia, can be achieved presently, given the socio- 
political situation in Bangladesh. In this regard it is submitted that while the ultimate 
objective of legal reform should be to ensure a uniform and equality-based personal law, 
there are different strategies that can be pursued to further the same goal. One such 
strategy can be to reform the personal laws through progressive interpretations of the 
religious sources and doctrines or judicial rjtihad, side by side facilitating feminist 
reinterpretation of religious texts. The benefits of pursuing such a strategy are three fold: 
(a) It can serve to broaden the base of support for women-friendly legal reforms and will 
be less susceptible to accusations of westernisation and political backlash; and (b) It can 
help to create the necessary atmosphere in the future for the judiciary and women 
activists to pursue a uniform personal status law based on gender equality; and (c) a 
piecemeal reform approach to religious laws can serve as a testing ground for 
developing a more substantive understanding of equality. 
Rabbani. The Appellate Division also observed that the said recommendation was unrelated to the 
matter before the High Court for disposal. For details, sec-Islamic Law Research Centre and Legal 
Aid Bangladesh v Eva Sunanda Chowdhury and others (2002) 54 DLR (AD) 168. 
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As has been discussed, judicial ijtihad has been successfully used in the past to achieve 
some important rights for women in Bangladesh and it still holds real promise in 
reforming the personal laws relating to polygamy, divorce etc to bring them in line with 
the notion of equality. 
In this regard, the thesis concluded in Chapter VII that reforms introduced in Tunisia 
and especially in Morocco (which explicitly took a reform approach consistent with the 
values and spirit of Islam) in various areas such as divorce, polygamy and custody of 
children can be followed to reform the relevant provisions of the personal status law for 
the Muslim community in Bangladesh. For example, drawing on the provisions in 
Tunisia and Morocco, the Bangladeshi Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) should 
be amended to make all divorce subject to judicial process instead of leaving it to the 
non judicial Arbitration Council. `x With regard to polygamy, it has been proposed in 
this thesis that the example of Tunisia can be followed to abolish polygamy outright. 
Alternatively, if abolishing polygamy outright proves to be difficult due to the fear of 
political backlash from religious fundamentalist groups, Bangladesh can at least follow 
the example of Morocco by making polygamy subject to the prior authorisation of the 
court. In the cases of guardianship and custody of children, the prime consideration 
should be the welfare of the child and both the guardianship and custody should be 
placed in one person. 
2 The procedure for divorce under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) and some of the 
problems that arise while complying with it have been discussed in details in Chapter 11. 
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In addition to the above, reforms should be made to the Family Courts Ordinance (1985) 
so as to make the function of the Family Courts more expeditious. As has been pointed 
out in Chapter 1, the power and function of the Family Courts under the Ordinance is an 
important issue because of the possibility they offer for a unified system of family law at 
least at the procedural level. Chapter 1 of the thesis has already highlighted some of the 
problems relating to the function of the Family Courts under the Ordinance. In this 
regard it is suggested that in light of some of the problems identified in Chapter 1, that 
the Family Courts in Bangladesh would be more effective if they were made separate 
and independent courts dealing with all family and personal matters. It has been pointed 
out that as there are at the moment no separate Family Courts and the Assistant Judges' 
Courts acting as Family Courts, because of their workload are not in a position to give 
the time or effort necessary to handle family issues, including the conduction of 
reconciliation between the parties as prescribed by the Family Courts Ordinance (1985). 
As has been suggested in Chapter I the family courts should also be given some criminal 
jurisdiction as well as civil jurisdiction so that all issues could be handled by it. In this 
regard it is suggested that the list of issues should be expanded under the present section 
5 of the Family Courts Ordinance (1985) which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Family Courts to try and dispose of suits relating to the dissolution of marriage, 
restitution of conjugal rights, dower, maintenance, and guardianship and custody. 29 
Moreover, although the Ordinance gives exclusive jurisdiction, it does not give any 
29 The above mentioned reforms relating to the functions and powers of the Family Courts under the 
Ordinance have been suggested by the participants at a two-day workshop entitled Workshop on 
Uniform Family Code and Problems of Enforcement of Equal Rights of Women in Bangladesh: 
Legal Policy and Social Dimension (September 22-23,1992), organised jointly by Bangladesh 
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grounds or guidelines on the basis of which these powers may be exercised or relief 
sought by parties30. The benefits of developing a clear set of guidelines are many. Most 
importantly this will give the Family Courts the chance to apply law progressively 
without confining them to the restrictive boundary of the various regressive rules and 
practices of the religious laws and develop the law progressively and in tune with the 
needs of modern times. 
ý 
: 
4. Concluding remarks 
The above discussion has pointed out some examples and suggestions for piecemeal 
reform to the personal laws. It has been seen that this piecemeal reform approach, 
although not based on gender equality as such, can nevertheless serve towards 
eradicating glaring inequality and disadvantages and thus contribute towards building up 
an environment for adopting a substantive understanding of equality in the future. It is 
noted that approaches to reform in a Muslim society often rely heavily on religious 
principles and interpretation of Islamic sources either to support or to reject the notion of 
gender equality. In this regard, the recent reform experience of Morocco becomes 
valuable as it shows that the legal position of women can be substantially improved 
within the framework of Islam. Foregoing discussions also illustrate the clash of 
approaches relating to the issue of personal law reform in Bangladesh where patriarchal 
attitudes and cultural traditions disguised as religious norms are seen to be in conflict 
with the constitutional guarantee of equality between the sexes. Although orthodox 




Islamic views may be appearing as a strong force militating against change to the 
personal laws at present, countervailing forces of equality and secularism are also 
becoming potent as a result of social and economic transformation in Bangladesh. In this 
context, the progressive reforms in Tunisia and Morocco can serve as examples for 
Bangladesh for similar initiatives which in the long run may serve as a stepping stone 
towards replacing the prevailing patriarchal practices guised as religious norms and 
towards developing a substantive understanding of equality. 
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